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ABSTRACT
The Social Rule Theory of Law
(February 1982)
Brian McCalla Miller, B.A., New York University,
M.A., University of Massachusetts,
J.D., Harvard Law School,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Gareth Matthews
The principal elements of H. L. A. Hart's social
rule theory of law in The Concept of Law are developed
and defended and Hart's critique of the coercive orders
theory is examined and criticized. Legal systems are
characterized as systems of conventional social rules.
The existence of certain "secondary" rules of recognition,
change, and adjudication as social rules is shown to be a
necessary condition for the existence of a legal system.
The social and conventional nature of legal norms is
accounted for by the requirement that secondary rules be
social rules. The fundamental concepts of legal validity
and legal obligation are explained by such secondary rules
without the introduction of any substantive moral con-
siderations .
The existence of certain attitudes toward the use
of a norm as a standard of conduct as a condition of the
V
6xistence of that norm as a social rule is examined. It
is argued that Hart's analysis of social rules cannot
explain certain common attitudes towards legal norms and
must be made more complex in order to account for the
attitudes of persons, such as legal professionals, who
regard legal norms as binding standards but who may not
regard those standards as desirable or preferred patterns
of behavior.
A number of criticisms of the social rule theory are
considered and rejected. Most of these criticisms attempt
to show that the identification of legal norms requires
the introduction of substantive moral considerations.
Dworkin's arguments that the social rule theory cannot
account for certain fundamental aspects of a legal system
and the argument that a legal system has certain essential
functions the realization of which requires that legal
norms have a certain minimum moral content are rejected.
Finally, it is argued that the social rule theory is
neutral with respect to the question whether there is a
moral obligation to obey the law.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This study will examine the theory of law developed
by H. L. A. Hart in The Concept of Law .^ Although The
Concept of Law was originally published some twenty years
ago, it has been the subject of continuing philosophical
2interest. This continuing interest attests to the sig-
nificance of the issues Hart addresses and pays tribute to
the lasting contribution he has made to the discussion of
those issues. The seminal character of The Concept of
Law
,
the fact that it contains fundamentally sound in-
sights about the nature of law and legal systems even in
cases where the supporting arguments are flawed, and the
fact that Hart's critics and commentators have failed in
certain cases to grasp or appreciate key features of the
theories presented are the justification of the enterprise
undertaken in this dissertation.
Hart's goal is to analyze the concepts of law and
legal system. He seeks to show that laws are norms or
rules that provide, among other things, that certain types
of behavior are prohibited, permitted, or obligatory. How-
ever, Hart also seeks to show that the normativity of law
does not derive from morality. Rather, the existence of
legal norms depends entirely upon certain social facts
1
2that need not have moral significance. In particular, a
legal norm is a rule that is identified under a social
rule of recognition as a valid rule of a particular group
of persons. Social rules, including rules of recognition,
are rules that apply to the members of a particular group
by virtue of the fact that certain favorable attitudes and
practices regarding use of those rules as standards in
that group exist among at least some of the memb»ers of the
group. In general. Hart maintains that social rules of
recognition and the rules validated under such social
rules need not embody any substantive moral criteria.
Thus, the identification of law and the legally obligatory
does not depend upon morality and what is morally obliga-
tory.
Although Hart's analysis of law and legal obligation
in terms of social rules will be defended as fundamentally
correct, we will reject some of the critical claims that
Hart relies on as the background against which he develops
his constructive theory. Thus, in the next chapter we
will examine Hart's criticism of the "coercive orders
theory" of law, according to which laws are general orders
backed by threats given by one who is habitually obeyed
but who habitually obeys no one. Although we will agree
with Hart that the coercive orders theory provides an
inadequate theory of law in certain respects, we will
reject Hart's principal line of criticism. In particular.
3rsjGct the thesis that the coercive orders theory
cannot account for rules that confer powers even if it can
account for rules that impose duties. Consequently, we
will question whether it is necessary under the coercive
orders theory to postulate the notion of habitual obedi-
ence in order to account for certain salient features of
a legal system, such as the continuity of law in a legal
system through successive regimes.
We will see in Chapter III that the distinction
between habitual behavior and rule following is a useful
heuristic device for developing the social rule theory,
even though it is not a sound basis for criticizing the
coercive orders theory. However, this distinction does
not yield an account of the social normativity of law that
is rich enough to account for the variety of attitudes
that people who recognize a particular rule as setting a
standard may have toward that rule. In Chapter V, it
will be argued that Hart's theory cannot distinguish
between the person who actively supports and seeks to
maintain certain rules as standards for appraising conduct
and the person who recognizes that those rules are so used
and identifies those rules as the rules that are consid-
ered to be appropriate for use in appraising conduct but
who is indifferent or hostile toward maintaining those
rules as the rules applicable to his group. We will see
that the latter attitude is characteristic of lawyers and
4oth.6irs who ha.v6 a profossiona.! intarast in idantifying
laws and advising paopla as to thair rights and dutias
undar a systam of rulas.
In ganaral, howavar, Hart's social rula thaory will
ba dafandad as a fundamantally corract analysis of law
and lagal sys tarns
. In Chaptars IV and VI, various axpress
or impliad criticisms of tha social rula thaory will ba
considarad and rajactad. Soma of thasa criticisms focus
on cartain logical characteristics of a lagal systam and
Hart's thaory. Thus, wa will dafand Hart against tha
claim that ha raducas laws to complaxas of behavior or
other social phenomena. In addition, the thesis that it
is logically possible for a single legal system to have
valid laws that are not mutually satisfiable will be
defended.
Certain other criticisms of Hart's theory have in
common the attempt to show that legal normativity depends
in some essential way on moral considerations. Thus,
Ronald Dworkin argues that judges can always decide cases,
including controversial cases, in accordance with extant
legal material, and that the social rule theory cannot
account for this fact because the identification of extant
law in such a case requires consideration of what is mor-
ally required and not of what is required according to a
social consensus. We will see in our consideration of
Dworkin in Chapter IV that this argument and related
5arguments can be met without introducing substantive moral
considerations into the theory of law. Similarly, the
argument considered in Chapter VI, according to which a
legal system has an essential function that either is
itself moral in nature or is realizable only if certain
moral criteria are satisfied, will be rejected. The posi-
*^®fsnded in this study is that legal systems are
systems of con-ventional norms that may, but need not,
coincide with or incorporate moral criteria. Thus,
laws may, but need not, state moral require-
ments and the constitutive rules of a legal system may,
but need not, provide that the substantive rules of the
system must satisfy certain moral criteria.
The social rule theory of law leaves the question
of political obligation open, as we will see in Ch^lpter
VII. That is, nothing in the analysis of law and legal
systems provided by the social rule theory entails that
there is a prima facie moral obligation to obey the laws
of the particular country in which one resides or is pre-
sent. Although a skeptical answer to the question of
political obligation will not be defended in this study,
the fact that the social rule theory of law leaves the
question open will be taken as a virtue, not a defect.
CHAPTER I I
THE COERCIVE ORDERS THEORY OF LAW
Hart's Version of the Coercive Orders Theory
Before presenting his own theory of law in The Con-
cept of Law
,
Hart develops and criticizes an account of
law based on Austin's theory.^ Although Hart maintains
that his version of Austin's theory conforms substantially
to the positions actually held by Austin, he acknowledges
that his statement of the theory probably diverges from
Austin's doctrine at certain points. However, Hart's
goal is not to reconstruct and analyze Austin's theory as
such, but to demonstrate that a theory like Austin's in
key respects is an inadequate account of law and legal
systems and that insights into a more adequate theory can
be gleaned from the shortcomings of the Austinian theory.
Consistent with this goal. Hart ignores entirely certain
theories, such as those of Hobbes and Bentham, that share
fundamental assumptions with Austin's theory.
Since the principal concern of this dissertation is
the investigation of Hart's theory, it is not necessary to
evaluate the faithfulness of Hart's version of Austin's
theory, its relation to other similar theories, or the
persuasiveness of his criticisms as they apply to those
theories. Rather, the purpose in this chapter is to
6
7understand Hart's version of Austin's theory and his
criticisms of that theory in order to understand better
the constructive theory that he offers as a solution to
the problems he finds in the Austinian account. The
thesis of this chapter is that some of Hart's criticisms,
as well as other criticisms not developed by Hart, appear
to be decisive objections to the Austinian theory. Other
criticisms advanced by Hart are less persuasive, but an
examination of Hart's arguments will aid significantly in
understanding Hart's theory. Some of the arguments set
out here will be examined more carefully in the next chap-
ter, since they lead directly into Hart's theory.
Hart's version of Austin's theory can be stated
briefly. According to Hart, Austin maintains that laws
are "general orders backed by threats given by one gener-
3
ally obeyed." This claim about law is the fundamental
thesis of what for convenience may be referred to as the
command theory or the coercive orders theory of law.
Hart prefers to use the term "coercive orders" rather
than the term "command" for two reasons. First, he argues
that since the term "command" may be applicable in circum-
stances where there is no patent or latent threat of harm
in the event of disobedience, it fails to reflect the
thesis that laws are imperatives backed by threats of
harm. Hart cites as an example the commands of a holy
man to his disciples. Secondly, Hart argues that the
8term "command" implies that the issuer has authority over
the subjects to whom the command is addressed. Since the
Austinian theory is intended to explain legal authority,
among other things, use of a concept that arguably
includes the concept of authority presupposes an under-
standing of what it is meant to explain.
The latter point focuses on the fact that the coer-
cive orders theory offers a reductive analysis of law and
legal rules. As Hart explains, the goal of the Austinian
theory is to employ seemingly simple, unproblem.atic ele-
ments such as commands or orders and threats of harm to
4build up to the idea of law. However, the theory should
not be confused with other theories that focus on the
role of sanctions in a legal system. For example,
although the concept of sanctions or threats of harm is
central to the coercive orders theory, the theory does
not claim that an assertion of a legal duty to perform
some act is equivalent to a prediction that the obligor
will suffer the imposition of a sanction for failing to
perform that act. In contrast, some legal theorists,
such as Holmes, have maintained the view that the "proph-
ecies of what courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what ... is meant by the law ...."
According to this position, which is characteristic of
legal realism, "the notion of legal duty . . . means to a
bad man . . . mainly, and in the first place, a prophecy
9that if he does certain things he will be subjected to
disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or com-
pulsory payment of money.
The coercive orders theory does not analyze laws as
predictions. Rather, assertions of legal obligation, or
assertions of obligation generally, are treated as direc -
tives . For present purposes, we can understand a direc-
tive to be an expression that " formulate [s ] for someone a
possible course of action" and which is "capable of
guiding those to whom it applies."^ What distinguishes
the directives involved in the coercive orders analysis
of assertions of obligation is that they are "supported
7
only by threats." A coercive order provides its
addressees with a reason for acting in accordance with
the course of conduct set forth in the directive, but
only to the extent that the addressees desire to avoid
the imposition of the sanctions that are threatened for
noncompliance. The analysis specifically excludes the
idea that the issuer of a coercive order has a right to
the obedience of the addressees or that the addressees
have a duty to obey the directive, or more generally that
the issuer of the order is authorized to issue the direc-
tive.® In Kelsenian terms, the relationship between
issuer and addressee is not interpreted "normatively"
;
that is, the relationship is not interpreted as involving
"obligations, authorizations, rights, etc. constituted
10
by objectively valid norms.” Rather, the relationship
is interpreted as a "power relation”; that is, as a
"relation between commanding and obeying or disobeying
human beings." The reason for excluding the "normative"
interpretation from the coercive orders theory is simple:
the point of the analysis is to explain how assertions
about one's legal obligations are reducible without resi-
due to directives issued in the context of appropriate
power relationships.
Hart argues that in order to distinguish laws from
the directives issued by the highwayman to his victim,
several complicating elements must be introduced into
the coercive orders theory. First, coercive orders which
are laws are doubly general. They specify general types
of conduct which are prohibited or mandated and they
apply to a general class of persons. Secondly, laws are
distinguished from the orders of the gurjnan by the fact
that the gunman has only temporary "ascendency or superi-
ority" over his victim, so that his orders are effective
directives only to the extent that the threatened harm is
imminent, whereas laws have a "standing" or "persistent"
character. Under the coercive orders theory. Hart
attributes the persistence of law to the existence of a
"general belief on the part of those to whom the general
orders apply that disobedience is likely to be followed
by the execution of the threat not only on the first
11
promulgation of the order, but continuously until the
order is withdrawn or cancelled. Thirdly, laws,
unlike the orders of a gunman, not only are believed
generally to be continuously enforced but are habitually
obeyed by most people. As we will see. Hart's claim that
the coercive orders theory must postulate a general habit
of obedience is erroneous although it helps us to under-
stand his constructive theory.
Finally, Hart argues that in order for the coercive
orders theory to accommodate the fact that "the legal
system of a modern state is characterized by a certain
kind of supremacy within its territory and independence
of other systems . .
.
, " the fundamental thesis that laws
are general orders backed by threats given by one who is
generally obeyed must be augmented by an account of the
person who gives the orders. Hart suggests that accord-
ing to the coercive orders theory the supremacy and
independence of a legal system are explained in terms of
the supremacy and independence of a source of coercive
orders. A supreme and independent source of coercive
orders, viz., a sovereign, is a person or entity whose
orders backed by threats are habitually obeyed by others,
but who does not habitually obey the orders of others.
In short, the coercive orders theory maintains that "the
laws of any country will be the general rules backed by
threats which are issued either by the sovereign or
12
subordinat0 s in obediBncs to tho sovoroign.
It may be noted in defense of the integrity of Kart's
version of Austin's theory that Hart's characterization
generally follows the following synopsis given by Austin:
[T]he superiority which is styled sover-
eignty, and the independent political
society which sovereignty implies, is
distinguished from other superiority and
from other society, by the following
marks or characters.--!. The bulk of the
given society are in a habit of obedience
or submission to a determinate and common
superior: let that common superior be a
certain body or aggregate of individual
persons. 2. That certain individual, or
that certain body of individuals, is not in
a habit of obedience to a determinate human
superior
.
However, the principal concern here is to develop an
understanding of Hart's theory by considering his criti-
cisms of Austin, rather than to defend the coercive
orders theory. As will be seen, many key criticisms cen-
ter on the necessity and role in a legal system of rules
that confer powers. Some aspects of Hart's arguments
that the coercive orders theory is unable to accommodate
such laws will be addressed in this chapter, while other
aspects will be dealt with in the next chapter in con-
sidering Hart's theory.
Hart's Criticisms of the
Coercive Orders Theory
Hart's first criticism of the coercive orders theory
is that there is a kind of law that cannot be perspicu-
13
ously analyzed as a sanction-supported directive, namely,
laws that appear to confer powers on individuals or
officials rather than to impose requirements to perform
or forbear an act. For example, there are laws that
enable individuals to make contracts or to devise property.
Other laws enable officials to adjudicate disputes or to
enact new laws. Although Hart does not clearly acknow-
ledge the fact, these laws are directives at least inas-
much as they set forth certain conduct as a model
. For
example, certain conduct is "required" in order to make
a contract, or to convey land, or to devise property, or
to pass legislation. Thus, in order to make an effective
testamentary transfer in a particular jurisdiction, it
may be necessary that the testator's will be reduced to
a written form signed by the testator and witnessed by
two persons. If the testator fails to conform to these
requirements, and if these requirements are enforced,
then the testator's property will be distributed in
accordance with the laws of intestate succession and not
in accordance with the distribution specified in his
will. If the interests given to the testator's heirs
under the laws of intestate succession are not identical
to the interests allocated to the devisees specified in
his will, and if the testator intended the persons named
in the will to receive the property allocated to them
under the will, then distribution of the testator's prop-
14
erty to his heirs will prevent the realization of the
distribution intended by the testator.
However, the conduct required, for example, to make
testamentary dispositions of property, is not "required"
in the sense that the addressees are subject to sanctions
for failure to conform to the model. Or so Hart argues,
claiming that the legal "nullity" that results from non-
conformance with such a law is not a sanction for noncon-
formance and that such laws are not segments of more
complex laws that are analyzable as directives supported
by conventional sanctions. Both of these claims and the
persuasiveness of this criticism generally will be ques-
tioned below.
Hart's second criticism is that an "order backed by
threats is essentially the expression of a wish that
others should do or abstain from doing certain things.
The argument appears to be grounded in the fact that
coercive orders are other-directed because it is not
possible to threaten oneself. In contrast, laws are
apparently not necessarily other-regarding, since it
appears that the legislators who originate a particular
law may themselves be subject to it. Given the possibil-
ity, and actual frequency, of laws that apply to the
lawmakers as well as to nonlawmakers, the coercive orders
theory must explain how the model of coercive orders is
an appropriate one.
15
Hart plausibly maintains that the viability of the
coercive orders theory in light of this apparent differ-
ence between laws and orders backed by threats depends
upon distinguishing between the lawmaker as the issuer
of a directive and the lawmaker as the addressee who is
ordered to comply with the directive. However, this
distinction requires the ability to identify conduct in
an official capacity whereby a person is authorized to
issue orders and conduct of the same person in an unoffi-
cial capacity as an addressee of those orders. Hart
correctly believes that this distinction can be made
only in terms of rules that confer powers. That is, a
person has authority to legislate by virtue of a rule
that empowers him to formulate legal rules. Since Hart
concedes that by distinguishing between an individual's
capacity as lawmaker and his capacity as subject the
objection based on the other-regarding character of
coercive orders can be avoided, this objection is per-
suasive only if the argument that power-conferring rules
cannot be analyzed as coercive orders is persuasive.
Consequently, this second argument ultimately rests on
the soundness of the first argument and Hart's other
arguments that the coercive orders theory cannot account
for power-conferring rules
.
Hart's third criticism of the Austinian model does
not turn on the peculiarties of power-conferring rules.
16
He argues that if laws are orders issued by a sovereign
or his delegates then all laws originate in datable acts
of order-giving. However, at least some laws originate
in customary social practices. Since at least some
customs lack the force of law, such as the custom in
American society of giving gifts on birthdays, it does
not suffice to postulate a general order according to
which the sovereign commands obedience to all custom.
Thus, it is necessary to identify orders concerning each
custom that is recognized as law. However, with respect
to those customs which are laws, there often appears to
be no act of order-giving whereby the custom is originally
recognized as a legal rule. Furthermore, even in cases
where there is some official act whereby a customary
practice is given legal recognition, it seems to be erro-
neous to maintain that the practice did not become law
until it was recognized by some official. In fact, when
courts apply customary practices in cases before them
they appear to consider themselves to be enforcing extant
lav/ rather than creating new laws. For example, in State
ex rel . Thornton v. Hay
,
the court held that although
private ownership of littoral property extended to the
high water mark, there was a public right of passage over
dry sand areas which had been acquired by customary usage.
The court stated:
Because so much of our law is the product
17
of legislation, we sometimes lose sight
of the importance of custom as a source
of law in our society. It seems particu-
larly appropriate in the case at bar to
look at ancient and accepted custom in
this state as the source of a rule of law.
The rule in this case, based upon custom,
is salutary in confirming a public right,
and at the same time it takes from no man
anything which he has had a legitimate rea-
son to regard as exclusively his.^^
Admittedly, a court's assertion that it is merely enforc-
ing extant law that has its origin in custom rather than
legislating ^ novo may carry little weight in support
of the view that the act of recognition of the legal
status of a particular custom by a court is not itself
an act of order-giving of the sort required by the coer-
cive orders theory. After all, the political system
may purport to be a representative democracy in the sense
that the individuals who are authorized to legislate are
chosen by the governed whereas members of the judiciary
are not so chosen. In such a system, judges may want to
conceal their legislative functions.
Nevertheless, the actual practice of judges as
exemplified by Thornton v. Hay is at least a datum to be
explained by the coercive orders theory in its undertaking
to identify particular acts of order-giving: since recog-
nition of custom by courts is the most likely candidate of
an order-giving act, the theory must explain the widely
held view that courts in fact are enforcing extant legal
rules in such cases. It appears to be necessary to
18
hypothesize some sort of antecedent "tacit" order by the
sovereign that is implemented by the court. If this
hypothesis makes the theory too implausible, and if the
idea that custom becomes law by virtue of the court'
s
act of recognition is accepted, it is nevertheless still
necessary to hypothesize a "tacit" order of the sover-
eign. This conclusion follows from the assumption that
the courts are subordinate to the sovereign, and that the
acts of the court constitute laws, that is, orders of the
sovereign, only if the sovereign has "tacitly" ordered
what the court has ordered by not intervening and pre-
19
empting the court.
In either case it is necessary to give some sense to
the idea of a tacit order. Hart maintains that "[t]he main
objection to the use of the idea of tacit expressions of
the sovereign's will to explain the legal status of custom
is that, in any modern state, it is rarely possible to as-
cribe such knowledge, consideration and decision not to in-
terfere to the 'sovereign,' whether we identify the sover-
20
eign with the supreme legislature or the electorate."
In other words, it would be difficult in most cases to
establish that the nonaction of the legislative body
constitutes the expression of a desire that certain
individuals conform their behavior to a particular model.
Hart's objection is based on the fact that it is diffi-
cult to ascertain whether the sovereign expressed any
19
will at all and if so what the sovereign willed in cases
of "tacit" orders.
The notion of a tacit order is required by the coer-
orders theory because under the theory every law is
a coercive order expressing the unitary psychological
will of the sovereign. Laws having their source in cus-
tomary practices are not the only laws that appear not
to be expressions of the will of the sovereign. As we
will see, laws originally promulgated by a predecessor
sovereign and never reaffirmed by subsequent sovereigns
frequently continue to exist as current laws despite
the fact that they appear not to express the will of the
current sovereign. Furthermore, laws adopted by legis-
lative bodies typically are not expressive of any uni-
tary psychological will. Thus, a legislature could enact
a law by following certain procedures, compliance with
which is a sufficient condition for legislating, without
willing the content of the law. For example, the legis-
lators could have been bribed to vote for a particular
bill without having any knowledge of its contents. In
general, the steps necessary to enact legislation could
have been taken by any particular legislator because he
desired the addressees to engage in the specfied behavior,
or because he wanted people to conform to some other
behavior specified in another bill, and mistook the one
enacted for the one he wanted enacted, and so on, or for
20
no reason at all. in contrast, the coercive orders theory
appears to postulate in the case of every law a unitary
sovereign will that certain models of conduct be followed,
despite the fact that many laws appear to have been cre-
ated without the occurrence of the psychological events
required by the theory.
The fact that it appears to be possible for orders
to be issued under circumstances which are such that the
content of the order does not express the will of the
issuer may suggest that orders and laws are not dissimilar
in their relationship to acts of will. That is, just as
a law passed by a legislature does not express any actual
psychological will, so the orders issued by an intoxicated
sovereign might not express the actual psychological will
of the issuer. However, these cases appear to differ
precisely in the respect we have been focusing on;
namely, in order to interpret what the intoxicated sover-
eign issued as an order, it seems to be necessary to pre-
suppose that it expresses the sovereign's will. However,
in order to interpret what the legislature enacted as a
law, it is not necessary to assume that it expresses any
will at all.
We will return later to the question of what beliefs,
desires, or other psychological states, if any, must exist
in a society in order to have a legal system. Although it
will be important to establish that the existence of a
21
legal system depends upon at least some people in society
having favorable attitudes towards conformity with at
least some directives, the point remains that the coer-
cive orders theory erroneously requires that there be a
psychological will with respect to every law.^^
In his fourth argument, Hart returns to his concern
about the role of empowering rules and the alleged in-
ability of the coercive orders theory to account for them.
He argues that the model of law according to which there
is a legal system if there is a group of persons who
habitually obey the orders backed by threats of an indi-
vidual who habitually obeys no one cannot account for
the continuity of authority to make law that is possessed
by successive legislators. The idea that there must be
habitual obedience to the sovereign was introduced into
the coercive orders theory by Hart in an effort to dis-
tinguish coercive directives that qualify as laws from
the coercive orders of a gunman. Since a legal system
displays a "relatively enduring and settled character,"
whereas the gunman situation represents "mere temporary
ascendancy of one person over another," Hart suggests
that a legal system is distinguishable under the coercive
orders theory by virtue of the habitual nature of obedi-
ence. The notion that obedience in the case of con-
formity to legal directives is habitual establishes the
settled nature and continuity of a legal system without
22
reintroducing elements that the coercive orders analysis
seeks to eliminate. Thus, the settled and enduring nature
of a legal system, as manifested in the fact that each of
the sovereign's orders is recognized as law immediately,
is not attributed to a right or authority of the sovereign
to make law, but to the fact that his orders are habitu-
ally obeyed.
Hart is challenging the coercive orders theory to
explain how in the structurally simple and familiar situ-
ation in which a sovereign, Rex I, is succeeded by another
sovereign, Rex II, the orders or directives issued by Rex
II can be law from the beginning of Rex II 's reign. As
Hart understands it, the "habit of obedience" that the
coercive orders theory must hypothesize in order to dis-
tinguish the settled character of a legal system from
the temporary regime of a gunman is a "personal relation-
ship between each subject and Rex." Because the habit
of obedience is a personal relationship between sovereign
and subject. Hart argues that the fact that Rex I is
habitually obeyed provides no reason for thinking that
Rex I's successor, Rex II, will also be habitually obeyed.
Thus, until it is demonstrated that the subjects will
habitually obey Rex II 's coercive directives, Rex II 's
orders are not laws
,
but are analytically equivalent to
the orders of a mere gunman. The result follows because
an order is not a law unless its issuer, de re, is habitu-
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ally obeyed. Rex II cannot be habitually obeyed until he
has for some period of time successfully issued orders
that have been generally obeyed.
Hart argues that the only explanation of the fact
that there is continuity in a legal system (that is, that
successive legislators do succeed in having their enacted
directives function as laws from the outset) is that the
successors have a right to succeed and a right to make
laws. Moreover, Hart argues that there are rights of the
kind required if and only if there are rules specifying
the conditions of succession and the manner of lawmaking.
As Hart puts it: under the coercive orders model "there
were no rules, and so no rights or titles, and hence a
fortiori no right or title to succeed: there were just
the facts that orders were given by Rex I, and his orders
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were habitually obeyed." However, in Hart's view the
habit of obeying Rex I cannot account for continuity in
the legal system because a habit of obeying Rex I fails
to confer any right on Rex II to give orders and because
a habit of obeying Rex I gives us no reason to suppose
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that the orders of Rex II will in fact be obeyed.
Hart's argument that continuity in a legal system
cannot be explained on the basis of habits of obedience
to a particular person seems correct. However, the argu-
ment raises several related questions which will be
addressed in the next chapter. First, we may question
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whether the concept of habitual obedience is consistent
since the fact that a person is obeying seems to preclude
his acting habitually. Further, it may be questioned
whether the idea of habits of obedience is a necessary
component of the coercive orders theory. If the coercive
orders theory need not postulate habits of obedience,
then it would analyze continuity in terms of rules of
succession, just as Hart suggests. However, since rules
of succession are rules that empower an individual or
group of individuals to legislate and enforce laws, this
approach raises the point Hart is most insistent upon,
but which remains doubtful, namely, that the coercive
orders theory cannot account for rules that confer powers.
Hart's fifth argument derives from an amalgam of
his thesis that the coercive orders theory cannot account
for rules of the power-conferring kind and the thesis
that, as a will theory, the coercive orders theory must
postulate in certain instances the existence of tacit
orders . Hart argues that the coercive orders theory can-
not adequately explain the persistence of law in a typi-
cal legal system. For example, even if a particular
criminal statute promulgated by Rex I to his subjects can
be conceived as an order backed by threats, it is diffi-
cult to conceive how it is an order of any kind when it
is enforced some time later in Rex IX 's regime against
subjects none of whom existed at the time Rex I issued
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the order. Hart's diagnosis is the now familiar one that
what is needed is a rule of the sort that confers powers,
that the coercive orders theory cannot account for
such rules. As he puts it, what is needed is:
. .
. the notion of currently accepted funda-
mental rules specifying a class or line of
persons whose word is to constitute a stan-
dard of behavior for the society, i.e., who
have the right to legislate. Such a rule,
though it must exist now, may in a sense be
timeless in its reference: it may not only
look forward and refer to the legislative
operation of a future legislator but it may
also look back and refer to the operations
of a past one .26
Although Hart's argument is based on a questionable
view about the inability of the coercive orders theory to
account in any respect for the kind of rules needed to
explain the persistence of law, his argument nonetheless
contains a core criticism that is valid. The problem of
explaining persistence arises because the relationship
involved in issuing a coercive order is directed to par-
ticular individuals who are coerced by the issuer. As
we will see below, although Hart's arguments about con-
tinuity are vulnerable to the argument that Rex I may
order his subjects to obey his successors, whoever they
may be, such an order is still an order to his present
subjects. What seems to be needed is the reiteration of
the relevant order by the current sovereign to the current
subject. The reiterated order could be a directive to
engage in particular specified conduct or it could be an
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order to engage in whatever conduct was directed by some
past line of sovereigns. The shortcoming of the coercive
orders theory, as Hart correctly perceives, is that it
must take one of two unacceptable approaches. On the
one hand, laws issued to earlier subjects can be treated
merely as sources of law, rather than as laws, which
become law only if actually enforced. The enforcement
activities therefore would constitute the requisite act
of ordering the present subjects. The defect of this
approach is that it fails to accord with the fact that
courts generally are considered to be applying extant law
and not legislating (even if from restricted sources), a
point discussed above in connection with Hart’s argument
about the need under the coercive orders theory to iden-
tify particular order-giving events. On the other hand,
the necessity that directives be issued to the present
subjects in order to constitute coercive orders might be
provided for by postulating a tacit order by the current
sovereign to present subjects to obey particular prior
orders. Again, the defects of this approach were pointed
out above
.
Hart's final argument is based on the fact that
there appear to be various legal limitations on the sov-
ereign legislator in many legal systems. For example,
there may be constitutional provisions that forbid the
enactment of certain kinds of legal rules. These are
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familiar phenomena that a theory of law must explain.
However, under the coercive orders theory, there can be
no legal limits on the sovereign. There can be no legal
because a legal limitation on the sovereign's
power (i.e., a law limiting the sovereign) is, according
to the theory, an order of an entity habitually obeyed by
the addressees. However, under the theory, the sovereign
by definition habitually obeys no one. Therefore, there
can be no such law.
Hart argues that the only recourse open to the coer-
cive orders theory is to look for an underlying, unlimited
sovereign that will replace the apparent sovereign in the
account of the legal system. For example, rather than
supposing that an elected legislature is sovereign, it is
necessary to maintain that the electorate is sovereign
and imposes limits on the legislature's power to legis-
late. However, Hart argues that the coercive orders
theory cannot carry out this program for in order to do
so it is necessary to differentiate the electorate acting
in a sovereign capacity from the electorate as the ad-
dressee of its own orders. However, this distinction
in roles can be made only by reference to rules that
authorize lawmaking, which Hart argues are outside the
coercive orders model.
This criticism follows the familiar pattern that
was noted in our discussion of Hart's other criticisms.
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First, Hart argues that if laws are coercive orders of
the sovereign, then in order to be subject to legal lim-
itations the sovereign must give orders to himself, which
reguires distinguishing between himself as law—giver and
himself as subject. However, Hart argues that this dis-
tinction can be made only by means of power-conferring
rules, which Hart has argued are beyond the ability of
the coercive orders theory to provide for. Thus, the
coercive orders theory must seek to identify an under-
lying sovereign--a "sovereign behind the legislature"^®
that issues orders to and thereby legally limits the
apparent sovereign. This underlying sovereign in the
case of a democratic political system is the electorate,
which by virtue of its direct or indirect power to elect
legislators, executives, and adjudicators has the ability
to issue and enforce orders indirectly through its agents.
However, postulating such a role for the electorate merely
raises at another level the need to distinguish the elec-
torate as the issuer of an order and the electorate as
subject of the order. Moreover, this solution requires
the questionable notion of a tacit order, since in order
for the orders enacted and enforced by the sovereign
electorate's agents to constitute orders of the sovereign
it must be supposed that these orders were tacitly issued
by the electorate by the electorate's not intervening.
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Powers under the Coercive Orders Theory
As we have seen, many of Hart's criticisms are based
on the distinction between laws that appear to impose
duties and those that appear to confer powers and on the
argument that even if the former fit the model of coer-
cive orders, the latter do not and are not reducible to
the former.
Hart does not contend that all legal material that
is typically not expressed in imperative form is a coun-
terexample to the coercive orders model. Certain "laws"
that are not directive in form may be analyzed as seg-
ments of more complex laws that are directive in form.
For example, a law may provide a definition of a term
used in a directtive or may expand or narrow the apparent
scope of a directive. The supplementation of a directive
by other legal material can be illustrated in the case of
the rule discussed earlier regarding the formal require-
ments for making valid testamentary instruments. The
legislature may have provided by statute or a court may
have held in a decision that where a testamentary instru-
ment is witnessed by a person who is not a supernumerary
and who either has a beneficial interest under the in-
strument or is related in certain specified ways to a
person who has such an interest, then either the instru-
ment is ineffective for purposes of making a testamentary
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disposition because it has not been properly witnessed or
the instrument is effective for purposes of making testa-
mentary dispositions to all persons under the instrument
except the interested witness. Further, it may have been
held that the interest that an attorney who is appointed
in the will as the legal representative of the testator's
estate has in collecting legal fees from the estate prop-
is not a beneficial interest so that such an attorney
may be an essential witness to a will without the will's
being invalidated or having the interest of the attorney
purged from it. The former "law" supplements the direc-
tive regarding the making of a will by specifying the
characteristics of persons who qualify as witnesses for
purposes of making an enforceable will (e.g., they must
be disinterested) or providing for varying degrees of
enforceability depending upon the compliance with the
specified formalities (e.g., a will witnessed by an
interested person is enforceable but only with respect
to dispositions to disinterested persons). The second
"law" also supplements the directive regarding the making
of a will by spelling out what constitutes an "interested
witness." Many, if not most, legal statements have the
form of these examples. Although they are not directive
in form, they supplement statements that are directive,
and so do not seem to be persuasive counterexamples to
the coercive orders analysis.
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Hart is not concerned about the analysis of legal
material that spells out the scope of a straightforward
directive. Rather, he focuses on rules that authorize
persons to make general rules (for example, constitutive
rules of a legislature), or rules that enable persons to
create particular legal obligations (for example, rules
governing the formation of contracts or the conveyance
of property), or rules whereby other rules are recognized
as rules of the system. Hart's argument is that in many
cases these rules do not appear to be orders backed by
threats
.
As mentioned earlier. Hart discusses and rejects two
arguments intended to demonstrate that power-conferring
rules do come within the coercive orders model. The first
argument is that just as duty-imposing laws are backed by
the sanction of punishment or seizure of property if one
does not comply with the directive to perform or refrain
from certain conduct, so power-conferring laws are backed
by the sanction of nullity if one does not comply with
the directive to perform or refrain from the conduct
required in order to accomplish certain transactions.
The second argument is that all laws, including those
that fall under the categories of laws imposing duties
on citizens and laws conferring powers on citizens, are
in fact orders addressed to officials directing them to
apply sanctions in the event certain conduct occurs or
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fails to occur.
Hart's criticism of the first argument is neither
clear nor persuasive. He states:
... [W]e can distinguish clearly the rule
Prohibiting certain behaviour from the pro-
vision for penalties to be exacted if the
rule is broken, and suppose the first to
exist without the latter. ... But we can-
not logically make such a distinction
between the rule requiring compliance with
certain conditions, e.g., attestation for
a valid will, and the so-called sanction of
"nullity." Inthis case, if failure to
comply with this essential condition did
not entail nullity, the rule itself could
not be intelligibly said to exist without
sanctions even as a non-legal rule. 2
9
In part. Hart's argument appears to be that nullity cannot
be considered to be a sanction because sanctions are only
contingent consequences of noncompliance with a duty-
imposing directive whereas nullity is a necessary conse-
quence of noncompliance with a directive specifying how a
power must be exercised in order to be legally effective.
One difficulty with Hart's argument is that even if it
is true that nullity is a necessary consequence of non-
compliance with an empowering rule, whereas punishment or
other undesirable occurrences are only contingent conse-
quences of noncompliance with a duty-imposing rule. Hart
has not given us an argument that sanctions must be con-
tingent consequences. Furthermore, there is some ground
for arguing that necessary consequences may be considered
to be sanctions. Sanctions may be viewed as generally
33
undesirable circumstances that are applied to an individ-
ual upon the occurrence of some condition. To the extent
that these undesirable consequences are applied as a
result of the individual
’ s failure to comply with the
requirements of some directive, they function as general
or specific deterrents to such noncompliance. In this
regard, the function of deterring noncompliance occurs
whether the undesirable consequences occur necessarily
or contingently.
Hart might justifiably reply that this view of sanc-
tions fails to distinguish sanctions from undesirable
causally necessary consequences of natural events. For
example, we do not characterize the hangover that is the
causal consequence of drunkenness as a sanction for
becoming intoxicated. Rather, we treat sanctions as
undesirable circumstances that are applied ^ the will
of other human agents, and we suppose that it is a con-
tingent matter whether the sanction will be applied.
But this refinement does not vindicate Hart, for
Hart appears to be mistaken in his view that the logical
relationship of nullity to failure to comply with a power-
conferring rule differs from the logical relationship of
punishment or other undesirable circumstances to failure
to comply with duty-imposing rules. Phillip Mullock
argues that nullity either refers to the fact that the
rule has not been complied with or to the legal invalidity
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oi some act. For example, if the testator fails to
procure the proper attestation then there is nullity
either in the sense that the testator failed to comply
with the rule regarding witnesses, or in the sense that
the testamentary instrument is invalid. However, the con
sequences of failure to comply with a duty-imposing rule
can be viewed analogously. That is, with respect to a
coercive order directing an individual, i, to refrain
from engaging in act A, i’s doing A may be viewed as i's
to comply with the rule directing i not to do A,
or as i's engaging in delictual conduct. Mullock argues
that the respective characterizations of conduct not in
conformity with the conduct specified by duty-imposing
and power-conferring rules are equivalent. Given that
behavior inconsistent with what the rules call for has
occurred, that the rule has not been complied with is a
necessary consequence in both cases. Further, Mullock
contends that invalidity in the case of power-conferring
rules and punishment or other sanction in the case of
duty-imposing rules is a contingent consequence since
there must be an official action in both cases and such
action might not be taken.
Mullock's argument is not quite correct. It is not
necessary to maintain that some document is invalid or
that some action is delictual only if an official deter-
mines that the applicable rules were not followed. The
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better view is that for both duty-imposing rules and
power-conferring rules the fact that noncompliance has
occurred is a necessary consequence. Further, in the
case of noncompliance with a power-conferring rule the
fact, for example, that the testator's will is, other
things being equal, invalid, is also a necessary conse-
quence, although it is a contingent matter whether in any
particular case the testamentary instrument will be en-
forced despite its invalidity. Similarly, in the case
of noncompliance with a duty-imposing rule the fact that
the conduct in question is, other things being equal, a
delict, is a necessary consequence, although it is a
contingent matter whether in any particular case the
threatened sanction will in fact be applied.
The upshot of this discussion is that Hart's argu-
ment for rejecting the idea that nullity can be viewed as
a sanction is not persuasive. As far as the features
singled out by Hart are concerned, power-conferring rules
and duty-imposing rules appear to be on a par. However,
Hart's argument reflects a reasonable underlying concern.
Intuitively, there is a difference between, for example,
the legal requirement not to commit murder and the legal
requirement that the testator's signature on a testamen-
tary instrument be witnessed by a certain number of per-
sons. For one thing, people are not legally required to
make wills, and so an individual is not required to have
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proper witnessing unless he opts to make a will. In con-
trast, an individual is legally required to refrain
from murder, come what may. The distinction may reflect
a difference between a line of conduct society through
its legal system wants to occur under any circumstances--
society wants no murder--and behavior desired only if
people choose to engage in behavior society is otherwise
indifferent towards--society is indifferent whether peo-
ple make wills, but if people do choose to make wills
society wants them to follow a particular procedure that
ensures that the instrument is the voluntary act of the
testator
.
Nevertheless, this means of distinguishing nullity
and sanction is difficult to maintain. For suppose that
most people want to provide after their death for their
loved ones and that the laws of intestate succession
provide for escheat of all of the intestate decedent's
property. In such a case, it may appear that this Dra-
conian law reflects a desire in society, as manifested
in the legal system, that people actively take steps to
provide for the disposition of their property after
death. That is, the law of intestate succession operates
as a penalty on those who fail to make testamentary
instruments at all or who fail to make them in conformity
to the formal requirements, at least to the extent that
those who so fail want their property to pass into the
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possession of persons other than government officials.
In this case, the nullity due to failure to conform to
the requirements for making a valid will is more like a
familiar sanction.
In short, there may be circumstances in which nullity
as the consequence of failure to follow a rule can be
viewed as an ordinary sanction. This fact presents the
following difficulty. On the one hand. Hart's arguments
that nullity is not a sanction are not persuasive, so
there appears to be nothing on that account to preclude
the coercive orders theory from analyzing all laws (other
than supplementary laws as discussed above) as orders
backed by the threat of sanctions. On the other hand,
the coercive orders theory cannot explain why nullity in
some cases functions like a familiar sanction, whereas
in other circumstances it does not.
These problems with the attempt to assimilate nullity
and other consequences of nonconformity under the concept
of sanction do not arise in the second theory considered
by Hart to be an effort to account for power-conferring
rules v^ithin the confines of a theory that treats laws as
orders and assigns a central role to sanctions. The theory
in question holds that laws are ultimately analyzable as
directives addressed to officials to apply sanctions upon
the occurrence of a specified condition. This position
is espoused by Kelsen, whose theory will be considered
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in other respects in a later chapter. According to
this theory, duty- imposing and power-conferring rules are
reduced to a single form. However, it is not accurate
under this theory to characterize laws as orders backed
by the threat of sanctions. Rather, laws are orders to
to apply sanctions upon the occurrence of a
condition. The condition for application of a sanction
is what is ordinarily thought of as the content of a law.
The condition for the application of a sanction might be
a status rather than a particular act, as for example
where being black was the condition for the application
sanctions under Jim Crow laws or where having Japanese
ancestry was the basis for the forcible relocation and
incarceration of United States citizens and resident
aliens during World War but generally the condition
is a particular action. In the case of a duty-imposing
law--for example, a criminal law that prohibits combina-
tions in restraint of trade--the proper form of the law
is a direction to officials to apply a sanction, such as
imprisonment or the imposition of pecuniary penalties on
the individuals who have formed the prohibited combina-
tion. In the case of power-conferring laws--for example,
laws dealing with the formation and breach of contracts
—
the proper form of the law is a direction to officials
to compel the payment of damages or the specific perfor-
mance of contractual undertakings upon the occurrence of
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the events constituting offer and acceptance, the exis-
tence of legal "consideration," the events constituting
"conditions precedent" to performance, the event of non-
performance (breach), the nonoccurrence of certain events
(defenses), and so on. If the conditions are satisfied
and if the individual the official is directed to impri-
son or to exact damages from fails to submit voluntarily,
then an official is directed to seize his person or prop-
erty. As Kelsen puts it:
As a coercive order, the law is distin-
guished from other social orders. The
decisive criterion is the element of force
—this means that the act prescribed by
the order as a consequence of socially
detrimental facts ought to be executed even
against the will of the individual and, if
he resists, by physical force. 33
In short, law is a coercive order (i.e., system) "... in
the sense that it prescribes coercive acts, namely the
forcible deprivation of life, freedom, economic and other
values as a consequence of certain conditions."
Hart's criticism of this thesis is largely unobjec-
tionable as far as it goes. He complains that the theory
distorts the nature of law by failing to recognize that
laws guide action not only indirectly by virtue of the
minimally compliant citizen's acting so as to avoid the
imposition of sanctions that Kelsenian laws direct offi-
cials to i.mpose, but also directly by providing models
that citizens might choose to follow as such. However,
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this complaint is not a sufficient basis for abandoning
an otherwise acceptable analysis of law unless there is
a more penetrating analysis available. Furthermore,
although Kelsen makes coercive sanctions and force cen-
tral features of a legal system by analyzing laws as
directives addressed to officials to apply sanctions upon
the occurrence of a condition, he does not analyze these
directives as coercive orders issued by a sovereign. In
thu-s respect, Kelsen' s theory is unlike the Austinian
coercive orders theory and does not suffer certain defects
of the Austinian theory discussed above.
On the other hand, because laws are analyzed as
directives to officials to apply sanctions, it does not
appear that the theory can account for the obligation of
officials to comply with these directives unless there are
directives to other officials to apply sanctions in the
event the former officials fail to apply sanctions as
they were directed. However, this result fails to reflect
the fact that officials may have legal duties to apply or
enforce the law in cases where they are not subject to
any sanction--including nullification, if that is a sanc-
tion--for failure to conform to that requirement.
Furthermore, it appears to be impossible to distin-
guish between a tax and a penalty under the Kelsenian
model. Ordinarily, we would not maintain that taxable
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transactions or statuses are transactions or statuses
that individuals have a legal obligation to refrain from.
In fact, if the tax is imposed for revenue-raising pur-
poses then the taxing authority would generally want tax-
able events or circumstances to occur. Nevertheless, in
some cases taxes are imposed in order to discourage cer-
tain activities. For example, so-called nuisance taxes
(taxes on "nuisances") such as extraordinary taxes on
gasoline, tobacco, and liguor may be imposed to discourage
consumption. Conversely, exemptions or deductions or tax
credits may be made available to encourage certain activi-
ties, such as credits toward income tax for investment in
machinery or equipment. However, even when taxes are
used to encourage or discourage activities there is no
implication that the activities in question are legally
required or prohibited, respectively. On the other hand,
if a fine is imposed on an individual for engaging in
certain activities, then it is implied that the activity
is legally prohibited. However, this distinction cannot
be reflected in the Kelsenian theory--in either case
there is a directive to the official to collect a sum of
money upon the occurrence of certain conditions.
Summary
We have reviewed six principal criticisms brought by
Hart against the coercive orders theory: the general
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argument that laws that confer powers cannot be analyzed
as coercive orders, the argument that self-referential
laws cannot be analyzed as orders to oneself, the argument
that some laws arise without there being a datable enact-
ing event as required by the coercive orders theory, and
the arguments that the coercive orders theory cannot
account for continuity of legal authority, the persis-
tence of law, or legal limitations of sovereign power.
As we have seen, these arguments turn largely on two
principal criticisms of the coercive orders theory. The
first criticism is that the coercive orders theory is
unable to account for power-conferring rules and that
such rules are necessary to explain certain key features
of a legal system, such as continuity of law-making
authority and the existence of legal limitations on
sovereign power. The second criticism is that in order
to explain certain features of a legal system, the coer-
cive orders theory must postulate the existence of tacit
orders
.
With respect to the general argument about power-
conferring rules we have examined Hart's criticism of
the attempt to assimilate power-conferring rules and
duty-imposing rules by treating nullity as a sanction
and by treating all laws as directives addressed to offi-
cials to apply sanctions upon the occurrence of a condi-
tion. Although Hart's arguments against the latter theory
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are persuasive, his arguments against the thesis that nul-
^ sanction appear to be incorrect. Thus, he has
not foreclosed an analysis of power-conferring rules as
orders backed by the sanction of nullity. Furthermore,
discussion of certain other aspects of Hart's argument
that power-conferring rules cannot be accounted for
within the confines of the coercive orders theory has
been deferred until the next chapter, as the discussion
will take us to the core of Hart's constructive account
of law and legal obligation.
Although Hart's arguments about the inability of the
coercive orders theory to account for power—conferring
rules have been disputed, we have agreed with his criti-
cisms of the notion of tacit orders. Furthermore, it has
been argued that the concept of tacit orders is required
because the coercive orders theory appears to require
that laws be the expressions of a unitary psychological
will. The apparent lack of such a will is what gives
rise to the hypothesis that certain laws are tacitly
ordered by the sovereign.
CHAPTER I I I
THE SOCIAL RULE THEORY OF LAW
After presenting the arguments against the coercive
orders theory of law which were discussed in the preceding
chapter. Hart states a general lesson that he thinks can
be drawn from his assessment of that theory:
The root cause of failure [of the coercive
orders theory] is that the elements out of
which the theory was constructed, viz. the
ideas of orders, obedience, habits, and
threats, do not include, and cannot by
their combination yield, the idea of a rule,
without which we cannot hope to elucidate
even the most elementary forms of law.l
then sets forth his own account of law in response
to the alleged defects of the coercive orders theory.
The central thesis of Hart's constructive account is that
the minimum necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a legal system for a group of persons are:
(i) that certain "... rules of recognition specifying the
criteria of legal validity and . . . rules of changes and
adjudication must be effectively accepted as common pub-
lic standards of official behaviour by ... officials" of
the group and (ii) that "... rules of behaviour which are
valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of
validity must be generally obeyed...." As will be seen,
with some reservations this thesis is broadly correct and
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provides a penetrating and perceptive account of law that
is generally defensible against certain criticisms of it
made from time to time since the publication of The Con-
cept of Law. However, in order to examine and defend
Hart's thesis it is necessary to develop his concepts of a
social rule, primary and secondary rules, rule of recog-
nition, and legal validity. This task requires us to
return first to Hart's argument that the coercive orders
theory cannot explain the continuity of legislative
authority in a legal system, for it is in that context
that the idea of a social rule is introduced.
Habits of Obedience: Hart's Straw Man
The argument that the coercive orders theory cannot
explain continuity of legislative authority was discussed
in the last chapter. Briefly, Hart's argument was that
in order to distinguish the orders of a gunman, which are
not laws, from the orders of the sovereign, which are
laws, the coercive orders theory must maintain that orders
backed by threats are laws only if the issuer of the
orders is habitually obeyed by his addressees. However,
habitual obedience is an inadequate foundation for ex-
plaining the phenomenon of continuity of legislative
authority, since habitual obedience to a particular
individual, Rex I, does not imply that another individual,
Rex II, will be habitually obeyed; indeed, it is not
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possible for Rex II to be obeyed habitually until he has
been generally obeyed for some period of time. Neverthe-
less, It appears quite clear that if Rex II satisfies a
rule of succession within the legal system whereby his
commands are laws, then his commands are laws from the
outset, whether or not he is habitually obeyed.
There are several related problems with Hart's argu-
ment that merit attention because of the light they shed
on his own theory. First, even if we accept Hart's claim
that in order to distinguish the mere gunman from the
sovereign, the coercive orders theory must postulate
habitual obedience, it appears to be possible to deal
with the problem of continuity. Hart claims that the
habit of obedience hypothesized by the coercive orders
theory is a "personal relationship" between each subject
and a particular individual or entity that issues orders.
Although it is possible that the members of a group have
the habit of complying with the orders of a unique indi-
vidual as such, this is not the only, or even the most
probable, social situation. In such a society there
could never be a successful imposter situation. For
example, if the sovereign, Rex I, decided to switch
places with his physically similar subject. Pauper, the
members of the society who habitually obey Rex I would
not, at least as a matter of habit, obey the orders issued
by Pauper while he was posing as Rex I. They would con-
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tinue to obey orders, if any, issued by Rex I himself.
Since rhe exclusion of the imposter case seems arbi-
trary, we might reformulate the required obedience rela-
tion such that the members of the group habitually obey
the individual believed by them to be Rex I. In order to
reach the imposter situation it is not necessary to sup-
pose that the members of the group must believe the
absurdity that Pauper is Rex I. It is sufficient to sup-
pose instead that:
(3x)[(x = Pauper) and (the members of
society believe that x = Rex I)].
Although this modification of the habitual obedience rela-
tion deals with the imposter case, for practical purposes
it does not deal with the successor case. That is, Hart
can still make his critical point that the theory cannot
account for the successor's commands being law ^ initio
even if the habitual obedience relation holds between
subjects and the person believed to be Rex I, since as a
matter of contingent fact it would be improbable that the
subjects would believe with respect to the successor, s,
that s is Rex I, in a social situation in which there was
habitual obedience to the individual believed to be Rex I
.
However, the reformulation of the habitual obedience
relationship proposed in order to accommodate the imposter
situation also suggests a means of reformulation that will
accommodate the successor situation. Rather than suppos-
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ing that the relationship of habitual obedience holds
between subjects and a particular named individual, or
between subjects and an individual believed by the sub-
jects to be a particular named individual, we can hypoth-
esize that the relationship holds between subjects and
any individual who is believed by the subjects to satisfy
some definite description. For example, rather than
habitually obeying Rex I or the individual believed by
the members of the society to be Rex I, the members of a
society may be supposed to obey the individual who at the
time has the greatest enforcement power to support his
edicts. The identity of the individual that satisfies
this description may change. However, change in the
identity of the individual satisfying the description
does not preclude the existence of the habitual obedience
relation. All that is required is that the members of
society routinely obey the orders of whoever monopolizes
or controls the greatest quantum of enforcement powers.
As an empirical hypothesis, it is likely that the
relationship between subjects and the governing officials
is more aptly characterized in terms of such a descrip-
tion rather than in terms of particular named individuals.
Thus, this solution is not an implausible response to
Hart's criticism. Moreover, it is an adequate response
since continuity is explained without tacitly assuming
unanalyzed rights to govern or succeed or legislate. The
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possibility of accounting for continuity in such a manner
within the confines of the coercive orders theory has
been illustrated by Stanley Bates. ^ Bates’ example is a
child who frequents playgrounds where he habitually con-
forms to the demands of the "playground bully." The
identity of the bully changes over time and across play-
grounds but the child's behavior is accurately charac-
terized as habitual obedience to the playground bully.
The individual satisfying this description need not be
assumed to possess unanalyzable rights in order to
6xplain the situation of the obedient child.
Hart's argument about continuity is based on the
presumed need to postulate a habit of obedience that is
a personal relationship between each subject and Rex.
Hart seems to have assumed erroneously that a personal
relationship to a named individual is necessary because
he assumes that the alternative to a social situation in
which the same type of action is taken by different people
in response to a norm is a situation in which different
people "for their own part" without regard to whether the
behavior of others is the same, in fact do engage in the
same type of action in response to an order. ^ The latter
situation is one in which the behavior of the group is
merely convergent. The fact that the obedient individual
does not regard the commanded behavior as a standard to
be followed by all makes the obedience relation in some
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sense personal to him; but this aspect does not imply
that it can hold only between a subject and some named
person, as Hart seems to have concluded.
A further difficulty with Hart's argument about con-
tinuity is that he inexplicably denies the coercive orders
theory the benefit of certain obvious rebuttals. In this
regard, the peculiarity of Hart's form of argument may be
noted. In general, in analyzing the coercive orders
theory. Hart seems to assume that the data that a theory
of law seeks to account for are legal rules or norms
.
The adequacy of the theory is measured in part by how
well the theoretical model--in this case of orders backed
by threats--matches the salient characteristics of the
phenomena being analyzed. As we have seen, certain
aspects of certain legal rules are poorly reflected in
the coercive orders model. For example, the model cannot
account for customary sources of legal rules or the per-
sistence of particular norms over time without introducing
the dubious concept of a tacit order.
In light of this expected procedure. Hart's argument
that the coercive orders theory cannot explain continuity
because the theory relies on the concepts of habits of
obedience and orders but not on the concept of a rule is
perplexing. One would have expected Hart to argue that
one salient feature of a legal system is its continuity,
that continuity appears to be provided for by rules whereby
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individuals are deemed to have authority to legislate and
so on, and that the coercive orders theory cannot account
for such rules. Hart might well argue that the coercive
orders theory is most persuasive in analyzing legal rules
that impose obligations but is unsuccessful in analyzing
legal rules that confer powers, including rules that pro-
vide for continuity in a legal system by conferring powers
to legislate on certain named individuals or individuals
who satisfy some description.
Presented with this form of argument, the coercive
orders theory would reply by subjecting the rule in ques-
tion to its standard reductive analysis. Thus, assuming
that it is necessary to postulate habitual obedience,
then according to the coercive orders theory, the rule
providing for continuity is a legal rule only if it is
an order backed by threats issued by a sovereign who is
habitually obeyed. For example, the legal rule of suc-
cession might provide that the oldest male child of Rex n
living at the time of Rex n's death, or the oldest female
child of Rex n living at the time of Rex n’s death if
there are no living male children of Rex n shall at the
time of Rex n's death and thereafter be named Rex + 1^
and succeed to all sovereign powers formerly held by
Rex n. At this point, it would seem appropriate to
appeal to Hart's complaint that the coercive orders
theory cannot explain such power-conferring rules. How-
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ever, the eai.lier criticism is not persuasive in this
case. The succession rule under the theory is an order
by Rex I to his subjects to do whatever the individuals
who satisfy this description order. As such, it is a
coercive directive formally equivalent to an order to
perform or abstain some action specified in the order.
In each case, ordinary sanctions are available: it is
not necessary to suppose that nullity is a sanction.
Moreover, it is not necessary that Rex I survive to impose
the sanctions: it is sufficient if the members of society
believe that sanctions will be imposed even if Rex I is
no longer present. By hypothesis, Rex I is habitually
obeyed. Consequently, this order qualifies as a law.
Since Rex I is habitually obeyed, this order will be
habitually obeyed. In obeying this order habitually,
the members of society will a fortiori be obeying the
orders of Rex II, Rex III, and so on, habitually. Con-
sequently, the orders of Rex II, Rex III, and so on will
also qualify as laws, and the criticism that continuity
cannot be explained by the coercive orders theory because
it depends upon power-conferring rules can be avoided.
Of course, this response by the coercive orders
theory is not the end of the matter, as we have seen in
the last chapter. One problem that this response brings
to the fore is that of explaining the persistence of law.
Although Rex I may be able to ensure continuity of legal
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authority by commanding ^ addressees to obey Rex II,
III, and so on, subsequent generations and new members
of the group who did not habitually obey Rex I, but who
do habitually obey Rex IX, presumably must have the suc-
cession rule reiterated to them by Rex IX. In the coer-
cive orders model this requirement appears to be satis-
fiable only if the idea of a tacit order is accepted.
Nevertheless, the preceding dialogue does not occur;
instead. Hart focuses on the differences between habits
and rules, or, more specifically, on the differences
between the social situation in which a habit of obedience
exists and the social situation in which there exists
the "more complex” "general social practice” by virtue of
which a social rule "exists” under which the new legisla-
tor is entitled to succeed.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the notion of
habitual obedience is required by the coercive orders
theory. Although Austin referred to habitual obedience
to an individual or group that habitually obeys no one
as a distinguishing characteristic of a legal system,^
Bates seems to be correct in maintaining that "rather
than speaking of a 'habit of obedience' we should speak
fi
of a 'fact of general obedience.'” Even Hart shows a
limited recognition of the incongruous nature of a habit
of obedience. He notes in passing that if there is a
habit of obedience then there is regular compliance with
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Rex's orders, but that such compliance lacks "the unre-
flective, effortless, engrained character of a habit.
Hart attributes this fact to the existence of onerous
laws which engender a temptation to disobey and risk
punishment
.
However, Hart has misdiagnosed the problem. The
reason that compliance with an order lacks those charac-
teristics of habitual behavior is that order-following
behavior necessarily is, but habitual behavior need not
'
Qi^scted conduct. The coercive orders theory does not
maintain that the regular performance of some action, A
(e.g., paying Rex one-tenth of annual income) in a social
which Rex has ordered that A be performed
is merely a matter of there being a habit of doing A in
that society. Rex's addressees do not pay one-tenth of
annual income as a matter of habit but by virtue of con-
forming their behavior to an ideal model, viz. the model
of paying Rex one-tenth of annual income. Presumably, in
general the motivating factor for conforming to the model
is the desire to avoid the sanction that backs Rex's
order. In the case of habitual behavior, on the other
hand, the behavior is not engaged in by virtue of its
being the content of a habit but for some other reason.
For example, a person is correctly described as having a
habit of watching the news on television each night simply
because he in fact does regularly engage in that activity
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for any reason or none. However, it need not be the case
that he engages in the activity in order to conform his
behavior to the behavior type of watching the news on
television each night. In contrast, in obeying ^ order
to watch the news each night he engages in that behavior
^ lea^ in order to conform to the behavior type,
se, although he may also engage in the activity for other
reasons
.
Hart does not seem to acknowledge any ele-
ment of directedness in the coercive orders theory, at
least in the context of introducing his analysis of
social rules, it may be that Hart admits that under the
coercive orders model the addressees of a legal rule are
considered to act directively and not habitually, but only
with respect to the particular behaviors ordered by Rex.
In contrast, the habitual behavior that Hart believes the
coercive orders theory must assume is present in a social
group if there is to be a legal system in that group is
the habit of obeying the sanction-backed commands of a
certain individual, whatever they are. This habit must
be differentiated from the individual habits of doing A^,
in case Rex ordered that be done, of doing in case
Rex ordered that A^ be done, and so on. As we have seen,
the coercive orders model does not assume that Rex's
addressees do each of A^, . .
.
,
A^ habitually, where Rex
has commanded A, & ... & A : Rex's addressees treat each
1 n
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of A^, as a model or standard by which their con-
duct IS judged as conforming or conflicting. However,
according to Hart, under the coercive orders theory Rex's
addressees do not treat "compliance with a command of Rex"
as itself referring to a model behavior type. In the
first social situation, Rex commands that some act be
performed or abstained from, and Rex's addressees treat
that act type as a standard of conduct compliance with
which is prudentially justified. However, in treating
that act type as a standard, Rex's addressees are acting
habitually. In contrast, in the latter social situation,
Rex commands that some act be performed or abstained from,
and Rex's addressees treat that act type as a standard of
conduct because they treat the property of being commanded
by Rex as determining which act types establish standards
of conduct. The distinction between the two cases is
obscured by the fact that in each case the substance of
Rex's command establishes a standard of behavior by which
the conduct of his addressees is judged and in each case
the fact that the behavior type was the subject of a com-
mand issued by Rex is important.
An example will help to illuminate the point. Let
us suppose that it is a matter of contingent fact that
the regular performance by a particular individual i of
certain act types will produce a greater total welfare
in the world than would the performance by i of any other
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actions. For example, let us suppose that the only
actions performable by i are A, B, C, D, E, and F, and
that for each pair (A, B), (c, D), and (E, F) the first
and second members of each pair are not jointly realiz-
able, that i's life consists entirely of choices between
the performance of one or the other of the act types of
each pair, and that the performance of the first act type
of each ordered pair will always produce the greatest wel-
fare. Thus, if i, always does A, when presented with a
choice of A or B, always does C, when presented with a
choice of C or D, and always does E, when presented with
a choice of E or F
,
then
^ will have followed a course of
conduct that in fact conforms to the standard of acting
so as to produce the greatest welfare.
We can imagine several ways in which i might actually
pursue this course of conduct. For example, might do A,
C, and E as a matter of habit. Although is acting
habitually, it is not necessary to suppose that i is not
selecting or choosing to engage in the first type of
action of each pair. However, if i is acting habitually,
then he does not treat doing A, doing C, or doing E as
standards to which his conduct must conform and he does
not treat doing whatever will produce the greatest wel-
fare as a standard to which his conduct must conform.
Nevertheless, his habitual behavior in fact satisfies
each of these standards.
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In contrast, i might treat A'ing, C'ing, and E'ing
as standards that constrain his choice. in that case, on
each occasion that i is presented with a choice pair he
will select on the basis of these standards and in making
his selection i will treat his choice as constrained or
necessitated by the standards. It is possible that for
^ these act types are standards that constrain choice
solely in virtue of prudential considerations. However,
_i need not treat doing whatever will produce the greatest
welfare as a standard that directs and constrains his
behavior, even thougn his actual behavior in accordance
with those act types that he does treat as constraining
standards also accords with the general standard of act-
ing to maximize welfare. Although i regularly does what
produces the greatest welfare, he does so only in virtue
of his doing what, as it happens, is in accordance with
other standards. If i. were presented with a new choice
pair (G, H), and as a matter of fact the regular perfor-
mance of G by i would maximize welfare, we would not
expect on the basis of that fact alone that
^ would treat
G'ing as establishing a constraining standard, although
v/e might say that i does have a habit of acting in accor-
dance with standards that, as a matter of fact, do con-
form to the standard of acting to maximize welfare.
Finally, i might treat maximizing welfare as itself
establishing a standard that constrains his behavior. If
59
regularly performing A instead of B, C instead of D, and
so on, will maximize welfare, then the standard of acting
such that one will maximize welfare functions as a vali-
dating principle for establishing A'ing, C’ing, and so on
as standards of conduct. However, A'ing, C'ing, and so
on are not standards simpliciter
. It is by virtue of
their possessing the property of being such that regular
performance of them will maximize welfare that they serve
as standards of conduct. if i treats the validating
standard as a constraint on his behavior then we would
expect on the basis of that fact alone that i would treat
G'ing as a constraining standard when presented with the
choice pair, (G, H), and the fact that G'ing will maxi-
mize welfare. We would not need to know that i routinely
or habitually treats as standards those activities which
if regularly performed will maximize welfare.
There appears to be no justification under the coer-
cive orders theory for adopting a distinction between
order-following in the case of the particular act types
commanded by Rex and engaging in merely habitual behavior
with respect to obeying Rex per se. The theory postulates
that most members of the group generally obey the orders
of an individual who does not obey the orders of any other
individual. However, it is not merely a matter of habit
that members of the group obey the orders of Rex. It is
by virtue of being the subject matter of orders issued by
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Rex or perhaps of orders issued by the individual pos-
sessing a monopoly of force--that the behaviors ordered
by Rex serve as models to which Rex's addressees conform
for prudential or other reasons. Rex's addressees are
not merely taking A'ing, B'ing, and so on as models to
conform to in cases where Rex orders A, B, and so on.
^^ther, they are taking being ordered by Rex as the sali-
f^sture that identifies the types of behavior non-
conformity with which will probably result in the imposi-
tion of sanctions
. Habitual behavior does not enter the
analysis at all. As we will see, if Hart had focused
on the distinction between order-following and rule-
following, rather than on the distinction between habitual
behavior and rule-following, then certain fundamental simi-
larities between Hart's theory and the coercive orders
theory would have been apparent.
Hart's Analysis of Social Rules
As indicated by the unadorned statement of Hart's
central thesis that was made at the beginning of this
chapter. Hart maintains that a legal system exists only
if, inter alia
,
"rules of recognition specifying the
criteria of legal validity and . . . rules of change and
adjudication [are] effectively accepted as common public
standards of official behaviour by ... officials." Rules
of recognition, change, and adjudication are characterized
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by Hart as ^condary ru_l.es
. As we will see, under Hart's
analysis, if a rule is effectively accepted by members of
a group, then the rule ej^ists in the group or, in general,
IS a ^cial riU^ of that group. Thus, Hart's thesis is
that a group has a legal system only if certain secondary
rules are social rules of that group.
Certain aspects of the theory of social rules and
the view that the existence of a legal system depends
upon the existence of certain kinds of social rules will
be examined in depth in Chapter V. For the moment, dis-
cussion of these difficult matters will be facilitated if
the theory is presented first in broad outline. We can
begin by summarizing and consolidating Hart's analysis
of social rules and considering its relation to the coer-
otders theory. Hart's foil in developing the analy-
sis of social rules is the social situation in which a
habit of obedience exists. Whatever the merits of this
expository device may be, the argument of the preceding
section was that a habit of obedience is not an element
of the coercive orders theory. Nevertheless, Hart is
correct in observing that if a habit of engaging in cer-
tain behavior exists in a group, then most members of
the group have generally engaged in that behavior and
most members of the group are likely to continue engaging
in that behavior. More importantly, it is a sufficient
condition for the members of a group to have a habit that
62
"their behaviour in fact converges."^ It is not a neces-
sary condition for a group to have a habit that deviation
from the pattern of behavior is subject to criticism.
That is, a pattern of behavior can be habitual within a
group even though failure to conform one's behavior to
the pattern is not "a matter for any form of criticism.
As Hart puts it, under his version of the coercive orders
theory
:
. . . all that is required from the community
to constitute Rex the sovereign are the
personal acts of obedience on the part of
the population. Each of them need, for his
only obey,
. .
. no one in the community
need have or express any views as to whether
his own or others' obedience to Rex is in
any sense right, proper, or legitimately
demanded.
^
On the other hand, if a rule requiring a particular
behavior exists in some group, then there is more to the
social situation that "constitutes the existence of a
rule" than merely convergent behavior. In Hart's words,
the following conditions must be satisfied in order for
a rule requiring certain behavior to exist:
(1) "The behaviour in question ... must be general
though not necessarily invariable . .
.
[such
that] it is repeated when occasion arises
by most of the group
(2) "... [Djeviations are generally regarded as
lapses or faults open to criticism, and
threatened deviations meet with pressure
for conformity . ..."
(3) "... [Djeviation from the standard is
generally accepted as a good reason for
making [such criticism]"; that is, criti-
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cism for deviation "is regarded as legiti-
mate or justified ...."IS ^
( 4 ) "... [S]ome at least, must look upon thebehaviour in question as a general standardto be followed by the group as a whole";that IS, there must be "... a reflective
critical attitude to this pattern of behav-iour in accordance with which it is
regarded as "a standard for all "16
Hart observes that the first condition also must obtain in
order for a habit to exist in a group. That is, neither a
habit nor a rule "exists" unless the behavior in question
generally occurs "when occasion arises." Thus, in Hart's
analysis the last three conditions are what distinguish
the existence of a rule from the existence of a habit.
With respect to the last condition. Hart states that
it is "implicit in what has already been said." By this,
he appears to mean that the second two conditions ((2) and
(3)) imply the last condition. (If this claim is correct,
then (2) and (3) alone are the distinguishing characteris-
tics of the social situation in which a rule exists. ) Hart
maintains that this condition identifies the internal
aspect of rules. Elsewhere, he states that a person who
has a reflective critical attitude to the pattern of
behavior specified by the rule takes an internal point
of toward the rule. Furthermore, he characterizes
an internal statement any statement that "manifests
the internal point of view and is naturally used by one
1 8
who accepts" the rule in question. Hart's concepts of
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the internal aspect of rules, of the internal point of
view, and of internal statements will be explored in
Chapter V when the concept of a social rule is examined
in greater depth.
The distinction between habitual behavior that has a
high incidence of occurrence among the members of a group
and rule-following behavior by members of a group is
intuitively clear. For example, each of a number of
individuals may generally commute to his job on the same
regularly-scheduled train each day. Thus, for example,
among the members of this group, there exists a group
habit of commuting on the 8:15 train every day. Although
each commuter's behavior is "directed" in the sense that
taking the 8:15 train is intentional, goal-directed con-
duct, the behavior is not "directed" in the sense of
being the subject of a directive that could appropriately
be cited as a justification or rationale for his conduct,
except to the extent that having intended to engage in
certain behavior shows that engaging in the behavior was
not a happenstance. Thus, the fact that he generally
takes the 8:15 train may explain to some extent the
commuter's conduct on a particular occasion, but it does
not justify the conduct. The reason that the commuter's
having had the intent to engage in the behavior is not a
justification for the behavior is that the concept of
justification does not apply except where the behavior
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is judged relevant to a standard set by a source external
to the actor. Further, each commuter acts "for his own
part ' without regard to whether others who generally
engage in the same conduct in fact do so on any particular
occasion. That is, although each commuter may in time
due to the repeated occurrence of the events develop the
expectation that certain other people will be on the 8:15
train, failure of this expectation is not per se a ground
for criticism, even though the failure may be a source
*^is3ppointment to the person with this expectation.
The failure to follow an established habit may be an
occurrence for which explanation is appropriate, but it
is not an occurrence for which an excuse is appropriate.
In contrast to the group habit of taking the 8:15
train is the regular behavior among the members of the
group of train riders of reporting for work each day at
9:00. We may suppose for our purposes that this behavior
is the subject of a directive applicable to the members
of the group and accepted by some or all members of the
group. Unless all of our train riders work at the same
establishment they are members of different groups each
of which has a directive calling for its members to report
for work at nine o'clock. With respect to each such
group, if the behavior is the subject of a directive that
applies to the members of that group, then the fact that
the behavior is the subject of the directive is per se
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a reason for and justification of a member's engaging in
the conduct. Furthermore, the mere fact that the behavior
is the subject of a directive normally gives rise to an
expectation that those to whom it applies will engage in
the specified behavior if only because it is called for
by the directive. This expectation arises even though
the person to whom the directive applies has never engaged
in the behavior called for by the directive. If an indi-
vidual to whom the directive applies fails to perform the
specified act, then there is per se a ground for criticism
and an appropriate context for the individual to offer an
excuse rather than an explanation.
The nexus of habitual and rule-governed behavior is
complex. Certain behavior may have become habitual as a
consequence of an individual's regularly engaging in cer-
tain actions in order to meet the requirements of some
directive that applies to him. For example, the members
of our group of train takers may be taking the 8:15 train
in order to follow the rule of reporting for work at nine
o'clock. As to one another as members of the group of
8:15 train takers, the behavior of taking the 8:15 train
is not the basis of an expectation grounded in a rule of
that group, although members of this group may be aware
that each other member is a member of another group that
has a rule compliance with which is the basis for each
individual train taker's regular behavior. Moreover,
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even if taking the 8:15 train 2^ se is not the subject
of a rule among the members of the group of 8:15 train
takers and is not the subject of a rule among the members
of the separate groups to which the train takers belong
each of which has a nine o'clock work rule, taking the
8:15 train may be the subject of a rule of some other
group the rules of which are applicable to a particular
train taker. For example, a subgroup of train takers
may have agreed to play bridge during their commute and
to that end resolved upon the rule that they would all
take the 8:15 train.
When we turn to the coercive orders theory of law,
the analysis of law as an order backed by force issued
by a person or group of persons generally obeyed seems
to fit solidly under the rule-following model rather than
the model of habitual behavior. That is, if the perfor-
mance of some action A, is the subject of a coercive
order there is a straightforward sense in which Hart's
conditions for the existence of a social rule are satis-
fied. Because there are sanctions threatened in case of
nonperformance of A, then there are prudential reasons
not to deviate from the specified action. These reasons
support, warrant, or justify criticisms of deviant
behavior. Furthermore, Rex, at least, as the issuer of
the order who willed that A be performed, and threatened
sanctions for noncompliance, looks upon A'ing as a
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standard for the group. in general, because the coercive
orders theory analyzes laws as directives
. rather than
as predictions of official conduct, it is incorrect to
ascribe to the theory the view that the social situa-
tion in which a coercive order is issued is one in which
behavior conforming to the order is habitual behavior
rather than "directed" behavior.
Bates argues that the fact that the coercive orders
theory analyzes laws as directives demonstrates that Hart
can distinguish his own theory from the coercive orders
theory only by supposing that legal directives under the
social rule theory state moral and not simply prudential
19requirements. Bates points out that Hart's claim that
where a rule exists deviation from it is treated as a good
reason for making criticism is ambiguous. On the one
hand, there can be said to be good reason for criticizing
deviation if there is some fact that supports compliance.
The coercive orders theory satisfies this condition since
the existence of sanctions for deviation supports compli-
ance. On the other hand, there also might be said to be
a good reason for criticizing deviation if the rule states
a moral requirement. One persuasive reason for thinking
that laws are not accurately characterized in terms of
directives compliance with which is only prudentially
justified is that we ordinarily think that a law functions
as a directive even if the prudential justification for
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treating the behavior in question as a standard is absent.
For example, the legal directive establishes a standard
even is there is no prudential reason to comply because
there is no effective sanction. However, Hart is not
prepared to maintain that a law is a directive, compliance
with which is morally required solely in virtue of its
content, since he insists that the substantive content
^ legal directive not only need not correspond to a
moral requirement, but may actually conflict with moral-
ity.
Bates’ argument underscores a point worth making,
namely, that Hart tends to overlook the directive char-
acter of an order and the extent to which order-following
and rule-following are alike. Since Hart wants to deny
that social rules necessarily concern standards of conduct
that are morally required, he cannot distinguish orders
and social rules on the ground that the former may not,
whereas the latter necessarily do, concern moral require-
ments. The characterization of how the coercive orders
theory appears to fit within Hart's analysis of social
rules may suggest that the key distinction is that coer-
cive orders are not sufficiently "social" to satisfy the
criteria for existence of a social rule. That is, the
issuer may be the only member of the group who regards
the subject matter of his order as setting a standard of
behavior for every member of the group. In contrast.
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Hart states that where a social rule exists all except a
minority regard the behavior in question as a standard
for the group. The question of how large the group of
persons must be who regard some form of behavior as a
standard for all members of the group is dismissed as
frivolous. However, within the space of several pages
Hart appears to ignore the implicit view that only a
minority may fail to regard the behavior in question as
a general standard if there is to be a social rule regard-
ing that behavior. That is, in discussing the thesis that
if a group has a legal system there are certain "consti-
tutional” social rules dealing with the identification
of standards. Hart maintains that these rules exist even
though only "officials" or "experts" regard these consti-
tutional matters as the basis for the identification of
standards of conduct applicable to everyone. Analo-
gously, the issuer of coercive orders is functionally
equivalent to Hart's officials and experts inasmuch as he
regards the property of having been the subject matter of
an order issued by him as the basis for a particular behav-
ior's being a standard of conduct applicable to everyone.
Secondary Rules of a Legal System
Bates' argument and the discussion in the preceding
section do not address Hart's principal thesis, namely.
that the existence of a legal system depends upon the
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existence of social rules regarding how standards of
behavior are identified, changed, and applied to particu-
lar cases. Discussion in the preceding chapter and
earlier in this chapter suggests that the coercive
orders theory can attempt to address Hart's thesis by
postulating an order to obey the orders of individuals
who fit certain descriptions. As we have seen, this
rejoinder to Hart raises such problematic notions as
that of a tacit order. In light of these problems. Hart's
analysis appears promising, as long as we bear in mind
that there are significant similarities between order-
following and rule-following that Hart overlooks.
Hart's principal thesis is that the hallmark of a
legal system is a validating standard that functions in
the same way that the standard of maximizing welfare func-
tions in our example above. In the context of the argu-
ment about continuity in a legal system Hart states:
We may suppose that our social group has
not only rules which . . . make a specific
kind of behaviour standard, but a rule
which provides for the identification of
standards of behaviour in a less direct
fashion, by reference to the words, spoken
or written, of a given person. In its
simplest form this rule will be to the
effect that whatever actions Rex specifies
(perhaps in certain formal ways) are to be
done. This transforms the situation which
we first depicted in terms of mere habits
of obedience to Rex; for where such a rule
is accepted Rex will not only in fact spec-
ify what is to be done, but will have the
right to do this; and not only will there
be general obedience to his orders, but
it will be generally accepted that it is
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right to obey
Hart develops the concept of a validating rule
through the distinction between primary and secondary
rules. Hart characterizes primary rules as rules under
which "human beings are required to do or abstain from
^^rtain actions, whether they wish to or not." These
rules "impose duties" and "concern actions involving phys-
ical movement or changes. Primary or duty-imposing
rules are contrasted to secondary or power-conferring
rules. Secondary rules "are in a sense parasitic upon or
secondary to the first." They "provide that human beings
may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules
of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in
various ways determine their incidence or control their
operation." Secondary rules "confer powers, public or
snd "provide for operations which lead not merely
to physical movement or change, but to the creation or
variation of duties or obligations."
Hart identifies three kinds of secondary rules:
rules of recognition, rules of change, and rules of
adjudication. A rule of recognition "will specify some
feature or features possession of which by a suggested
rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that
it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social
24pressure it exerts." Rules that specify the steps
necessary in order to have some rule expression refer to
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a standard that makes certain conduct nonoptional are
secondary rules of change. Rules that regulate the
acquisition and transfer of property are examples of
secondary rules of change. Such rules specify the steps
by which property rights are altered. Property rights
are normative relations among individuals with respect
to abstract (e.g., literary property) or concrete (e.g.,
real property) objects. These normative relations are
the meanings of certain primary rules. For example, a
rule of gratuitous transfer might provide that the comple-
tion of certain steps by i will result in transfer of a
certain object of property from i to j_ upon the death of
i. Prior to such a transfer (in a simple case), before
i's death, no one aside from i may use the object (at
least in certain ways) without i's consent, so that every-
one except i is obligated to refrain from using the object
in certain ways unless i consents to such use. After i
dies, in virtue of i's satisfying the requirements of the
rules of gratuitous transfer, the obligations regarding
the use of the object (which are the subjects of Hartian
primary or duty-imposing rules) run to j_. This example
illustrates how conforming to the requirments of a secon-
dary rule of change can alter obligations imposed by
primary rules. Finally, rules of adjudication are second-
ary rules that empower certain individuals or groups to
determine whether a primary rule has been violated or
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whether the procedures specified by a secondary rule have
been carried out.
Hacker has argued that Hart's classification of rules
is defective. in particular, he argues that Hart is
mistaken in the view that all duty-imposing rules are "pri^
mary rules. This criticism is well taken since the rule
of recognition as described by Hart is a social rule that
imposes obligations on officials, namely, obligations to
identify as standards of conduct only those types of
behavior identified with reference to particular charac-
teristics specified in the rule of recognition. Further-
more, Hacker points out that Hart is mistaken in the
view that all rules that concern the exercise of a power
are not duty-imposing, since there may be an obligation
to exercise a power. Hacker concludes that Hart does
not need the distinction between primary and secondary
rules except for the purpose of having a convenient label
to single out rules of recognition, rules of change, and
rules of adjudication. That is. Hart can make the points
he wants to make about a legal system simply by eluci-
dating the concepts of these three kinds of rules, without
regard to whether they are only power-conferring rules,
and so on. However, we may still use Hart's term "secon-
dary rules" to refer to any of these three kinds of rules.
Hart introduces these three kinds of secondary rules
as the solutions to certain problems that allegedly arise
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in a social situation in which there are only primary
rules. Hart characterizes a social system that has only
primary rules as a pre-legal society. in contrast, a
society with secondary rules has a legal system. It is
not clear whether Hart’s characterization of pre-legal
culture and its problems and of legal culture and its
solutions is intended as an historical and anthropologi-
cal thesis or as a philosophical theory about the con-
cept of law. For our purposes any historical or
anthropological claims can be ignored. The important
point is that Hart thinks that secondary rules of these
kinds are definitive of law and legal systems.
According to Hart a pre-legal society is regulated
entirely by primary rules. In the light of Hacker's
criticism of Hart's classificatory scheme, this claim
merely restates the thesis that the distinctive feature
of a legal system is the existence of rules of recogni-
tion, change, and adjudication. Beyond that, however.
Hart's view of pre-legal society is erroneous since a
society without rules of recognition, change, and adjudi-
cation of the sort Hart focuses on may have certain
"secondary" power-conferring rules. For example, such
a society could have promising rules, the application
of which creates novel duties. Nevertheless, Hart's
argument is that such a society only has primary rules,
which in virtue of certain contingent, but universal.
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features of human nature typically restrict violence,
control the economic uses of objects (property), and dis-
allow deception and misrepresentation. The assertion that
there is a particular primary rule in a society is equiva-
lent to the claim that that rule exists in that society.
The claim that a certain primary rule exists in a society
is true just in case Hart's conditions for the existence
of a social rule are satisfied. In a Hartian pre-legal
society a particular primary rule is a rule of the society
solely in virtue of satisfying these "existence" condi-
tions. Thus, a rule regarding a behavior. A, "exists" in
a society, S, only if A is generally done by most members
of the group, failure to do A in S is generally regarded
in S as a good reason for criticism, and some memb'er of S
regards A'ing as a standard of behavior that everyone
must follow. Furthermore, this rule is an obligation
rule of the group, according to Hart, only if A'ing typi-
cally requires sacrifice or renunciation at least on the
part of some members of S but is regarded as important
enough to warrant being made nonoptional because it is
believed to be necessary to the maintenance of some aspect
of social life.
The substance of Hart's argument about pre-legal
society is that the regulatory structure of a society
is extremely limited if the social obligations referred
to by rules that satisfy Hart's conditions for the exis-
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tence of a social rule exhaust the domain of social
duties. Hart argues that without secondary rules of
change the regulatory structure of society is static,
because there are no methods for deliberately tailoring
rules to changing circumstances
. Rules change, if at all,
only as new patterns of conduct come to be regarded as
standards for the members of society. A pattern of behav-
ior may come to be regarded as a nonoptional standard
(i.e.
,
come to "exist” as an obligation rule of the
social group) for many reasons, except that in the absence
of the existence of a secondary rule of change it is not
so regarded in virtue of being the subject of a rule that
is adopted in accordance with a rule stating the ways in
which rules can be altered. Hart describes the altera-
tion of primary rules of obligation in a society without
secondary rules of change as a "slow process of growth"
whereby patterns of behavior that were optional become
habitual and then come to be regarded as obligatory (i.e.,
come to "exist" as subjects of social rules).
Hart's argument about the shortcomings of a society
without secondary rules of change is not entirely per-
suasive. Although a society without rules providing means
for deliberate alteration of the structure of the system
of primary duties might be static, there still could be
non-rule-governed forms of rule alteration that are highly
efficient. For example, treatise writers and law journal
78
commentators are not legislators, yet they articulate
standards of conduct according to their conception of
what conduct ought to be nonoptional under various factual
circumstances. The members of society might respond very
quickly to these suggested patterns of regulation. In
that case, the regulatory structure of society might
change relatively quickly, not because there is in
existence in the society a rule providing that rules
advocated by treatise writers are rules of the society,
but because the members of society, or some of them, are
persuaded for some reason on a case-by-case basis to
regard as nonoptional the behavior suggested by the
writers as proper subjects of rules. In short, treatise
writers and commentators are catalysts that accelerate
the process whereby members of the group come to regard
certain behavior patterns as appropriate standards.
There are other more or less effective non-constitutional
sources of standards--the news media, interest group
lobbies, for example--but the role of legal scholars
is clearest for present purposes.
Hart gives similar arguments about the shortcomings
of a society lacking secondary rules of adjudication.
That is, without rules empowering an individual or group
to make determinations about whether the regulatory struc-
ture of society has been maintained, there can only be
diffuse social pressure to sanction nonconforming behav-
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lor. Moreover, individual members of society would engage
in risky and inefficient modes of self-help in order to
enforce their rights under the scheme of primary rules.
Like Hart's argument about the defects of a society
without rules of change, his argument about the defects
of a society without secondary rules of adjudication is
less than fully persuasive. For example, there could
be a relatively efficient system under which certain
individuals were called upon by disputants on a voluntary
basis to hear grievances based on the primary rules. The
opinions of these individuals would be advisory in that
they were not enforced and were not regarded as binding
by the disputants. However, because of their reputation
for fairness and the persuasiveness of the reasons for
their decisions disputants in fact generally might abide
by the results reached by these "arbiters." The important
point is that there would be no rule according to which
their decisions regarding rights and duties under primary
rules would be themselves obligatory, just as there is no
rule according to which a pattern of behavior that com-
mentators argue should be obligatory is obligatory.
Finally, Hart argues that a society that lacks a rule
of recognition--the most important secondary rule for
Hart's theory--is characterized by uncertainty about what
the primary rules of obligation for the society are.
There is uncertainty because the primary rules are not
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systematic, and there are no procedures for settling
doubts about the identity or scope of the rules. The
primary rules of obligation can be identified only by
determining which patterns of conduct are directly
regarded as nonoptional standards for the group. For
example, the behaviors required or forbidden by the Bibli-
cal commandments are the subjects of rules of a pre-legal
society only in virtue of there being the requisite criti-
cal attitudes toward nonconforming conduct per se, not in
virtue of being referred to by an authoritative source.
The relevant behavior in each case is regarded by some
(at least) as a standard to which everyone must conform.
In contrast, in a legal culture it is not necessary
(although it is possible) that the behaviors required
or forbidden by these commandments are the subjects of
rules that "exist” in Hart's sense. What is required for
these behaviors to be the subjects of the rules of a legal
culture is the "existence" in the society of a validating
rule that identifies rules concerning those behaviors as
rules of the society; i.e., the members of society, or
some of them, must regard as determinative of the duties
of ^11 whatever behaviors are referred to by rules speci-
fied by some particular source (e.g., a sacred scroll, a
particular stone tablet, the Magna Carta, the Constitu-
tion). Rules identified by such a recognition rule are
27
valid rules of the society. A legal obligation is an
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obligation that arises under a valid rule.^®
The concept of a rule of recognition and the deriva-
tive concepts of legal validity and legal obligation en-
able us to explain important features of modern legal
systems. These concepts provide a means of dealing with
the complexity of a legal system. As a practical matter,
only relatively few rules can "exist” in Hart's sense in
any given social group. For example, the Internal Revenue
Code contains provisions that state or imply, alone or in
conjunction with other provisions, that if an individual
or entity engages in certain kinds of transactions then
that individual or entity must pay a tax of some speci-
fied amount. There are many such provisions. Typically,
a taxable transaction t^’po is identified by a very com-
plex property. In general, it is empirically likely
that for any given transaction type, T^, where according
to the Internal Revenue Code it is not permissible to
engage in T^ and not to pay a specified amount to the
Treasury, that there are relatively few individuals who
directly regard engaging in T^ and not paying the speci-
fied tax as a good reason for criticism, etc., as required
in order for a rule requiring payment of a tax if T^
occurs to "exist." Moreover, there is probably some
transaction type, T^
,
which under the Internal Revenue
Code may not occur without the payment of a tax, that,
if engaged in without payment of a tax, ^ one , including
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the legislators who enacted it, would directly regard as
a good reason for criticism. Even in those cases where
there is a critical regard concerning the taxation of a
type of transaction, it is unlikely that there would be
such regard with respect to the transaction type as
specified in its full complexity under the statute. For
example, under the Internal Revenue Code redemptions of
corporate stock are transactions taxable to the same ex-
tent as dividend distributions out of current or accumu-
lated earnings and profits, as these terms are defined
under the Code, unless the redemption has one of several
properties that qualify the transaction for taxation as a
sale or exchange of stock. The tax significance of the
presence or absence of the qualifying properties is that
the full amount of the dividend distribution is taxed at
higher ordinary income rates, whereas a "sale or exchange"
results in taxation of the gain at lower capital gain
rates (if the redeemed stock has been held for a speci-
fied length of time by the redeemed stockholder and is a
capital asset in his hands). One transaction type that
qualifies for sale or exchange treatment is a "substan-
tially disproportionate redemption." Such a redemption
occurs only if "the [redeemed] shareholder owns less than
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote "immediately after the
redemption." Moreover, there is a substantially dispro-
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portionate redemption only if the ratio that the redeemed
shareholder's voting stock after redemption bears to all
voting stock is less than 80 percent of the ratio that
the redeemed shareholder's voting stock before redemption
bears to all voting stock. Clearly it is difficult to
imagine that Hart's existence conditions could be satis-
fied for this rule— it is difficult enough even to under-
stand it, let alone to regard noncompliance with it
critically. it is less difficult to imagine the princi-
ples underlying the rule having Hartian "existence."
Thus, it is quite possible that some at least directly
possess the requisite critical regard for the principle
that economically equivalent transactions ought to be
taxed equivalently and consider redemptions without sig-
nificant erosion of control to be economically equivalent
to a dividend distribution— in each case cash is removed
from corporate solution without altering equitable owner-
ship of the corporate entity. However, even if the pur-
pose of Section 302(b)(2) is understood, and the Hartian
conditions for the "existence" of the underlying princi-
ples are satisfied (albeit only for relatively few per-
sons) we still do not have the "existence" of a rule con-
cerning the complex transactions described in Section
302(b)(2). That rule in its full complexity is a rule
of our society only in virtue of the fact that it is
referred to by a rule expression that was issued under
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conditions that are regarded in our society as giving
rise to valid rules that set forth legal obligations.
In general, in a complex legal system legal standards
will fall on a spectrum ranging from those that no one
regards directly as standards and which are thus rules of
the system only in virtue of satisfying the validation
rules to those which most people regard as standards
regardless of their satisfying the validation rules. One
of the typical functions of an adjudicator is to relate
rules accepted as rules merely because they are valid to
rules directly regarded as obligatory. The oughtishness
of some obligation claim is more easily accepted when we
see that noncompliance violates some primary rule we
accept as obligatory. This function is not unlike the
function of a priest. The faithful accept the oughtish-
ness of a rule "A must be done" merely on the ground that
God issued the rule, since the faithful accept the ought-
ishness of the rule that rules issued by God ought to be
obeyed. The priest contributes to the maintenance of the
system of rules by explaining how failure to do A is
inconsistent with some values that the faithful have
independently of God's commands.
Summary
Several important aspects of Hart's characterization
of a legal system as a union of primary and secondary
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rules should be noted before turning our attention to
some criticisms of Hart's theory.
First, as we have seen, the theory provides an
account of legal validity;
To say that a given rule is valid is torecognize it as passing all the testsprovided by the rule of recognition andso as a rule of the system. We can in-
^ Statement that aparticular rule is valid means that it
satisfies all the criteria provided bythe rule of recognition. 29
This account of legal validity accommodates the fact that
many rules are part of a legal system even though they do
not exist as social rules. Such rules are laws even
though they are too complex (such as the tax statute de-
scribed above), or widely disfavored (such as prohibition
laws were), or long disused (such as the witchcraft law
referred to by Hart^^ to exist as social rules. On the
other hand, this account of legal validity explains why
certain rules that do exist as social rules nevertheless
are not legal rules. In particular, a social rule, such
as a rule of etiquette, is not a legal rule unless it
passes the tests of the rules of recognition.
Secondly, Hart's theory accounts for the social basis
of a legal system. A rule is a legal rule only if it is
either a social rule (namely, a rule of recognition) or a
rule that passes the tests provided by the rules of recog-
nition. Consequently, all laws have a social source.
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Thirdly, there is no necessity under Hart's theory
that legal rules satisfy moral criteria, unless the rules
of recognition specify that legal rules must meet certain
moral requirements. Moreover, it is a contingent matter
of fact whether the rules of recognition of a particular
group contain moral tests which a rule must pass in order
to qualify as a legal rule.
Fourthly, it is a contingent matter whether a par-
ticular factual situation is regulated by a legal rule;
that IS, there may be "gaps" in the legal system. Such
gaps occur under Hart's theory where according to the
rules of recognition there is no specific legal material
applicable to the facts of a case and the rules of recog-
nition do not identify any general gap-filling rule (e.g.,
a closure rule according to which anything that is not
otherwise prohibited is legally permissible).
Fifthly, nothing Hart says precludes the logical
possibility of inconsistent laws being validated by the
rules of recognition. For example, a rule of recognition
may provide that the enactments of a particular legisla-
tive booy are legal rules but may fail to identify any
provision for dealing with inconsistent enactments. In
such a case, the addressees of the inconsistent enactments
would be subject to inconsistent legal obligations. Ordi-
this difficulty will not arise since the recogni-
tion rules of actual legal systems identify legal rules
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of priority that eliminate inconsistency. For example,
there may be a rule according to which later enactments
supercede prior inconsistent enactments; or there may be
a rule according to which later enactments are narrowly
construed so as to be consistent with prior enactments
unless the later enactment specifically repeals the prior
enactment; and so on.^^ However, there is no requirement
under Hart's theory that any particular legal system have
such rules.
Finally, under Hart's theory, the expression of a
particular rule refers to a legal rule of a group because
the rule referred to has certain properties which at
least some members of the group regard as identifying the
rules that apply to the group. Hart maintains that it is
erroneous to suppose that "the bulk of society
.
.
.
gener-
ally share, accept, or regard as binding the ultimate
rule of recognition specifying the criteria in terms of
which the validity of laws are ultimately assessed.
Rather, "in a complex modern state ... the reality of
the situation is that a great proportion of ordinary
citizens perhaps a majority—have no general conception
of the legal structure or of its criteria of validity.
^^^thermore, it is possible that only a handful of people
in the group regard as sources of obligations the direc-
tives that are identified by the rule of recognition as
rules applicable to the group. Each of the other members
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of the group individually may regard such directives
merely as orders that must be obeyed in order to avoid
sanctions. in short:
[Ojbeying a rule (or an order) needinvolve no thought on the part of theperson obeying that what he does is theright thing both for himself and for
need have no view of
^ fulfillment of a stan-dard of behaviour for others of the socialgroup.
Many of these features of Hart's theory are directly
or implicitly called into question by the critics and com-
mentators discussed in the following chapter. The discus-
sion of their views will enable us to obtain a more com-
plete understanding of Hart's theory.
chapter I V
CRITICS OF THE SOCIAL RULE THEORY OF LAW
Social Rules, Norms, and or
one source of misunderstanding of Hart's theory is
the failure to distinguish between Hart's treatment of
believing or accepting a rule and the concept of a rule
se. J. w. Harris' argument that Hart's theory is
inconsistent seems to be based on this misunderstanding.
However, before considering Harris' argument, it may be
noted that some of Hart's claims, such as the claim that
a society without a rule-recognition rule is marked by
uncertainty about what the rules of obligation of the
group are, are unfortunate, because they contribute to
the misunderstanding of his basic theory. m Hart's ter-
minology, if there is no rule of recognition in a group,
then a particular obligation rule is a rule of that group
only if the rule exists in that group—that is, only if
the rule is a social rule. As we have seen. Hart argues
that a social rule asserting that some behavior is
required or forbidden "exists" only if deviations from
that behavior pattern are considered to be a good reason
for criticism and are in fact generally criticized. Hart
maintains that these two conditions imply that at least
some members of the group "look upon the behaviour in
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question as a general standard to be followed by the
group as a whole. These conditions identify two key
elements in the social situation in which a rule "exists":
First, there is an "external" feature of the social situa-
tion that consists of negative behavioral responses to
conduct that does not conform to the behavior type speci-
fied by the rule. Second, there is an "internal" feature
that consists of acceptance of the rule as a rule appli-
cable to the group.
Hart appears to think that there may be uncertainty
about the identity of existent, or ^ facto rules of a
social group because he tends to rely on behavioral
manifestations of believing and other mental phenomena
as the means of establishing that a rule has been ac-
cepted. However, an account of the psychological phe-
nomenon of accepting a rule based on behavioral manifesta-
tions is not equivalent to a reduction of normative phe-
nomena into complexes of behavior. In fact. Hart does
not tell us about the ontological characteristics of
rules. Rather, he appears to tell us that a rule, what-
ever it is, establishes a social obligation of a group
if the rule is accepted and regarded by members of the
group as a rule that includes the members of the group
within its domain of applicability. Since Hart looks
at this social situation from the perspective of someone
who is trying to determine what another person believes
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to be normatively required, and since he analyzes believ-
ina in terms of behavioral manifestations, he focuses
on expressions of approval or disapproval of certain
actions, tendencies to criticize certain conduct, and so
Given this approach, there is uncertainty about what
rules are i.e., about what the identity of the ob-
jects of belief or acceptance are-to the extent that
there is doubt about whether some verbal or nonverbal
behavior is or signifies believing or accepting one rule
rather than another. However, Hart's reliance on behav-
ioral manifestations of acceptance of a rule is not incon-
sistent with the theory that a legal rule is "a 'pure
norm, that is, ... an ought or may meaning-content,"
which is the theory that Harris attributes to Kelsen.^
Rules are propositions containing a normative element;
they are the meanings of rule expressions—sentences con-
taining "ought" or terms logically related to "ought," or
sentences or symbolic conduct analyzable in terms of sen-
tences containing such terras.^ Harris, however, attri-
butes to Hart the following quite different hypotheses:
A positive legal rule is to be equated
with a ’rule situation,
' that is, with
3 social situation in which a certain
pattern of behaviour is regarded as a
standard .
^
A legal system is to be equated with a
social situation in which obligation-
standards—that is, standards enforced
by strong social pressure— are generally
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observed, and the officials of the so-
which patterns of
0 f^nIi°oM to the creationot ew obligation-standards .5
This interpretation of Hart seems to be based on the view
that Hart reduces or "equates" legal norms with complexes
of behavior. m contrast, the interpretation of Hart
advanced here is that Hart regards legal rules as "pure
norms" and is giving us a theory about when a particular
norm "applies to" a certain group or is "in force" in that
group. A rule that applies or "exists" in virtue of
acceptance of it as a standard is a social rule. The rule
pplies because a certain social situation exists, but the
rule is not equivalent to that social situation.
Harris’ argument that Hart’s theory is inconsistent
is based on the view that Hart maintains both that legal
rules are equivalent to "rule situations" (i.e., certain
complexes of behavior) and that they are equivalent to
"pure norms" (i.e., propositions containing deontic ele-
ments). Harris argues that the latter view is implicit
in Hart’s discussion of rule-skepticism, since Hart’s
conception of a rule as an entity that has a "core of
settled meaning" is coherent only if rules are pure norms.
That is, a deontic proposition logically might have a "core
of settled meaning, " but a complex of behavior is not an
ontologically appropriate subject of such a property.^
Although Harris’ argument about the implications of Hart’s
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treatment of rule-skepticism seems correct, he is not cor-
rect in his conclusion that Hart has been inconsistent in
his account of legal rules. For the reasons already cited,
Harris appears to reach his erroneous conclusion because
he mistakes Hart's reliance on behavioral manifestations
in his characterization of the psychological phenomenon
of believing that a rule is a standard that applies to
one's group for a reductive analysis of the rules which
in this case are the objects of belief.
Hart can consistently maintain that the conditions
for the existence of a social rule, rather than operating
as an analysis of rules, define a function that selects
from the set of all rules a subset of rules that apply to
the members of a particular social group. m contrast, we
can think of moral rules as the members of the subset of
the set of all rules that is selected by the function
defined by the correct moral theory. The rules of base-
ball are members of the subset of all rules that is
selected by the function defined by the theory of base-
ball. And so on. These subsets of rules need not be
mutually exclusive. Some members of the set of moral
rules might belong to one or more sets of social rules.
In the case of social rules, a rule of recognition is
picked out of the set of rules by the social-rule
existence-condition function. That rule, in turn, picks
out other rules from the set of rules. A social rule of
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recognition and the rules validated by such a rule are
the rules of a group simply because they are treated as
such by members of the group.
Possibility of Inconsistent r.^^w.c;
A second criticism of Hart's theory is implied by
Harris' own theory of law and is not based on a mis-
understanding of Hart's theory. Harris proposes the fol-
lowing fundamental schema, which he calls "the basic
legal science fiat"
:
Legal duties exist only if imposed (and
not excepted) by rules originating inthe following sources:
... or by rules
subsumable under such rules. Providedthat any contradiction between rules
originating in different sources shallbe resolved according to the following
ranking amongst the sources:
... and pro-
vided that no other contradiction shallbe a^itted to exist, (ellipsis in origi-
nal ) ‘ ^
The aspect of this conception of law that conflicts with
Hart's theory as it has been interpreted here is the
thesis that it is impossible for a single legal system to
have inconsistent legal norms. Elsewhere, Harris charac-
terizes the principle of non-contradiction as:
[T]hat principle in accordance with which
legal science rejects the possibility of
describing a legal system in such a way
that one could affirm the existence of a
duty, and also the non-existence of a
duty, covering the same act-situation
on the same occasion.^
Harris is not merely stating that as a matter of fact all
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existing legal systems have rules for eliminating incon-
sistencies among laws. Rather, he argues that his prin-
ciple of non-contradiction is "part of the 'logic' of
legal science.*'^
Harris characterization of the principle of non-
contradiction and his incorporation of it in the "basic
legal science fi^- do not preclude one interpretation
that IS consistent with Hart's theory. Namely, the prin-
ciple might be construed as the statement that:
(p) (It is not possible that (Op & ~ Op)),
where "0" is a deontic operator for legal norms of a par-
ticular legal system and "p" is a proposition. This prin
ciple is compatible with Hart's theory: it merely states
that it is not possible that some rule both is and is not
a legal rule of a particular legal system. For example,
it is not possible that a legislature has enactd a par-
ticular law and that it has not enacted that law, where
being enacted by a legislature is a criterion for identi-
fying rules of the system.
However, it seems clear that Harris has in mind a
principle that does conflict with Hart's theory; namely,
the principle that it is not possible for a given legal
system to impose inconsistent obligations. The notion
of inconsistent obligations can be elucidated simply in
terms of the concept of an obedience statement. A rule
of the form "_i ought not to do A" has an obedience state-
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ment of the form "i does not do A " ^xiuL a . Although statements
Of the fo™
..i ought to do A" and "i ought not to do A"
are contraries rather than contradictories, their corres-
ponding obedience statements are contradictories. since
the obedience statements corresponding to these two rules
are contradictories, it is impossible for both of these
rules to be obeyed or conformed to simultaneously. Thus,
we can say that inconsistent obligations are obligations
the obligation statements for which have corresponding
obedience statements that are contradictories
.
in his article on Kelsen's theory. Hart specifically
notes that the logical impossibility of joint obedience
to two rules does not imply that it is logically impos-
sible for the two rules "to coexist as valid rules either
of the same or different systems. With respect to the
possibility of conflicting laws in the same legal system.
Hart states that "... though it would certainly be deplor-
able on every practical score if laws of a single legal
system conflicted and the system provided no way of
resolving such conflicts, it is still far from obvious
that even this is a logical impossibility."^^ He then
notes that on the issue of the possibility of inconsis-
tent laws, legal rules, and second-person orders appear to
be on a par, and it seems clear enough that it is possible
for an individual to issue inconsistent orders. Inasmuch
as Hart's views in The Concept of Law appear to conform to
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the views expressed in the article on Kelsen, it seems
fair to conclude that Hart's theory permits the possi-
bility of inconsistent laws, whereas Harris' theory does
not.
Despite Hart's apparent commitment to the thesis
that inconsistent laws are logically possible, he alludes
to an argument against that thesis in his statement that
If an individual "insisted on producing streams of incon-
sistent orders and these could not be explained, e.g,,
by lapse of memory, we should conclude that he did not
understand what he was saying, and might well refuse to
classify what he said as constituting orders at all,"^^
Although Hart does not explain this statement, he may
have in mind the view that if it is not logically pos-
sible for the addressees of a law (or order) to conform
to its requirements, then it is not a directive or action-
guiding entity and thus is not a law (or order) at all.
Such an argument is made by von Wright in Norm and Action .
Von Wright poses the question of inconsistency as follows:
It is clear that it is logically impos-
sible for one and the same agent to do
f^o^tear the same thing on the same
occasion. But is it logically impos-
sible to command or permit an agent to
do and forbear the same thing on the
same occasion? If commanding and per-
mitting consisted just in shouting out
certain words to him, then this would
not be impossible . 14
Von Wright rejects this conception of prescriptions and
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argues that a statement of obligation
'expresses or mani-
fests a will to make agents do or forbear certain things"
and a statement of permission expresses or manifests "a
will to let agents do or forbear certain things." How-
ever, according to von Wright, "the normative relation-
ship, in the existence of which the existence of the pre-
scription consists" exists only if it is logically pos-
sible for the subjects of the prescription to do or for-
bear those things the issuer of the prescription wants
to make or let them do or forbear. in short:
If for reasons of logic, these things
cannot be done (and forborne) one cannot
make or let agents do or forbear them.
Therefore, neither can one command orpermit or prohibit them to agents. Suchprescriptions cannot 'exist. '15
This argument is not persuasive since the conclusion
does not appear to follow from von Wright's premises. In
particular, although it is true that the issuer of an
order cannot make his addressee do something that it is
logically impossible to do, it does not follow that a
command to that effect can't be given, unless one adopts
the improbable thesis that commanding an act to be per-
formed is equivalent to making the addressee perform the
act in question. The more supportable thesis that von
Wright begins with--namely
,
that a prescription is the
expression of a will to make the addressee do or forbear
some action—does not support his conclusion, inasmuch
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as it see^s entirely possible to will that someone do
something that cannot be done. Similarly, it seems to
be entirely possible for there to exist a social rule of
recognition that identifies inconsistent rules as rules
applicable to a group.
Although Harris presents his version of the non-
contradiction principle as an aspect of the "logic of
legal science," his argument in fact is based on certain
principles of political philosophy. Harris argues that
legality "... is a constituent element of the rules of
all officials in societies with developed legal institu-
tions. "Legality" and "the value of legality" are
terms Harris uses to refer to the political principle that
If a legal rule and the known facts imply a particular
practical conclusion (e.g., if a legal rule states or
implies that Smith ought to pay five dollars to Jones if
X has occurred, and x has occurred, so that Smith ought
to pay Jones), then officials (especially judges) ought
to make and enforce that decision. Apparently, the state-
ment that the principle of legality is a constituent ele-
ment of a developed legal system is not an empirical
observation but a conceptual claim. Thus, according to
Harris, no system of rules lacking this principle is a
legal system.
Harris relates the thesis that a legal system cannot
contain inconsistent legal rules to the thesis that a
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legal system must include the principle of legality:
IS an explicit role-value ofofficials, especially of judges. One of
'^hich the organized might ofthe modern state is filtered down to theindividual is through official decisionswhich purport to apply the law. This
mechanism would be gravely impaired ifjudges were regularly to announce that
whatever they did they would be acting
contrary to law. Instead, they purportto reconcile' seemingly contradictorylegal rules binding on them. 17
The upshot of this argument is that unless inconsistencies
among the rules of a system are precluded, then the prin-
ciple of legality cannot be satisfied in that system, and
therefore that system cannot be a legal system.
The flaw in this argum.ent is that there is no reason
to think that the application of inconsistent rules under-
mines the principle of legality. All that the principle
of legality holds is that judges ought to apply any appli-
cable legal rules in the cases that come before them. A
judge can satisfy this principle even if inconsistent
rules are applicable in a given case. What is not pos
sible is for the individual to whom inconsistent rules
are applied to conform to the requirements of such rules.
We are thus left v/ith Hart's conclusion that whereas it
may be deplorable to have a legal system that subjects
individuals to inconsistent legal requirements, there is
nothing logically impossible about such a situation.
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Legal Validity and the Trlea of
A third criticism of Hart's
recent article by Roscoe Hill.^®
theory is presented in a
Hill argues that Hart
presents two radically distinct and apparently inconsis-
tent theories of legal obligation. On the one hand, Hart
gives a straightforward positivistic theory of legal obli-
gation. According to this theory legal obligation is
explained in terms of legal validity. m particular, an
individual has a legal obligation to perform some act. A,
in a society, s, if and only if there is a valid rule of S
according to which one ought to do A. Legal validity, in
turn, IS broadly defined in terms of satisfaction of the
criteria specified by a socially-accepted authorizing norm
that IS, a rule is valid just in case it meets the tests
established by the rule of recognition, which exists
simply by virtue of the fact that it actually is used as
the basis for identifying valid rules. This conception
of legal validity is considered to be a broad one because
there are no limitations on the content of the rules
authorized by the validating rule. A valid rule might
state a moral requirement, it might be morally neutral,
or it might be morally repugnant. Regardless of its moral
merit, however, a valid rule establishes a legal obliga-
tion, according to the positivist account. Hill maintains
that- the positivist account of legal validity establishes
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IS iggaJ-ly obliged to act in accordance with a
rule that is legally valid. That is, "one should expect
the authorities to apply sanctions if they catch him devi-
ating from the rule, or law. in question. However,
according to Hill, legal validity ^ does not estab-
lish that there is a legal obligation. Hill's view
appears to be that inasmuch as Hart maintains the posi-
tivistic thesis that legal validity establishes legal ob-
ligation, his theory is indistinguishable from the Austin-
lan coercive orders theory, and that neither Hart's
theory nor the coercive orders theory yields anything of
normative significance to the extent that it treats as
sources of obligations valid rules that fail to conform
to principles of justice and that may even fail to qualify
as rules that are regarded as desirable or just by any
members of the group.
On the other hand, in contrast to the standard posi-
tivist account of legal obligation in terms of legal
validity. Hill argues that Hart gives the foundations of
a more adequate account of legal obligation based on "the
general idea of obligation." Hill notes that in Section 2
("The Idea of Obligation") of Chapter V ("Law as the Union
of Primary and Secondary Rules") Hart states that under-
standing "the general idea of obligation" is a "necessary
preliminary" to understanding legal obligation. Hill
maintains that this statement is inconsistent with Hart's
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commitment to positivistic analysis of legal
in terms of legal validity:
obligation
The positivist doctrine that legal valid-
rSlv^cuts^th^® obligation irrepa-ably cuts the connection between 'the
obligation’ and 'its legal
, rendering false the claim that
understanding the general idea of legal[Sic] obligation is a 'necessary prelimi-nary to understanding obligatiL in itslegal form. Since we can analyze and
understand the 'wider' concept of legal
validity [according to which unjust lawsmay be valid] without reference to 'thegeneral Idea of obligation' we can also,presumably, understand and analyze the(wider’) concept of legal obligation
without such a reference.
Hill proposes to resolve the alleged inconsistency not by
eliminating Hart's analysis of the "general idea of obli-
gation" but by rejecting the thesis that a valid law en-
tails the existence of a legal obligation. The rationale
for this resolution is that Hill finds a basis for what
he considers to be an acceptable form of normativity in
Hart's discussion of the general idea of obligation, but
not in the positivist analysis of legal validity.
Hiil ^^9^uss that the distinction between the "in-
ternal" and the "external" point of view, which Hart
introduces in order to distinguish habitual behavior from
rule following, can be made without reference to any eval-
uative elements. That is, a rule can be followed and con-
duct can be meaningfully and correctly justified or criti-
cized with reference to a rule, and so on, without any
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judgment being made about whether the rule is good, just,
or desirable and regardless of whether the rule in fact
'
has any of those qualities. In contrast, according to
Hxll, in distinguishing between being obliged and having
an obligation and in distinguishing between social rules
that impose obligations and those that do not impose
obligations. Hart introduces an evaluative element. Hill
believes that this evaluative element guarantees that
rules that impose legal obligations have moral signifi-
cance
:
On the one hand, to apply the concept
legally obliged (or to assertthat one is legally obliged by a givenlaw) simply involves the (value-free)
recognition that the law in question
i-e., that the law passes
all the tests provided by the rule of
recognition, and that the law will be
enforced. On the other hand, to applythe concept of legal obligation (or, to
assert, from the 'inside,' that a givenlaw imposes a legal obligation) involvesthe (value-charged) recognition that thelaw conforms to the 'true' principles ofjustice and morality, that it serves the
interest, the general welfare,
etc.“^^
It is not entirely clear what Hill means when he says that
legal obligation "involves the recognition" that the law
in question conforms to the principles of justice. In
his example of the legal obligations of the draftee with
a dependent parent. Hill refers only to the draftee's
beliefs that conscription and the purposes for which and
means by which it is carried out are "just and necessary."
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This example suggests that Hill’s view is that in order
rule to give rise to a legal obligation it is neces-
sary only that at least some members of the group believe
that the rule in question conforms to principles of jus-
tice. However, the thrust of Hill’s argument in general
appears to be that a rule imposes a legal obligation only
If It actually does conform to ’’true” principles of jus-
tice
.
Nevertheless, Hill does not maintain that being sub-
ject to a legal obligation necessarily determines one's
moral obligations. Thus, he distinguishes between being
legally obliged, having a legal obligation, and having a
moral obligation. Thus, in the example of the draftee
with the dependent parent. Hill argues that the individ-
ual may have a moral obligation to care for his parent in
violation of his legal obligation to report for military
service--which by hypothesis arises by virtue of its being
called for by principles of justice. On the other hand.
Hill argues that whereas one might have a moral obliga-
tion not to engage in certain acts which are also prohib-
ited by a valid rule of law, one may have no legal obli-
gation not to engage in the act. For example, it might
be argued that abortion is morally impermissible, and
abortion may in fact be legally prohibited, but there may
be no legal obligation not to perform an abortion under
s analysis because the prohibition of abortion is
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inconsistent with the principles of justice.
Hill's argument is mistaken in two respects
to our present purposes. First, Hill is mistaken
claim that Hart's account of legal validity and 1
relevant
in his
egal
obligation is "incoherent" or inconsistent. Second, Hill
is mistaken in his claim that Hart introduces evaluative
elements that guarantee that legal obligations are
grounded in principles of justice and therefore possess
justified normativity. These points are intertwined and
can be discussed in conjunction.
We have already seen that Hill argues that Hart's
theory is inconsistent because the account of legal obli-
gation in terms of legal validity does not refer to or
contain "evaluative" elements whereas the account of legal
obligation in terms of the general idea of obligation al-
legedly does not refer to or contain evaluative elements.
Hill bases this allegation on the fact that in drawing the
distinction between being obliged and being obligated Hart
makes various second-person statements that appear to call
on the reader's intuitions about what qualifies as the
content of an obligation. Thus, Hart says that with res-
pect to the situation in which A orders B to hand over
his money and threatens to harm B if B fails to comply,
^ would say that B was obliged to act, but that ^ would
misdescribe the situation if we said that B had an obliga-
tion to act. Hill's argument, therefore, is that Hart is
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able to make out the distinction only by appealing to his
reader's substantive judgments about what in fact is and
is not obligatory.
Hill's analysis of Hart's distinction between social
rules that impose duties and those that do not is less
direct. on the one hand, Hart follows a similar method
of arguing that we would say certain behaviors called for
by a rule are obligatory but that we would misdescribe
the situation to say that certain behaviors called for by
another rule are obligatory. On the other hand, Hill
acknowledges that in characterizing the conditions under
which a social rule is a rule of obligation. Hart does
not refer to or call for any substantive judgments. Thus,
Hart states that social rules "are conceived and spoken
of as imposing obligations" only if:
[1] the general demand for conformity
insistent and the social pressurebrought to bear upon those who deviate
or threaten to deviate is great.
[^] the rules supported by this serious
pressure are thought important because
they are believed to be necessary to the
maintenance of social life or some highly
prized feature of it.
[3] ... the conduct required by these
rules may, while benefitting others,
conflict with what the person who owes
the duty may wish to do. 2
3
These conditions look only at how rules are regarded by
members of a group. No appeal is made to the reader's
intuitions about which rules really are necessary to the
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maintenance of social life and so on. However, Hill
thinks that Hart rs covertly appealing to such substan-
tive judgments and that failure to do so makes the issue
Of legal obligation "turn upon sociological facts and
methods, not upon conceptual or philosophical issues. "24
Clearly, something has gone amiss here. One of the
principal points of Hart's theory is to show how legal ob-
ligation is a matter of sociological facts. That is, the
social rule theory endeavors to reveal the conventional
social basis of legal rules and the obligations aris-
ing under them. Hill is correct that legal normativity
under Hart's theory involves evaluative aspects in addi-
tion to the evaluations implicitly involved in rule
following and justifying and criticizing conduct relative
to a rule. That is, under Hart's theory there is at
least one social rule—namely, the rule of recognition—
and it exists because at least some members of the group
accent and regard it as appropriate for the purpose of
Identifying the rules that apply to the group. However,
there is no requirement that the rule of recognition of
a group conform to the principles of justice. Nor is it
necessary that those whose favorable attitudes toward the
use of a particular rule of recognition is the reason for
Its existence believe that the rule of recognition they
are using conforms to the principles of justice. Further-
more, under Hart’s theory there is no requirement that the
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rules identified under a rule of recognition either (A)
conform to or be believed by any member of the group to
conform to any principles of justice or (B) be favorably
viewed by anyone in the group except that at least some
members of the group must regard favorably the fact that
the rule possesses the qualities specified by the rule of
recognition as qualities of rules applicable to the group.
Thus, although evaluative elements are an important aspect
of the social rule theory, which we will explore further
in the next chapter. Hart does not maintain, and his
theory does not imply, that this aspect insures that con-
duct required by a social rule or conduct required by a
rule validated by a social rule will be required or per-
mitted by the principles of justice. Nevertheless, it
seems that Hart takes such rules to be the sort of rules
that are determinative of one's legal obligations.
Hill's misconceptions about Hart's analysis of social
rules of obligation is reflected in his conclusion that
Hart has two incompatible theories of legal obligation--
one based on legal validity and devoid of normative sig-
and the other based on the general idea of obli-
gation and possessing normative significance. The discus-
sion of the general idea of obligation is necessary to
illuminate the idea of a rule of recognition. The rule
of recognition is a social rule which "exists" in the
social situation, which implies both that people in fact
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employ the rule to evaluate conduct and that they regard
what it requires as a standard that must be followed by
everyone, what the rule of recognition requires is that
rules that satisfy certain criteria be used as rules of
the group. The members of society may not directly view
any of the validated rules as setting proper standards of
behavior, but the rules are linked to something—namely
,
the rule of recognition that is directly regarded by at
least some persons as establishing a standard. However,
a rule that no one has a favorable attitude towards never-
theless IS a source of obligation if it passes the tests
that are regarded as conclusive of whether a rule estab-
lishes an obligation for members of the group.
In summary, given a proper understanding of the vari-
ous elements of Hart's theory, and in particular of the
relationship between the rule of recognition, which is a
social rule, and rules validated by the rule of recogni-
tion, there is no basis for Hill's argument that Hart's
theory (inconsistently) articulates the view that one is
legally obliged to act just in case there is a valid rule
requiring the act but that one is legally obligated to
act only if there is a valid rule requiring the act,
where the rule in question conforms to substantive prin-
ciples of justice.
Ill
one of the most persistent critics of Hart's social
rule theory is Ronald Dworkin, who has criticized Hart's
positivism and developed his own theory in a number of
articles, 25 which in turn have attracted numerous coramen-
tators. Although a detailed examination of Dworkin'
s
views is beyond the scope of this study, the principal
arguments of interest for our purposes can be set forth
and analyzed with reasonable brevity.
J. Raz Identifies three central theses defended by
Dworkin, especially in "Hard Cases": (i) The "Natural
Law Thesis," according to which the determination of what
IS and what is not law necessarily depends in part on
what IS and what is not moral; (ii) The "Conservative
Thesis," according to which "all judicial decisions are
and should be justified on the basis of that political
theory which best justifies all valid enactments and
binding decisions," and (iii) The "Rights Thesis" (Dwor-
kin' s term), according to which adjudication is and
should be a matter of enforcing existing legal rights and
not of judicially legislating new legal relations
.
These theses are related by the view that judges have an
obligation to enforce extant rights and that this obli-
gation cannot be accounted for if there is only a social
rule of recognition for identifying legal norms; further.
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the Moral criteria that are necessarily involved in order
to account for the duties of a judge ensure that there
always will be a "right answer" tnyuu o the question of what
legal rights exist in any particular case. The first
two theses are directed at Hart's theory that a legal
system necessarily has a so^ rule of recognition that
establishes what is and is not law and that whether this
rule incorporates substantive moral criteria is a contin-
gent matter. The last thesis engages Hart's thesis that
there may be "gaps" in the rules identified by a social
rule of recognition so that in some cases a judge must
exercise "discretion" in reaching a decision and in such
cases necessarily must fail to enforce an antecedently
existing legal right, since many of Dworkin's arguments
have their genesis in his rejection of the thesis that
judges do or should have discretion, it is convenient to
begin with that issue.
Both Dworkin and Hart appear to assume that adjudi-
cation IS a process of reasoning from general norms and
particular statements of fact to particular practical con-
clusions. That is, the form of judicial decision-making
is: (i) according to the law of society, S, all F's
ought to do G; (ii) individual i is an F; (iii) therefore,
according to the law of S, i ought to do G. Whatever
shortcomings this schema may have as a general account of
legal reasoning, it captures the idea that adjudication
113
involves the "application'- of "legal material" to par
ticular facts to reach determinate conclusions.
Where Dworkin and Hart appear to part company is
over the issue of whether legal decisions are invariably
possible. Roughly, Hart thinks that it is in principle
impossible and in practice undesirable to have legal
material that antecedently resolves every factual situa-
tion of conflict with complete determinacy. it is impos
sible in principle to achieve complete determinacy
because legal materials-legal norms-are expressed in
general terms whose inherent vagueness precludes complete
determinacy in applying them to particular cases. Legal
norms have an 0£en texture that interferes with the opera
tion of the practical syllogism of legal reasoning:
Whichever device, precedent or legisla-
tion, is chosen for the communication
of standards of behaviour, these, how-
^ver smoothly they work over the great
mass of ordinary cases, will, at some
point where their application is in
question, prove indeterminate; they will
have what has been termed an open tex-
*
*
.
^*-^^tainty at the borderline
IS the price to be paid for use of gen-
eral classifying terms in any form of
communication concerning matters of
fact. Natural languages like English
are when so used irreducibly ooen tex-
tured. 28
In addition. Hart argues that it is often undesirable to
adopt legal norms that can be expressed with the maximum
specificity that language permits. A vague proposition
of law can be adapted more easily to unanticipated factual
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situations and permits shifts in the goals sought to be
furthered by the adoption of the norm.^^ Finally, al-
though Hart does not focus on this point, the fact that
the existence of law is a matter of fact contingent upon
what is provided by a social rule of recognition implies
that there may be gaps in the law such that no rule of
law specifies the rights of the persons involved in a
case and the rule of recognition does not provide a clo-
sure rule according to which that which is not specifi-
cally prohibited is specifically permitted.
According to Hart, when adjudication of a dispute is
impossible—that is, when the application of legal mate-
rial to the facts of a case does not produce a determinate
practical conclusion—then the resolution of the practical
question of what an individual is legally required or per-
mitted to do is discretionary. A discretionary decision
IS an instance of legislation or the creation of a legal
norm rather than an instance of adjudication or the appli-
cation of extant legal norms to the facts of a case. By
hypothesis, discretionary decisions are not based upon
the application of legal norms, but upon the application
of non-legal criteria. Taking the example discussed by
Hart of the rule prohibiting the use of motor vehicles
in the park, and supposing that an ambulance has been
used in the park to rescue an injured person, the ques-
tion of whether use of the ambulance is prohibited
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appears to be logically foreclosed by the fact that the
ambulance is a motor vehicle. However, there may be
other 1^ norms that narrow the generality of the rule.
For example, there may be a legal rule that exempts uses
relating to the delivery of emergency services from the
rules regarding the use of the park. On the other hand,
there may be no 1^ norms that preclude the application
of the general rule to the ambulance case, but the rule
may be treated as "open textured" by an adjudicator in
order to avoid what are deemed for extra-legal reasons to
be undesirable results.
Dworkin's complaint about Hart's account is that
whereas Hart believes that some cases cannot and should
not be adjudicated, but must be decided legislatively by
the adjudicator's exercise of discretion, Dworkin thinks
that all disputes can and should be adjudicated. Dwor-
kin's argument in "The Model of Rules," in relevant part,
is that Hart failed to see that all cases can be adjudi-
cated because he only accounted for legal rules and
failed to account for legal material that Dworkin calls
"principles." Dworkin maintains that Hart's failure to
account for principles is due to Hart's mistaken belief
that no proposition is a proposition of law unless it is
validated by a "master rule of recognition" that stipu-
lates the necessary and sufficient conditions for a norm's
being a legal norm, and that principles are norms that do
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not pass any litmus test established by social practice
that separates legal from non-legal norms.
The cogency of Dworkin's argument depends upon the
assumption that there are items distinct from rules that
Hart failed to take into account and that cannot be ac-
counted for by Hart's social rule theory. Even if there
are certain norms-principles-that are distinct from
rules, if Hart's theory does not exclude them from the
domain of legal material, then Dworkin has not engaged
Hart's thesis that some cases cannot be adjudicated on
the basis of extant legal rules that yield determinate
practical conclusions. Furthermore, even if there are
principles, as distinct from rules, the existence of
which as legal norms cannot be accounted for by a social
rule of recognition, it must be shown that the addition
of principles to the domain of legal material eliminates
the need for discretionary adjudicatory decisions.
Before examining Dworkin's principal arguments, one
non-argument that underlies much of his presentation
should be considered. Dworkin appears in part to base
his claims that there are legal principles distinct from
legal rules and that the application of principles to the
facts of a case produces determinate practical conclusions
on a particular understanding of the phenomenology of
judicial decision-making. Dworkin seems to think that
since (in Anglo-American legal systems) we experience the
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of **]ri3jrcl i-]-i=>+-nara cases
—that is, cases that Hart
thinks are decided by the exem'r rcise of discretion in the
absence of legal norms that yield determinate results-
as having been constrained by law and since we identify
the constraining factors as principles, then there are
in fact legal principles that constrain decisions in
cases where the application of rules fail to determine
a result.
Aside from the fact that the felt legal necessity of
a juaicial decision does not logically entail that the
decision is in fact legally necessary, the phenomenology
of judicial decision-making itself does not conclusively
support the view that all judicial decisions are con-
strained by legal norms. Although some judges may char-
acterize their decisions in "hard cases" as vindications
of pre-existing legal rights, other judges characterize
their decisions in such cases as the legislative creation
of legal rights and duties. It is not uncommon for a
court to acknowledge the novelty of a case, to consider
competing rules of law that are applied in other juris-
dictions, and to adopt one of those rules or some other
rule as the law of its jurisdiction. Furthermore, regard-
less of the court's characterization of its decision,
the respective party's perceptions of the decision may
well differ. For example, in the well-known case of
Hennigsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,^^ which Dworkin dis-
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cusses, the court ruled that a written contract for the
purchase and sale of an automobile agreed to by the pur-
chaser and containing a limited warranty and disclaimer
of liability for damage caused by defective parts was
ineffective, so that the manufacturer of the automobile
could be required to pay damages for personal injuries
caused by defective parts notwithstanding the contractual
agreement to the contrary. The injured plaintiff in
Hennigsen may have experienced the decision of the court
as a vindication of her legal rights, but the defendant
who had not insured against liability for defective prod-
ucts, on the assumption (grounded on existing legal rules
about the power of individuals to arrange their respective
rights and duties by mutual assent) that an assented- to
limited warranty and disclaimer of liability was an effec-
tive bar to liability, probably experienced the court's
decision as ex post facto legislation, in short, even if
the phenomenological facts had a bearing on the soundness
of Dworkin's position, they do not conform to his charac-
terization and so do not favor his position in any event.
The first substantive argument offered by Dworicin is
intended to support the thesis that rules and principles
are distinguishable kinds of norms. Dworkin claims that
"[t]he difference between legal principles and legal rules
is a logical distinction."^^ Rules and principles are en-
tities the ontological characteristics of which presumably
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are such that a logical distinction between them is re-
flected in a difference in the logical forms by which they
are expressed. Unfortunately, Dworkin has not provided us
with a formal characterization that elucidates the claim
that rules and principles are logically distinct. More-
over, his claim that "[i]t is not always clear from the
form of a standard whether it is a rule or a principle"^^
suggests that we ought not to take the claim that there
IS a logical distinction between rules and principles
very seriously. it seems reasonable to suppose that
norms are entities such that there are logical distinc-
tions among them if and only if there are differences in
the form in which they are properly expressed. Therefore,
If two norms are properly expressed by statements having
the same logical form, then it is false that there is a
logical distinction between the two norms.
Since Dworkin has not provided formal criteria for
distinguishing rules and principles, we must rely on his
less precise characterizations. Dworkin claims that
rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion"
whereas principles "... do not set out legal consequences
that follow automatically when the conditions provided
33are met. " in turn, this difference between rules and
principles is taken by Dworkin to imply that principles
do, but rules do not, have "the dimension of weight or
importance
.
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It is not clear what Dworkin-s thesis is. He appears
to be suggesting that principles are incomplete rules.
Thus, perhaps both rules and principles are properly ex-
pressed by a statement roughly to the effect that if
instances of event types E^(x,y) E^(x,y) occur, in-
volving individuals X and y, then x has a duty to y to do
A. If this statement expresses a rule, it is complete in
the sense that it conclusively settles the matter of x's
legal duty and y's legal right with respect to the perfor-
mance of A by X. However, if the statement expresses a
principle, it is an incomplete rule in the sense that the
question of x's and y's legal duties and rights is not
settled. Although the principle identifies factors that
are relevant in determining what x's and y's legal rights
ana duties are in the circumstances, whether x has a duty
to y to do A depends upon whether certain other events
have occurred. The value of a principle is in signalling
factual circumstances that have potential significance in
the ascription of legal rights and duties. For example,
the legal norm that an executory agreement that is not
supported by consideration is not legally enforceable in
an incomplete rule that focuses on potentially signifi-
cant facts in determining whether the promisee who has
not given consideration has a legal right to the perfor-
mance of the act promised by the promisor. The fact that
the promisee has not given consideration signals that the
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promisor may have no legal duty to perform the promised
act, but whether this fact is dispositive depends upon
the presence or absence of other facts, such as whether
there has been reasonable detrimental reliance by the
promisee on the promisor's promise.
Although Dworkin's presentation suggests that his
legal principles are incompletely expressed legal rules,
he rejects this interpretation on the ground that it is
theoretically impossible to enumerate the "counter-
instances" to any given legal principle. The counter-
instances cannot be enumerated, according to Dworkin,
because of "... those numberless imaginary cases in which
we know in advance that the principle would not hold."^^
Aside from the logical and ontological questions raised by
the claim that the "counter-instances" to a proposition
cannot be enumerated, this basis for rejecting the inter-
pretation of principles as incompletely-expressed rules
does not appear to help Dworkin reach his goal of demon-
strating that we never run out of legal material. By pre-
supposing that we can always reach a determinate practical
conclusion by applying a particular principle to a partic-
ular factual evaluation, he assumes that there is a "right
answer" to every legal question. Dworkin supposes that if
we run out of rules, we can turn to principles, but this
consideration yields his desired conclusion only because
he assumes that principles always yield determinate
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results
,
Although Dworkin's formal characterizations of rules
and principles do not reveal the alleged logical distinc-
tion between them, it may be possible to determine the
basis for the distinction from his examples. Dworkin
states that the legal norm according to which a will is
invalid unless it is signed by three witnesses is a legal
rule, whereas the legal norm according to which a person
IS not permitted to profit from his wrongful acts is a
legal principle. These examples suggest that the distinc-
tion IS based on whether or not it is possible for a par-
ticular type of legal norm to lack moral content. That
is, perhaps Dworkin's view is that principles necessarily
contain substantive moral content whereas rules may not.
His claim that principles state requirements of justice
and fairness suggests this criterion. However, since
nothing Dworkin (or Hart) says precludes a rule from
having moral content, this criterion is not an adequate
basis for differentiating rules and principles; that is,
a legal norm lacking moral content could only be a rule,
but a norm with moral content could be either a rule or
a principle.
Finally, although Dworkin has not recanted his argu-
alleging that Hart's theory is defective in part
because it cannot account for legal principles, it is not
clear that he still maintains the view that rules and
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principles are logically distinct and that the latter
cannot be identified by a rule of recognition.
m
"Hard cases,., principles are defined as
. propositions
that describe rights ......37
erty of "all-or-nothing applicability" is meaningful, it
seems to be characteristic of categorical ascriptions of
rights and duties. Thus, if principles are statements
that ascribe rights, then both rules and principles are
applicable in all-or-nothing fashion, which undercuts
Dworkin-s effort to distinguish them.
The upshot of this examination of Dworkin's argu-
ments is that he has not given us any persuasive reason
for thinking that there is a type of legal norm that
Hart.s theory cannot account for, since he has not shown
us that there are different types of norms distinguish-
able in the way he claims.
Even if there are such things as legal principles
that are distinguishable from legal rules, Dworkin's
view that they are not identifiable by means of a social
rule of recognition still must be defended. His princi-
pal argument will be discussed below. However, a thresh-
old difficulty that Dworkin appears to have overlooked
in "The Model of Rules" may be noted at this point. Even
if principles have a logical form that excludes them from
validation by a Hartian rule of recognition, it seems to
be necessary to appeal to some other sort of rule of
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recognition in order to distinguish those principles that
are norms of a particular legal system from those that are
not. Obviously, a judge could sit in his chambers and
spin off propositions that have the form of principles
but which do not express any existing legal norms of his
jurisdiction. For example, assuming that the statement
that no one should hold property as capital expresses a
principle, it is false that this proposition states an
extant law of any jurisdiction in the United States.
Thus, in order to distinguish principles that are within
the domain of legal material of a particular jurisdiction
from those that are not, some sort of validation proce-
SG0ITIS to b© necGsssry.
For the moment, let us assume that we can identify
certain principles that have a function in legal reasoning
in a particular legal system. The role assigned to them
by Dworkin is that of filling gaps left by rules in hard
cases, such that there is a determinate result to every
case that a judge is obligated to reach based on extant
legal material. A positivist might respond to Dworkin 's
characterization of the function of such principles by
agreeing that there are certain maxims or principles cited
by judges as justifications for their decisions in hard
cases that are so entrenched in the legal profession that
we can identify these justifying principles as legal prin^
ciples. Nevertheless, the positivist may argue against
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Dworkin that these principles do no-. . •i t constrain decisions
in cases because there is no requirement that a judge
consider them in reaching a decrsion. That is, whether
or not a legal principle is applied in a case is a matter
of discretion.
Dworkin ’s defense of the thesis that there are bind-
ing legal principles is suggested by his statement that
"[ujnless at least some principles are acknowledged to be
binding upon judges, requiring them as a set to reach par-
ticular decisions, then no rules, or very few rules, can
be said to be binding upon them either. argument
suggested by this assertion is as follows. First, there
are binding legal rules; that is, there are rules that a
judge is obligated to apply in adjudicating a case. If a
rule IS binding, then it cannot be abrogated by the exer-
cise of discretion. However, abrogation of a rule by the
exercise of discretion is precluded only if there are
standards that constrain a judge from such action. The
only standards that constrain a judge from abrogating a
legal rule at will are binding legal principles. There-
fore, since there are binding legal rules, then there are
binding legal principles.
The basic idea seems to be that unless there are
principles that constrain judicial decisions to overrule
rules, then rules would lose their binding force because
they would be subject to abrogation at will and a rule
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that can be abrogated at will is not a rule at all. How-
ever, the supposition that a rule that can be abrogated
at will is not a rule seems to be false. The at will
abrogation of a rule is simply a process of legislation
rather than adjudication, but the fact that a legal rule
can be legislated out of existence does not demonstrate
that it is not a rule.
Thus, Dworkin's argument in effect amounts to the
that if the judicial abrogation or modification of
legal rules is a legal decision--that is, if it is the
outcome of adjudication and not legislation—then it must
be based on binding standards. However, this thesis is
not an argument against Hart, since Hart’s claim is that
the judicial abrogation or modification of rules is a mat-
ter of judicial legislation, and in the process of legis-
lating, the adjudicator is not logically confined to the
domain of existing legal material in giving reasons for
decisions
.
It is important for Dworkin to maintain the thesis
that there are legal principles that judges are obligated
to apply because his conclusion that Hart's social rule
of recognition is inadequate is based on the argument that
there are such legal principles, but that the assumption
that there is a social rule of recognition implies that
there are no such principles. Dworkin's argument, rough-
ly, as developed in "Social Rules and Legal Theory," is
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that the social rule theory maintains that whether there
IS an obligation depends upon a consensus view about what
is required, which consensus is borne out to a large
extent in conforming practice. m the case of the social
rule of recognition, a judge's obligation to decide a case
in accordance with a particular norm exists by virtue of a
consensus view and corresponding practice about what the
norms of the group are. However, in hard cases, it is a
matter of controversy what the legal rights and duties of
parties are, that is, there is no consensus view and
general practice about the applicable rule for the case.
In such a case under the social rule theory, according to
Dworkin, there is no norm that the judge is obligated to
apply. As we have seen, Dworkin believes that even in
hard cases there are extant legal rights and duties speci
fied by legal norms that judges are obligated to apply.
These legal norms are principles, since the case is a
hard case for which no consensus exists as to its proper
resolution, the applicable legal norms are not identifi-
able by a social rule.
One reply to Dworkin has already been developed
above; namely, that there are no legal principles of the
sort he postulates that fill in the gaps left by rules
identified by a social rule of recognition; or, if there
are maxims or principles that are cited by judges from
time to time in support of decisions in hard cases, these
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are not principles that constrain decision but in fact are
extra-legal justifications for new (judicial) legislation.
^Another reply to Dworkin's argument is made by c. L.
Ten. 39 Ten argues that although the cases that Dworkin
Identifies as hard cases may be resolved in accordance
with rules that are controversial and which are not ^
novo in the sense that legislation is, it does not follow
that the application of such rules disproves the social
rule theory. Rather the positivist can say that:
law consists not just of explic-itly adopted rules and principles but
also of whatever rules and principles
are embedded in constitutional provi-
sions, legislative enactments, and
authoritative judicial decisions[Tjhere may be considerable disagree-
ment among judges about what rules andprinciples are embedded in the legal
sources. But even so, the rule of
recognition is dependent on social
practice--the practice of recognizing
constitutional provisions, legislative
enactments and judicial decisions, as
well as what is en^edded in them, aslegal standards . ^
^
In short, controversy about whether a particular rule is
a legal norm does not preclude recognition of its applica-
tion by a judge as being in conformity with the obligation
of officials under the rule of recognition, if the contro-
versial rule is arrived at by the judge by means of an
acceptable procedure of reasoning from accepted sources
.
The solution outlined by Ten parallels the approach
described by Dv/orkin as reasoning to legal conclusions on
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the basis of the "soundest theory of law. "41
view, in part, is that hard cases are decided by a judge
-s
reasonrng from the theory he thanks best explains settled
law. However, Dworkin's theory goes further than the
embedded principles theory Ten proposes as the positivists'
solution to legal reasoning in hard cases. First, Ten's
proposal describes a contingent feature of a legal system.
In other words, it is a matter of fact determined by social
practice whether and under what circumstances reasoning on
the basis of embedded principles constitutes a judge's
obligation in deciding a case. m this regard, Dworkin's
view that rules identified on the basis of the "soundest
theory of law" are an essential feature of any legal sys-
tem ties into his view that there is always a right answer
to any question of law. That is, the right answer to a
hard case can be determined by reasoning from the sound-
est theory of law. The flaw in this position is nicely
exposed in A. D. Woozley's critique of Dworkin's "right
answer thesis. Dworkin analogizes statements about
whether a particular norm is a legal norm to statements
about characters and events in fiction. His thesis is
that a theory of the settled law yields answers to diffi-
cult questions of law, just as a theory of the fictional
work yields answers to hard questions about the charac-
ters and events. Thus, it is possible to settle on the
truth of ascriptions of motives and beliefs and so on
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regarding characters in the novel, even though the author
has not expressly provxded that the characters or events
were so, based on what the author does say. Similarly,
we can answer questions of law based on a theory of set-
tled legal norms. However, Woozley points out that the
fact that some statement is consistent with or explains
or follows from what the author says does not imply that
the statement is true according to the story.
larly, the fact that a particular norm follows from a
theory that accounts for the settled law of a jurisdic-
tion does not eer ^ imply that it is also a law of that
jurisdiction unless there is a social practice of treating
such norms as laws.
In summary, this brief discussion of Dworkin’s cri-
tique of Hart has called into question Dworkin's view that
there are legal principles that have a logical form dis-
tinct from legal rules. Further, it has been suggested
that the addition of principles does not necessarily imply
that judges lack discretion to reach legislative solutions
to problems, since principles may not be binding. More-
over, even if there are binding principles, Dworkin's
argument that they cannot be accounted for by a social
rule of recognition is mistaken. Thus, it is not neces-
sary to hypothesize a normative rule of recognition that
incorporates moral elements. Therefore, Dworkin has not
shown that it is necessary to appeal to moral criteria
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in order to identify what is and what is not law.
Vchapter
legal NORMATIVITY and the "INTERNAL ASPECT" OF LAW
In the examination of the coercive orders theory in
Chapter ll, we rejected the position required by that
theory that there is a unitary psychological will with
respect to every law of a given legal system. However,
discussion of the question of what beliefs, desires, or
other psychological states, if any, must exist in a
society in order to have a legal system was deferred,
in this chapter we will address this question and clarify
and defend the thesis that the existence of a legal sys-
tem depends, at a minimum, upon there being at least some
members of the group who have favorable attitudes toward
using a particular rule of recognition in identifying the
norms that apply to the group. As we will see, the con-
text for developing these views is a discussion of Hart's
notion of the "internal point of view" and the "internal
aspect" of rules. We have already encountered these ideas
in the course of describing Hart's basic theory, but de-
tailed examination was postponed until this chapter.
In the first section below it will be argued that
Hart's concepts of the internal point of view and the
internal aspect of rules must be made more sophisticated
in order to allow for the existence of individuals who
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regard the legal syste. as a syste. of „or.s, hut who »ay
not regard favorably what is required by those norms
such an attitude is characteristic of the legal profes-
sional. in the second section, Hart's theory of social
normativity will be developed further and it will be
argued that Hart correctly maintained not only that a sys-
tem of directives need not be justifiable on moral grounds
order to be a system of legal norms but that it is not
necessary that anyone in the social group to whom the sys-
tem of directives applies believes that the rule of recog-
nition or any rules validated by it are justifiable on
moral or any other grounds in order for the system to be
a system of legal norms.
Z2Le ’’Internal Aspect” of Legal
Hart does not clearly differentiate between his con-
cept of the internal point of view and his concept of the
internal aspect of rules. ^ A review of some of his char-
acterizations reveals that these concepts are used by
Hart to develop a view about what attitudes and beliefs
must exist in a society that has a legal system. We have
already seen that in Hart's view a social rule exists
* ' • some at least
. . . look upon the behaviour in
question as a general standard to be followed by the group
as a whole." This condition is identified as the inter-
nal aspect of social rules. Later, Hart states that
134
"••• a member of the group which accepts and uses [the
rules of conduct of the group] as guides to conduct" is
"concerned with the rules" from the "internal point of
view. "3 The internal point of view is "... the view of
those who do not merely record and predict behaviour con-
forming to rules, but use the rules as standards for the
appraisal of their own and others' behaviour.""* Thus, it
appears that the internal aspect of rules is the property
a rule has by virtue of being regarded from the internal
point of view by some members of a group. m turn, regard-
ing a rule from the internal point of view is a matter of
"accepting" and using the rule as a guide to conduct.
In the broad overview of Hart's theory that was pre-
sented in Chapter III, the most important element of the
theory was identified as the thesis that a society has a
legal system only if certain social rules—namely second-
ary rules of recognition, change and adjudication—exist
in the group. The role of acceptance in the existence of
a social rule of recognition is brought out in the fol-
lowing passage:
First, a person who seriously asserts
the validity of some given rule of law,
say a particular statute, himself makes
use of a rule of recognition which he
accepts as appropriate for identifying
the law. Secondly, it is the case that
this rule of recognition, in terms of
which he assesses the validity of a
P^^ticular statute, is not only accepted
by him but is the rule of recognition
actually accepted and employed in the
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general operation of the system.^
fact that a legal system may exist under Hart's
theory even though only the rule of recognition is "ac-
cepted.. and then only by those in the group who have coer-
ive power (viz., officials) has engendered criticism.
Beehler, for example, argues that by not requiring general
acceptance of a rule by the members of a society, Hart
fails to move beyond the coercive orders theory.®
Beehler 's argument seems to be as follows, on the one
hand. Hart is correct that the typical use of the state-
ment that an individual has a particular obligation is to
remind the^individual that his case falls under a partic-
ular rule.’ However, a statement reminding the addressee
that his case falls under a rule is ordinarily made only
If the fact that his case falls under the rule
..makes a
difference., to the speaker and his addressee. But the
fact that the case falls under the rule
..makes a differ-
ence only if the speaker and the addressee accept the
rule. Therefore, Hart.s characterization of the typical
use of statements about one's obligations is correct only
if the rules according to which one has those obligations
are accepted by the speaker and his addressee.
Beehler 's argument is flawed by the failure to take
into account the variety of reasons the fact that one's
case falls under a rule may "make a difference." The
speaker may be providing information to the addressee
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about the rules of the group without regard to the merits
Of the rule or of the social practice by virtue of which
It IS recognized as a rule. Or the fact that his case
falls under a rule may make a difference to the addressee
because the addressee wants to avoid the probable imposi-
tion of sanctions for noncompliance. Furthermore, al-
though some degree of acceptance of a rule is required in
order for the rule to be a soci^ rule that establishes a
soci^ Obligation, the fact that the obligor does not ac-
cept a rule establishing a moral obligation is irrelevant
to the existence of the obligation. Thus, inasmuch as
Beehler seeks to show that the obligation to obey the law
IS a moral obligation,^ the requirement of acceptance is
sn obstacle to his goal.
Hart's position, then, is that a minimum necessary
condition for the existence of a legal system is the ac-
ceptance by officials of a secondary rule of recognition
as the appropriate means of identifying rules of conduct
applicable to the group. Hart gives us virtually no
guidance in understanding what constitutes accepting a
rule. The only elaboration offered is the intimation of
an account of believing that relies largely on behavioral
manifestations of psychological phenomena. That is, as
mentioned in the last chapter in the discussion of Harris'
argument that Hart equates legal norms with social situa-
tions, Hart appears at times to identify acceptance of a
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rule with certain overt behaviors such as using particu-
lar expressions to criticize conduct that deviates from
the rule and citing the rule as justification for conduct
that conforms to it. Such a behavioristic analysis does
not give us much insight into how to distinguish among
individuals who "accept" a rule because they prefer what
it calls for on moral or other grounds, individuals who
accept" a rule on prudential grounds, and individuals who
"accept" a rule on professional grounds for the purpose
of advising a client. All of these individuals could
"appropriately" use normative expressions in criticizing
and justifying conduct. Furthermore, whether an individ-
ual who, for whatever reason, evaluates conduct against
the requirements of a particular rule, chooses to express
criticism or justification is adventitious in relation to
the existence of the individual's attitudes and beliefs.
Moreover, the fact that certain expressions—namely
, norma-
tive expressions—and not others are the proper means of
expressing such criticisms and justifications indicates
that acceptance of the norms in terms of which evaluations
are made is independent of the expression of them.^°
Aside from this unhelpful flirtation with a behav-
ioristic analysis of acceptance of norms. Hart offers no
illumination of what is involved in accepting a norm.
Moreover, the basic concepts Hart has proposed are not
^^iii*-i®ntly sophisticated to account for the complexity
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Of social negativity. Hart contrasts the internal pornt
external view. The external point of view for Hart
IS the vantage point of the individual who records regu-
larrtres in behavior without taking cognizance of the fact
that the behavior is rule-governed. That is. from the
external point of vxew, there are only group habits-for
xaraple, the habit operators of motor vehicles have of
stopping at intersections when the light facing them is
red. From the external point of view, this behavior is
not different in kind from the migratory patterns of
birds. in contrast, the internal point of view for Hart
is the vantage point of the individual who recognizes and
accepts certain standards of behavior-such as stopping at
red lights-as appropriate guides to conduct. From this
point of view, the regular behavior is not merely a matter
of habit; it is behavior that is directed by the standard.
Some of the inadequacies of this account have been
discussed in Chapter III. First, even habitual behavior
may be directed in the sense of being purposeful; recall
the commuter who habitually rides the 8:15 a.m. train,
whose behavior is guided and directed at least in that
he acts so as to realize his intention of catching the
train, although he is not following a rule in doing so.
On the other hand, an individual who is following a rule,
and so has taken Hart's internal point of view, may be
doing so for the prudential reason of avoiding the imposi-
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txon Of a sanction for nonco^pliance, or he .ay have no
reason at all for following the rule, such an indivrdual
might be acting
.'for his own part," without regard to
whether others also follow the rule and be indifferent to
Whether the rule is maintained. In contrast, an individ-
ual who follows a rule may accept the rule in the sense
of desiring the occurrence of the conduct it calls for and
preferring the occurrence of that conduct to some alterna-
tive. Both of these rule-followers seem to view behavior
from the internal point of view under Hart's analysis, but
there are differences between them that must be explained.
In addition. Hart's dichotomy of internal and external
p ints of view cannot account for the observer who not
only recognizes the existence of behavioral regularities
among the members of a group, but recognizes that the
individuals engaged in that behavior are following a rule
He can describe and evaluate conduct relative to that
normative order without having any opinion about its
merit. He is, as it were, an outsider with the internal
point of view.
Neil MacCormick's suggestion that Hart's theory must
distinguish between what he terms the "volitionally inter-
nal point of view" and the "cognitively internal point of
view" enables us to deal with the situation of the out-
sider with the internal point of view. The cognitively
point of view is the point of view:
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... from which conduct is appreciat^H
|uidLrst^nda?ds:^\^L^^I
In contrast, the volitionally internal point of view is
some^dearee^Ld^/^^'^ agent, who inb a gree and for reasons which sepmgood to him has a volitional commitmentto observance of a given pattern of coLduct as a standard for himself or forother people or for both: his attitudeincludes, but is not included by, thecognitively internal' attitude. 12
MacCormick argues that a rule identifies a model or stan
dard pattern of conduct; it refers to a possible (or at
least conceivable) state of affairs against which actual
conduct can be compared. However, if a rule exists in a
group, the possible state of affairs referred to by the
rule IS not regarded merely as a hypothetical basis for
comparison, but is regarded by at least some members of
the group as the basis for appraisal of actual conduct.
Possible or conceivable patterns of conduct are regarded
as the basis for appraisal only if the patterns of con-
duct are "actually willed, desired, preferred, approved as
patterns conduct and its appraisal in our society just
now." In short, "the relevant appraisal is appraisal for
conformity or not with some pattern which is envisaged as
a pattern of preferred conduct."
The thesis underlying the distinction between the
cognitively internal point of view and the volitionally
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internal point of view accounts for the social character
of Hart's social rules. A rule is a social rule only if
either some member of the group actually prefers or wills
that the behavior called for by the rule occur or some
member of the group believes that some one in the group
prefers or wills that the behavior in question occur. The
element of preference is necessary if the pattern of behav-
ior IS to serve as a model for purposes of evaluating,
criticizing, and justifying actual conduct. It is because
actual conduct does not measure up to what is or is pre-
sumed to be desired that it is appropriately criticized.
The requirement that some one in the group actually have
the preference or at least believe that some one has the
preference gives the rule its social basis.
The cognitively internal point of view depends upon
the volitionally internal point of view, as MacCormick
explains
:
[T]he position of those who, while under-
standing a norin, and able to frame judg-
ments in terms of it, remain indifferent
or hostile to it, is a position which is
P^^^sitic on that of those who do for
whatever reason will the pattern of
behaviour in question as a standard for
all in their group. This detached
view of social rules makes sense only
if those who hold it suppose (and it
may be a false supposition) that there
are some who do care about maintenance
of the pattern of conduct in question.
That there can be common patterns of
criticism of conduct or states of af-
fairs depends upon our conceiving that
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patterns
P ople in given circumstances.^^
This view about the necessity of some actual or supposed
volitional element-a pro attitude toward some conceived
pattern of conduct-must be refined in order to avoid the
criticism brought against the coercive orders theory that
it erroneously supposes that every legal norm expresses
the actual will of the sovereign legislator. The inade-
quacy of this theory is manifest in the case of complex
statutes that are law by virtue of the actions of persons
who may have had no volitions at all with respect to what
the statutes call for. Moreover, there are occasions
when lawyers are called upon to ascertain the legal rights
and duties of individuals involved in novel circumstances.
It was argued against Dworkin in the last chapter that in
some cases the proper conclusion is that there is no
"right answer” to the question of law presented, and that
If the case were to be litigated, the judge's decision
would involve interstitial lawmaking. However, in other
novel cases the existing substantive rules and the ac-
cepted rules of legal reasoning may enable the lawyer to
conclude that there exist certain dispositive legal rules
applicable to the facts. Nevertheless, by hypothesis,
since the situation is novel, no one has or had the voli-
tionally internal point of view with respect to the norma-
tive conclusion the lawyer concludes is applicable. Thus,
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the lawyer is not merely reporting what is believed or
actually willed to be the rule applicable to the case.
The resolution of these problems is provided by
Hart's theory of a social rule of recognition. At a mini-
mum there must exist or be assumed to exist a volitionally
internal point of view to a rule by virtue of which other
rules are identified as being applicable to the group.
Some member of the group must, for whatever reason,
actually prefer, desire, or will that certain rules-for
example, those rules adopted in accordance with certain
procedures by persons satisfying certain criteria—be used
as the standards for appraisal of conduct, or some member
of the group must actually believe that some member of the
group has those preferences or desires. So long as this
minimum condition is satisfied, in conjunction with gen-
eral conformity to the rules so identified, a rule so
validated specifies a standard for appraising conduct of
members of the group even though there is no actual or
imagined volitional element with respect to what the rule
calls for.
In general, the volitionally internal point of view
appears to be diffusely directed in a mature municipal
legal system. On the one hand, as Hart observed, it will
generally only be officials and legal professionals who
are familiar with the secondary rules of recognition in
any detail. The volitional element or the belief that
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there is a volitional element regarding those rules may
exist only among the members of those subgroups, if at
all. Most people, if they have favorable attitudes toward
secondary rules, direct their attention to very general
enabling norms. For example, the average citizen may
regard favorably a system providing for legislators who
are elected periodically by a relatively large subgroup
of persons regarded as subject to the system. The rules
adopted by these legislators, perhaps as limited by some
imprecisely conceived constitutional constraints, are
the rules regarded as valid by these citizens. Perhaps
an even more common favorable attitude toward secondary
rules of recognition is that of regarding as valid what-
ever is regarded as valid by persons who satisfy a par-
ticular description or whatever is valid according to
whatever rules of recognition are regarded as the appro-
priate validation standards by persons who satisfy that
description.
On the other hand, it seems as a matter of fact that
in actual legal systems there is substantial congruity
between what the legal rules of the system require and
what members of the group as a whole or members of the
subgroups especially affected by particular rules gener-
ally prefer as standards for the society irrespective of
what the legal rules require. However, this congruity
may exist only at a very general level or it may exist
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only indirectly in the sense that people favorably regard
the goals promoted by particular rules and so, other
things being equal, regard those rules favorably as well
For example, there may be direct support for a particular
taxing statute in virtue nfo the revenue goals served by
it (as where the revenues aen»ar-a-i-^^ ut^venu generated by an excise tax are
used to fund a specific proiect that is regarded favor-
ably by members of the group, or in virtue of non-revenue-
related social or political goals (as where wealth trans-
fer taxation is utilized to prevent accumulation of dynas-
tic wealth or where tax expenditures that involve devia-
tion from a "normal" tax are employed to subsidize favored
goals such as home ownership and industrial development)
.
The interest of members of the group in promoting goals
intended by the legislators who adopted a particular
rule may account for some degree of direct support for
particular rules. For example, federal laws in the
United States that generally prohibit commercial banks
from engaging in the securities industry are broadly
supported by securities businesses because of the bene-
ficial anti-competitive effects these laws have on such
businesses. m many instances, private enforcement for
self-interested reasons is the principal reason that cer-
tain valid rules are actively maintained even after the
original rationale for the adoption of the rule no longer
applies
.
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This range of favorable attitudes towards general
authorizing norms broadly-conceived or towards particular
rules for self-interested or disinterested reasons, or for
no reason other than patriotic inculcation, is in sharp
contrast to the cognitive, non-evaluative internal point
of view. The latter point of view is characteristic of
the legal professional who for the purpose of advising
his client or promoting his client's goals (generally
for a fee), treats the legal system as a system of norms
that specify what his client ought to do or refrain from,
what his client is permitted to do, and what other per-
sons are required to do or refrain from with respect to
his client's affairs. The lawyer may regard the legal
system in this way although he regards unfavorably what
the legal system provides. Kelsen recognized that the
legal professional might treat the law as normative and
yet not regard it favorably on any grounds. First,
Kelsen states:
The fact that the basic norm of a posi-
tive legal order may but need not be pre-
supposed means: the relevant interhuman
relationships may be, but need not be,interpreted as 'normative,
' that is, as
obligations, authorizations, rights, etc.
constituted by objectively valid norms.
It means further: they can be inter-
preted without such presupposition (i.e.,
without the basic norm) as power rela-
tions (i.e., relations between command-
ing and obeying or disobeying human
beings)
--in other words, they can be
interpreted sociologically, not juristi-
cally . 18
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This distinction between regarding the system sociologi-
cally and presupposing the basic norm is a version of
the distinction between the external point of view and
Maccormick's volitionally internal point of view. How-
ever, in a footnote, Kelsen acknowledges that it is pos-
to regard the legal system as a system of norms
without approving of it. In particular, he argues that
the anarchist, who "emotionally rejects the law as a coer-
cive order," nevertheless as "a professor of law, could
describe positive law as a system of valid norms, without
having to approve of this law." m short, the anarchist
law professor takes the cognitively internal point of
view.
Because lawyers are professionally concerned with the
legal system, are generally relatively better informed
about the content and scope of the enabling and obligation
norms of the system, and must view the legal system as a
system of valid, even if not desirable, norms in order to
function as legal advisors and advocates, they are impor-
tant in maintaining the legal order, even if they do not
approve of the legal order they are dealing with. It is
interesting to observe that the jurisprudential signifi-
cance of the legal profession has not always been appreci-
ated by legal institutions. For example, the reasoning of
Justice Powell in In re Griffiths invalidating a Connecti-
cut law prohibiting aliens from admission to the practice
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Of law IS insensitive to the peculiarities of the lawyer’s
posrtion. in general, alienage and certain other charac-
teristics such as race are considered to be "suspect
classifications" under the Equal Protection Clause of the
united States Constitution, so that a state law that dis-
criminates on the basis of such classifications must with-
stand "strict scrutiny" under which the State must demon-
strate that the use of the classification is necessary in
order to advance or protect a substantial, legitimate
governmental interest. m contrast, differential treat-
ment based on certain other characteristics, such as sex,
must withstand "intermediate scrutiny." Finally, most
ciassificatory criteria need pass only a weak "rational
relationship" test. In the domain of regulation of labor
the rational relationship test has been applied under
Equal Protection Clause examination of laws limiting
access to public employment by aliens on the ground that
a sovereign state has the inherent power and right to pre-
serve its conception of political community by permitting
only those individuals who are citizens to hold elective
or non-elective positions that involve direct participa-
tion in the "formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy."^® Under the rational relationship test
xaws excluding aliens from employment as state police
f-f 21otlicers and as public elementary and secondary school
22teachers have withstood Equal Protection Clause chal-
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lenges
.
In contrast, ir^re Griffiths applied Equal Protec-
tion strict scrutiny and invalidated a Connecticut statute
disqualifying aliens from admission to the bar. The court
refused to apply the weaker rational relationship test
that had been applied in examining other laws that ex-
cluded aliens from employment in jobs having "governmental
functions." m his opinion for the court Justice Powell
made the following remarks about the role of legal profes-
sionals in a legal system:
Lawyers do indeed occupy professionalpositions of responsibility and influ-ence that impose on them duties correla-
their vital right of access tohe courts. Moreover, by virtue of theirprofessional aptitudes and natural inter-
ests, lawyers have been leaders in gov-
ernment throughout the history of our
country. Yet, they are not officials ofgovernment by virtue of being lawyers.Nor does the status of holding a licenseto practice law place one so close tothe core of the political process as to
make him a formulator of government
policy .23
From a philosophical point of view, in re Griffiths
reaches a sound conclusion for the wrong reason. Although
it is probably too strong to describe lawyers qua lawyers
as formulators of government policy, the point made above
about the importance of lawyers in maintaining the legal
order raises the concerns that led to the application of
a weaker standard of review to laws discriminating against
aliens in public employment. That is, the legal profes-
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-on
.3 sufficiently close to the functioning of govern-
ment to raise the question of the threat, if any. its
practitioners pose to the political co^nunity. Thus at
-ast in the light of earlier cases healing „ith the'
right of aliens to hold public offices and positions
involving participation in public policy-making or execu-
tion, IrLr^Griffi^ i^ „^ong in applying the weaker
rational relationship criterion, on the other hand, in
Irght of the internal attitude that is characteristic of
the legal professional regardless of his personal politi-
cal preferences. In re Griffith.s reaches the correct con-
clusion about admitting aliens to the practice of law. m
short, neither alienage nor anarchism is incompatible with
the lawyer's role.
Motwithstanding the importance of the lawyer in rein-
forcing and maintaining the legal order by advising his
client of the relevant legal rules, this role is always
secondary in that the lawyers 's cognitively internal point
of view presupposes a volitionally internal point of view
to the rules of recognition the lawyer uses in identifying
particular rules of conduct as legal rules of the system.
Unless there is assumed to be or unless there actually is
somewhere in the group a favorable attitude towards iden-
tifying applicable rules by using particular rules of
recognition, then there is no occasion for the lawyer's
point of view. Whatever may be the case with respect to
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moral obligations, at least in the case of social obliga-
trons it seems correct that no conduct is obligatory unless
It is assumed that someone regards that conduct as prefer-
able, appropriate, or right, and in the case of legal
obligations, unless someone regards it to be preferable,
appropriate, or right to use a particular means of iden-
tifying rules in accordance with which the rule requiring
the conduct in question is valid.
Social Normativity and Justified Normati v-,' r,.
The contribution that the distinction between the
cognitively internal point of view and the volitionally
internal point of view towards rules makes to the social
rule theory of law is enhanced by focusing on the dis-
tinction between what Raz has called "justified norma-
tivity" and "social normativity
. Raz maintains that
according to the conception of law characteristically
endorsed by natural law theorists, the normativity of law
is justified normativity :
According to [this] view legal standards
of behaviour are norms only if and in sofar as they are justified. They may bejustified by some objective and univer-
sally valid reasons. They may be intui-
tively perceived as binding or they maybe accepted as justified by personal com-
mitment.
He goes on to state that "theorists using the concepts of
justified normativity claim that a legal system can be
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regarded as normative only by people considering it as
iust and endorsing its norms by accepting them as part of
thGiiT own moiTdl views.
on the other hand, Raz maintarns that according to
the conception of law usually endorsed by positivists, and
explained and defended most successfully by Hart in The
Concept of Law
, the normativity of law is social norma -
tivity :
On [this] view standards of behaviourcan be considered as norms regardless oftheir merit They are social norms in
they are socially upheld asbinding standards and in so far as thesociety involved exerts pressure onpeople to whom the standards apply to
conform to them. ^ ^
Raz states that "theorists using the concepts of social
normativity maintain that everyone should regard legal
systems as normative regardless of his judgment about
their merits."
An important consequence of the social normativity
conception of law, as Raz points out, is that because the
normativity of law is based on social facts rather than
moral considerations, there may be a valid law that one
is not morally obligated to obey unless the relevant
social facts necessarily have moral significance. In con-
trast, Raz argues that under the justified normativity
conception, "the concepts of the normativity of the law
and of the obligation to obey it are analytically tied
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together.. Thus, according to this vrew. it the law is
valid, then one ought, morally, to obey it.
Although these characterizations of social norma-
tivity and justified normativity are suggestive, Raz has
not differentiated between the justified normativity
theory of law and a version of the social normativity
theory according to which a group of persons has a legal
system only if at least some of its members believe that
certain rules of recognition are morally justified. Raz
maintains that under the justified normativity conception
of law a particular standard of conduct is a valid rule
of law only if it actually is morally justified. This
"natural law" thesis must be supplemented with an explana-
tion of what it means for a standard of conduct to be
morally justified and of what other conditions, if any,
a standard of conduct must satisfy in order to be a law.
For example, are all requirements of justice conceived to
be legal requirements, or are some moral requirements
acknowledged not to be legal requirements? Further, is
a standard of conduct a valid law only if it states a
requirement of justice, or is the requirement that a valid
law be morally justified satisfied as long as the stan-
dard of conduct is consistent with the requirements of
justice, so that a standard of conduct that is morally
neutral may nevertheless state a valid legal obligation?
the latter case, the fact that one's case is covered
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by a valid law does not answer the question of one's
obligation to obey the law. Perhaps, then, to ensure that
the theory does answer affirmatively the question of wheth-
er one is morally obligated to obey the law, the theory
holds that a standard of conduct is a valid legal standard
only if What it calls for is consistent with morality and
If It was adopted in accordance with a just social prac-
tice by virtue of which participants in the practice or
beneficiaries of the practice become morally obligated to
Obey otherwise
.morally-neutral directives. These ques-
tions deal with the nature and scope of the natural law
theorist's commitment to the conception of justified nor-
mativity. In addition, the natural law theorist's concep
tion of law will be affected by his metaethical theory of
justified normativity. For example, to use the examples
suggested by Raz in his description of justified norma-
tivity, having justified normativity may be thought to be
a matter of satisfying some objective and universally
valid reasons, or of being the object of moral intuition,
or of being the object of "personal commitment." Kelsen's
metaethical theory, to take another example, appears to be
noncognitivistic and relativistic, so that having justi-
fied normativity is a matter of being the object of
individual preferences, and statements about one's obliga-
tions are analyzed as expressions of those preferences.
The justified normativity conception of law, accord-
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mg to which a standard of conduct is a valid law only if
It conforms to, is consistent with, and is adopted pursu-
ant to, the requirements of morality, however analyzed
Must not be confused with the thesis that a group of per-
sons has a legal system only if at least some members of
the group regard standards of conduct identified by means
particular rules of recognition as having justified no:
mativity. According to the latter theory, the existence
Of a legal system in which those standards are valid laws
depends upon the existence of certain social facts rather
than upon those standards actually having justified norma-
tivity. However, Raz's statement that according to the
theory of justified normativity "a legal system can be
regarded as normative only by people considering it as
just and endorsing its norms by accepting them as part
of their own moral views" blurs the distinction between
the justified normativity theory and a social normativity
theory that maintains that the existence of certain be-
liefs about the justified normativity of law is necessary
for the existence of law. The natural law theorist holds
that a standard is a law only if it is just; whether peo-
ple consider the standard to be just and endorse it by
accepting it as part of their own moral views is relevant
to the natural law theorist only if his theory of morality
analyzes moral justification in terms of what people be-
lieve to be morally required or in terms of what people
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are ''personally committed" to.
Raz's quarry was Kelsen's theory, and his failure
to make the distincton suggested here reflects Kelsen's
theory. Raz argues that Kelsen has a justified norma-
tivity conception of law because Kelsen maintains that
If a norm is valid, then it is binding, so that one ought
morally to behave as specified by the norm.^^ However,
Kelsen's moral relativism, according to which moral judg-
ments are matters of personal preference, leads him to the
view that law is regarded as normative, that is, morally
obligatory, only by persons who have the appropriate per-
sonal preferences. Furthermore, Kelsen rejects tradi-
tional natural law conceptions for failing to recognize
that law IS a "social technique" for controlling behavior
and that the same social technique is used when a legis-
lator enacts a standard of behavior that is unjust as
when he enacts a standard of behavior that is just.^^
In effect, Kelsen appears to endorse a social rule
theory according to which a group has a legal system only
if there aie favorable attitudes among members of the
group toward using certain rules of recognition to iden-
fy the standards of behavior that are applicable to the
group. In short, people must regard the system as a sys-
tem of norms or directives that ought to be obeyed. The
concept of justified normativity becomes important because
of Kelsen's commitment to the theory of the unity of nor-
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mative systems. The implication of this theory for
Kelsen's theory of law is that the existence of a legal
system depends upon there being people who regard certain
socially-derived standards as morally justified. That
IS, according to the theory of the unity of normative sys-
tems, all standards of conduct regarded by an individual
as valid and binding are regarded as consistent members of
a unified system of norms. Thus, if an individual regards
as valid a particular standard of conduct adopted in accor
dance with a particular social practice, then he regards
that standard as justified from the moral point of view.
Consequently, if the existence of beliefs about the valid-
ity and bindingness of such standards is required in order
for a legal system to exist, then there is a legal system
only if its rules are regarded as morally justified.
Kelsen's argument for the theory of the unity of nor-
mative systems is based on the thesis that valid norms
cannot conflict. This thesis was discussed in the last
(.chapter, when the criticism that Hart's theory erroneously
permits the possibility of inconsistent norms was examined
and rejected. The argument considered at that juncture
was von Wright's argument that valid norms necessarily
are jointly realizable because the normative relationship
exists only if the subjects of a prescription can do or
forbear those things the issuer of the prescription wants
to make them do or forbear. Thus, if two norms are not
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jointly realizable then at least one of them is not a
valid prescription because the norm subject cannot be
made to do what both norms require. This argument is
flawed by the fact that it incorrectly assumes that pre-
scribing some act is equivalent to making the norm subject
comply. Kelsen's argument for the thesis that valid norms
cannot conflict is slightly different. Raz summarizes
Kelsen's argument as follows:
[I]t makes no sense to say that [a] nor-
mative system contains conflicting norms.
It IS of the essence of the concept of a
normative system that it guides behav-iour; it guides the behaviour of those
persons who adopt the relevant point of
view. But if conflicting norms are
assumed to be valid from one point of
view, then they do not guide behaviour
for they point in opposing directions
at the same time. Therefore, all the
norms held valid from one point of view
necessarily form one consistent system.
This argument differs from von Wright's in that what is
supposed to be impossible is being guided in "opposing
directions" rather than being ordered to go in opposing
directions. However, an analogous error seems to be
involved; namely, the error of maintaining that being
directed implies following the directions. The fact that
an individual who is being guided in different directions
cannot follow both directions does not imply that he is
not being directed or guided. In this respect the addres-
see of conflicting directives is unlike the person to whom
a statement of the form "P and not-P" is addressed, where
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p IS a sentence in indicative form. m the latter case,
the statement purports to say something about the actual
state of things in the world, but fails to do so since
the state of affairs it refers to is not logically pos-
sible. In the former case, on the other hand, the addres-
see IS being told what ought to be the case, rather than
what IS the case. The statement that some non-actual
state of affairs ought to be the case is not vacuous,
even though the state of affairs in question is logically
impossible
.
Hart’s theory is based on a social normativity con-
ception of law and, in contrast to Kelsen’s theory does
not bring in a metaethical theory that blurs the justified
normativity/social normativity distinction. However, it
is less clear whether Hart believes that the existence of
a legal system in a group depends upon certain of its
members, and especially the officials who control the
use of coercive power, believing that the rules of con-
duct of the system or at least the secondary rules of
recognition of the system are morally justified. We have
already considered Hart's characterization of social
rules, according to which a pattern of behavior is the
subject of a social rule only if there is a "critical
reflective attitude" toward using that pattern as a stan-
dard, which is displayed in criticisms of deviations and
demands for conformity expressed in "the normative ter-
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minologyof
-ought,'
-must,- and
-should,-
-right,- and
wrong.-- Furthermore, it may be recalled that Hart
argues that social rules are rules of obligation only if,
inter they are regarded as important enough to
back up with serious and insistent demands for conformity
and are believed to be necessary to the maintenance of
social life or some highly-prized feature of it.32 ^
the last chapter, Hill's argument that a law possessing
these characteristics gives rise to a prima facie moral
Obl-gation, whereas a law that is merely valid under a
secondary rules does not, was rejected. It seems clear
that the fact that some rule or system of rules is re-
garded as necessary to maintaining a social order is in-
sufficient to yield even prima facie moral obligation.
The implausibility of this view is amply illustrated by
many examples of conventional norms that fail to meet even
noncontroversial moral standards. The norms of societies
that have accepted rules requiring or condoning slavery,
racial discrimination, genocide, and torture are obvious
examples
.
However, the question here is whether, granting that
Hart's thesis namely, that the existence of a system of
conventional obligation norms depends upon certain people
regarding certain patterns of behavior as standards that
are necessary to the maintenance of social order--does not
entail that such a system actually is morally justified.
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it nevertheless does follow that those persons who regard
those patterns of behavior as standards believe those
standards are morally justified. m other words, is it
possible to believe that some pattern ought to be main-
3,nd to boliovp mnai-i-f- •ijeiie e that maintaining it is necessary
to the preservation of social life or some important fea-
ture of It, but not to believe that it is morally justi-
fied? In the sections of llie Concept of r.;.w where the
analysis of social rules and of social rules of obliga-
tion are presented it is not foreclosed that Hart main-
tains that acceptance on morals grounds is required. How-
ever, elsewhere he rejects categorically any such require-
ment that the system be regarded as morally justified.
For example, he maintains not only that most members of
a society may be coerced by laws that they do not regard
as morally acceptable, but that even those who
-'accept
the system voluntarily" may not believe that they are
morally required to do so. Moreover, according to Hart,
there is indeed no reason why those who accept the auth-
ority of the system should not examine their conscience
and decide that, morally, they ought not to accept it,
yet for a variety of reasons continue to do so."^^ Hart
suggests that among the reasons a conventional system of
norms may be accepted are "calculations of long-term
interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflect-
ing inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish
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to do as others do.'.^S
the Ust Of alternative
"reasons" offered by Hart appears
to be a recrtation of possible y^r uncoerced accep-
tance of a legal system, and that it is possible that what
people accept as a consequence of these "reasons" or
causes is the moral bindingness of the legal system.
Nevertheless, Soper acknowledges that Hart-s statement
that an individual may accept the system but believe it
to be morally unacceptable indicates that the theory
advanced by Hart, at least in the passage in ^estion,
admits the possibility of a group with a legal system
that no members of the group believe to be morally jus-
Although Hart rejects the idea that a group has a
legal system only if certain of its members believe the
system is morally justified, Soper proposes such a theory
as an alternative to Hart's theory. He notes that the
basic thesis is that a legal system exists only if the
"fundamental, constitutional design-the rule of recogni-
tion— is acceptable. That is, some members of the
group must believe that the secondary rules of recognition
are morally justified. By requiring only that the rules
of recognition are believed to be morally justified, Soper
avoids the obvious complaint that particular laws or judi-
cial decisions may be believed to be unjust even though
they are the product of a system that is considered by
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Its members to be morally justifiable. Conceivably, an
individual may believe that the system as a whole is
morally the best that can be realized and that it ought
to be maintained despite occasional unjust results. For
example, a judge who applies what he believes to be an
unjust law may believe that the value of legality- that
IS, of decision in accordance with law—outweighs the
value of avoidance of individual unjust results because
he believes that the system generally is just and better
than any available alternatives, and that maintenance of
the system depends upon realization of the value of
legality.
Although Soper avoids this complaint, he offers very
little reason for adopting his proposal. The only con-
sideration adduced by him is the following:
[The theory] requires officials to claim
and believe in the justice of the sys-
tem s basic rules, which then (and only
then) converts the system into a 'legal
system,
' however unjustified in fact
such claims may be thought to be. This
demand that the officials pay heed to
the moral acceptability of the system
they enforce may well furnish some small
theoretical, and no small practical,
limitations on the ability of an offi-
cial to issue commands and at the same
time to appeal to respect for 'the law'
in urging obedience to those commands.
In effect, Soper is claiming that if officials regard the
legal system as morally justified, then there will be some
constraints on their decisions. The only link that this
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consideration appears to have to the question of the exis-
tence of a legal system is that of efficacy and stability.
That is, if the legal system must be accepted by officials
as morally justifiable, then conceivably the norms re-
garded as legal norms will be less arbitrary than they
might otherwise have been, with the result that the per
sons subject to the system will accept it more readily.
This link can be questioned, since the moral beliefs of
the persons who control coercive power in a group may
appear to be as arbitrary as the rules of a system that
no one believes to be morally justified. Any doubts about
this observation should be considered in the light of such
phenomena as the mass murder/suicide at Jonestown, Guyana
by the followers of the Reverend Jim Jones. However, even
if the constraint of believed-in moral justifiability
makes a system of norms more efficacious, it does not en-
tail that a system not believed to be morally justified
is not a legal system. All that follows is that such a
system is less effective and stable.
We are still left with the question of whether some
members of the group must believe that the patterns of
behavior that are preferred as standards for the group
are morally justified. There does not seem to be any way
to answer this question except to note that there does
not seem to be any absurdity in supposing that the rules
of recognition regarded as appropriate for identifying the
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applicable norms are preferred or accepted without any
regard to moral considerations. For example, it seems
perfectly possible for members of a group to accept as
the appropriate means of identifying rules applicable to
the group a rule of recognition selected entirely for the
purpose of conducting an experiment.
CHAPTER V I
THE FUNCTION AND CONTENT OF LAW
In the preceding chapters, Hart's social rule theory
of law has been expounded, defended in certain respects,
and clarified or criticized in other respects. According
to the social rule theory, a group of persons has a legal
system if and only if (i) there exist in the group certain
secondary rules, including in particular secondary rules
of recognition, according to which other rules, by virtue
of possessing certain characteristics specified in the
rules of recognition, are regarded as rules that are
applicable to the members of the group and (ii) the rules
recognized under the secondary rules as applicable to the
members of the group are generally adhered to by those to
whom they apply. A rule exists in a given group only if
certain beliefs about the rule exist in that group; in
particular, a rule of conduct exists in a group only if
some members of the group either actually regard the form
of behavior called for by the rule as a standard in terms
of which the behavior of members of the group is appropri-
ately evaluated or, at a minimum, believe that the form of
behavior is regarded as such by other members of the group.
In the limiting case, no member of the group actually has
a volitionally internal point of view" toward treating
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the subject matter of the rule as a standard, although
some members of the group beli^ that that point of vrew
does exist in the group. For practical purposes, however
we can assume that if a social rule exists, some members
of the group actually accept it as establishing a stan-
dard. Thus, a secondary rule of recognition exists in a
group only if the criteria specified in the rule are
regarded by some members of the group as standards to be
used for the purpose of identifying rules that are appli-
cable to the group. m short, the existence of a secon-
dary rule of recognition in a group depends upon the
existence of favorable attitudes among its members towards
using the criteria specified in the rule as the basis for
Identifying valid rules that apply to the group.
Hart maintains that there can be a legal system even
If the only persons who accept secondary rules of recogni-
tion are "officials" and persons who are professionally
interested in the system of valid rules of the group. All
other members of the group need only obey the valid rules.
As we have seen in the discussion of Hart's criticisms of
the coercive orders theory, it is not necessary to suppose
that those who do not accept the rules of recognition that
are accepted by officials but who do comply with the re-
quirements of the rules that are valid under the rules of
recognition, are merely acting habitually
. Rather, they
may recognize the valid rules as well as the secondary
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rules as directives that are applicable to the group, even
though they do not regard those rules favorably. Hart's
principal criticisms of the coercive orders theory are
based on his claim that the theory must hypothesize a
habit of obedience, which he correctly shows to be an
inadequate basis for explaining certain aspects of a legal
system. Although we have disagreed with Hart's claim that
the coercive orders theory must rely on the concept of
habitual obedience, we have nevertheless rejected the
theory because it hypothesizes a unitary psychological
will for every law. This defect is remedied in Hart's
theory by virtue of the fact that favorable attitudes need
exist only with respect to secondary rules rather than for
every rule validated by the secondary rules.
In the last chapter it was argued that even those
persons who do accept the secondary rules of the legal
system need not believe that particular rules or the sys-
tem of rules in general are morally justified. According
to the theory it is possible that there is one individual
in the group, Rex, for example, who regards favorably the
rule that (i) any directive endorsed by Rex or by Rex's
lineal descendants and (ii) any directive implied by such
directives and (iii) any order issued pursuant to such
directives by a trier of fact appointed by Rex or his
lineal descendants is a valid rule or order applicable to
a particular group. The members of that group generally
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adhere to these rules an. orders, an. treat the™ as
.irec-
applicable to their behavior, although noneOf the™ regards favorably the authorizing rule or the
rules or orders authorized thereunder. Moreover. Rex ™aybe a contemplative despot who believes that such a system
rs morally bankrupt. Nevertheless, Rex enjoys making the
rules and has not translated his moral judgment about the
system's lack of merit into an abdication of rule-making
authority. According to the theory, this group of persons
has a legal system despite its narrow base of acceptance.
As we have seen, various critics of Hart's theory
have attempted to introduce substantive considerations of
various kinds into this starkly positivistic theory. For
example, some theories about the formal characteristics
of a legal system, such as the thesis that a legal system
rs a system of non-contradictory norms, imply substantive
constraints on the content of law, m this chapter we
will examine another approach to the issue of limitations
on the content of law that are implied by essential fea-
tures of a legal system. In particular, the thesis that
a legal system has an essential purpose or function and
tnat this purpose or function is realized only if the
content of law is limited in specified ways will be dis-
cussed. Hart makes a half-hearted effort at developing
a theory about the function of law in The Concept of Law .
T. M. Benditt, following Hart and developing a theory
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along Hartian lines, makes a more daring effort in Law as
RlLl
.
e and Princip l e
. Questions will be raised about the
adeguacy and moral significance of both Hart's "minimal-
natural law theory and Benditt's functional theory of law.
Before examining the details of the treatment of this
thesis by Hart and Benditt it should be noted that the
broad questions about whether there is a particular essen-
tial purpose that all legal systems have and whether such
a purpose implies substantive moral constraint on the
content of a legal system are distinct from the narrower
questions asked on the one hand by the lawyer about the
purpose of a particular legal norm and asked on the other
hand by the legal historian or sociologist about particu-
lar political and economic functions that different legal
systems serve or that a single legal system serves at
different times.
The lawyer may be concerned about the purpose of a
particular law for several different reasons. The juris-
prudential significance of the answer to the question
about the purpose of a law varies depending upon the
nature of the concern and on certain contingent features
of a legal system. For example, the question about the
purpose of a law or body of law may be broached largely
for heuristic reasons. Knowledge of the broad, generally-
acknowledged purposes of particular laws helps the lawyer
identify potentially applicable legal norms. Thus, know-
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ledge that the broad purposes of certain provisions of the
law Of corporations are to promote shareholder democracy
and informed investment decision-making might lead the
legal advisor of a corporation that proposes to engage
in some transaction to consider whether the transaction
Should be disclosed to the investment community or sub-
mitted to shareholder approval.
Although certain purposes may be generally acknow-
ledged to underlie a particular law, the fact that appli-
cation of that law in a particular case is inconsistent
with or not in furtherance of that purpose is not a reason
for not applying the law in that case unless the rules of
recognition so provide. if the fact that acknowledged
purposes are not furthered by a particular application of
the law were recognized as a ground for not applying the
law, then purposes would be not merely heuristic devices
for Identifying potential legal problems, but elements of
the secondary rules of recognition. Within a single legal
system the role of purposes may vary in different areas of
law. For example, it has been held by the United States
Supreme Court as a matter of federal law that the interest
an employee has in a compulsory pension plan is not a
security subject to the requirement of registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.^ In large part,
this holding is based on the fact that a primary purpose
of the registration requirement under the federal Secur-
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ities Act Of 1933 xs to ensure that information is dis-
closed to potential investors in an enterprise. This
purpose is not furthered in the case of compulsory pen-
sion plans because the employee obtains his interest in
the plan simply by virtue of deciding to work for the
employer who maintains the plan. m general, the char-
acteristics of the employer's pension plan are not sig-
nificant factors in the employee's decision to accept
employment. Thus, the employee's decision to accept em-
ployment is not an investment decision, so that disclosure
of information about the enterprise (i.e., the pension
plan), such as the investment portfolio and policies of
the pension plan, would not promote the purposes under-
lying the disclosure requirement. On the other hand, in
the area of taxation, statutes and rules frequently are
applied without regard to acknowleged underlying purposes.
For example, exemptions from taxes on retail sales are
generally provided with respect to sales of tangible per-
sonal property used or consumed in manufacturing or pro-
cessing tangible personal property for sale.^ The purpose
of such exemptions is to prevent a tax intended to be
imposed on ultimate consumers from being a "turnover tax"
that applies to each transfer of ownership of an item for
value or to each stage of a productive process prior to
sale to a consumer
. Notwithstanding general acceptance
of this purpose, courts in many jurisdictions construe
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such exemptions so narrowly as to defeat the purpose.
Thus, the supreme Court of Virginia held that sales of
feed to commercial breeders of laboratory animals are not
exempt because the process of breeding and raising animals
for sale is not manufacturing or processing material into
.terns for sale.^ whatever one's answer to the guestion of
Whether the terms "processing" and "manufacturing" encom-
pass breeding and raising animals, it seems clear that if
the purpose of the exemption figured in the rules of
recognition of the jurisdiction in this area of law, then
the exemption would apply.
The legal historian or sociologist, to a greater
extent than the lawyer, seeks to identify political or
economic purposes or functions served by particular legal
systems that explain the content of a legal system at a
particular time and modifications of the law from time to
time. For example, Roscoe Pound has proposed what is in
effect an explanatory account of the development of modern
Western legal systems based on certain functions of law.
In the first stage, which he calls ''the stage of primi-
tive law," "... law exists in order to keep the peace in
a given society; to keep the peace at all events and at
any price. The goal or purpose of the legal system is
to satisfy the desire for security. As an explanatory
hypothesis, such a function might account for those as-
pects of the law of crimes and the law of torts that are
concerned with limiting the use of violence and force
against persons
.
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in Pound's second stage, law is a means of preserving
a social and economic status quo. The function of a legal
system is to maintain "the general security mediately
through the security of social institutions."® Legal
rules in many areas of law may be understood as the prod-
uct of efforts to satisfy this function. For example,
in Anglo-American law, rules of property deal with the
rights and duties of individuals with respect to concrete
things and abstract objects such as ideas. Many of these
rules manifest "status" relationships such as landlord-
tenant, debtor-creditor, or trustee-beneficiary relation-
ships. Often these relationships may not be varied by
mutual agreement of the persons bearing the relationship
to one another, so that the individuals have statuses
defined by rigid, highly-articulated rules. A particular
status may both protect and constrain its occupants. By
limiting the power of others who have greater resources
and could extract concessions in unregulated interaction,
a status position protects its occupant; by preventing
the occupant from pursuing and realizing self-initiated
goals outside of the status, a status position constrains
its occupant.
In contrast to the second stage, the function of law
in Pound s third stage is to make possible "the maximum of
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individual free self-assertion.
^ Such a function might
be hypothesized to explain much of Anglo-American contract
law and commercial law. That is, if the function of the
legal system is to promote the ability of each individual
to maximize the satisfaction of his own wants consistent
with an equal ability of others to maximize the satisfac-
tion of their desires, then it may be expected that the
legal system will contain rules that facilitate freely
bargained-for transfers of rights to use resources and
obtain services. m theory, by enabling individuals to
enter into bargained-for, enforceable private agreements,
natural resources, manufactured goods, and labor will be
utilized by those persons who place the highest value on
such goods and services. m addition to rules providing
for the enforceability of such private arrangements,
there may be rules protecting the integrity of the bar-
gaining process, such as prohibitions of fraud and mis-
representation. However, in keeping with the function of
promoting self-assertion and satisfaction of individual
v/ants by facilitating bargained-for transfers, the protec-
tion against fraud may be limited in order not to increase
transaction costs. For example, the "holder in due
course" doctrine in commercial law has the effect of cut-
ting off certain defenses that the maker of a negotiable
instrument (such as a bank check) has against the payee.
Thus, if the maker draws a check to the order of a seller
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in payment for goods the characteristics of which the sell-
er has misrepresented, the buyer has a defense against
the seller's enforcing the buyer's obligations on the
check. But if the seller has endorsed the check to an
individual who gives value and takes the check in "good
faith" in ignorance of the maker's defense against the
seller, then he may become a holder in due course who can
enforce the maker's obligations. The effect of this rule
IS to facilitate commercial transactions by minimizing
transaction costs: the holder in due course, who has a
pure heart and an empty head, can transact business with-
out having to inquire into whether there was a fraudulent
transaction upstream from him with which he had no connec-
tion. The point of these examples is to illustrate how
various aspects of a legal system which may appear to
reflect incompatible underlying concerns, can be explained
by a particular function that a particular legal system
may serve. Thus, although cutting off the defenses of
the defrauded buyer appears to be inconsistent with pro-
moting the integrity of the bargaining process by pro-
hibiting fraudulent dealings, both rules serve the broader
purpose of facilitating commercial transactions in order
to enable people to achieve maximum self-realization.
In Pound's fourth stage, the function of law is still
conceived to be that of promoting the satisfaction of in-
dividual wants, but the approach is not that of facilitat-
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mg self-assertion and rndividual arrangments reached
through bargaining in the market-place, but that of in-
stituting regulatory structures that supplant the market-
place in order to alter the bargaining power of individ-
uals or to redistribute wealth by more direct intervention.
For example, a private contractual arrangement might be un-
enforceable not because it was not freely bargained- for
without fraud but because it is "unconscionable."^ The
relationship between employer and employee might be sub-
ject to regulations that prohibit an employer from
refusing to deal with an association of employees (a
union) even though there are potential employees with
whom the employer could deal on terms more suitable to
the employer.
The hypothesis that the function of law is to provide
for the satisfaction of wants per se rather than to provide
for maximum mutual self-assertion leads Pound to the fol-
lowing conception of a legal system:
[L]aw [is] a social institution to satis-
fy social wants— the claims and demands
and expectations involved in the exis-
tence of civilized society—by giving
effect to as much as we may with the
least sacrifice, so far as such wants
may be satisfied or such claims given
effect by an ordering of human conduct
through politically organized society.
Pound maintains a developmental theory according to which
L-he four stages of law that he identifies manifest:
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recognizing and
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tence--in short, a continually more ef-ficacious social engineering.il
This diachronic hypothesis is questionable in view of the
presence in a particular legal system at any given time
of some or all of the kinds of law associated with Pound's
four stages. That is. Pound's developmental hypothesis
IS empirically disproven by the fact that the Western
legal systems he is describing historically have contained
at all times some elements of tort and criminal law,
status relationships as embodied in property and family
law, contract law, and social welfare legislation.
.Admit-
tedly, certain of these kinds of law are more predominant
than others from time to time. However, there is no evi-
dence that there is a unidirectional, historically deter-
mined progression from the predominance of laws charac-
teristic of Pound's stage one to the predominance of laws
characteristic of Pound's stage four. Rather, there
appear to be shifts in emphasis from time to time which
reflect changes in the political ideologies that underlie
the functions which are furthered by these different
kinds of law. The social activist who prefers a minimal
state in which individuals are provided with structures
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for ordering their own affairs through enforceable bar-
gains struck among themselves or the Iranian religious
leaders who prefer a society with well-defined social
statuses may well strive for the "development" of society
beyond the welfare state envisioned by Pound's "more effi-
cacious social engineering.''
Regardless of whether Pound’s theory accounts for the
historical development of Western legal systems in general
or of Anglo-American legal systems in particular, and re-
gardless of whether the hypothesized functions of law pro-
vide a satisfactory explanation of particular kinds of
laws, the fundamental point for present purposes is that
the theory postulates functions to explain certain general
features of particular legal systems. The theory does not
maintain that a system of rules that fails to satisfy any
of these functions is not a legal system. Nor does the
theory suggest in some other way that having or being
capable of having one or more of the postulated functions
IS an essential characteristic of a legal system.
In contrast to Pound’s empirical theory about the
development of a particular legal system. Hart’s theory
of "the minimum content of Natural Law" postulates certain
contingent, but universal truths about human nature and
the circumstances of human life. From these truths Hart
draws conclusions about certain characteristics that every
legal system created by humans v/ill have as a consequence
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Of these truths of hu^an nature and the circumstances of
human life. As we will see, part of the puzzle of Hart's
theory is the difficulty of determining the logical status
of the argument and the implications of the conclusions
in regard to the content of a legal system.
Hart begins with the observation that it is a con-
tingent fact that in general human beings desire to sur-
vive. Consequently, survival is a goal and actions and
objects are appraised in part on the basis of whether they
promote or impede the realization of that goal. Hart ar-
gues that survival is presupposed as a goal in terms of
which normative systems are created, because
-our concern
IS with social arrangements for continued existence, not
with those of a suicide club.-^^ ^^i^hough Hart maintains
that it is a contingent matter that survival is a gener-
ally held goal and a contingent matter that there are
legal systems, it is less clear whether he maintains that
It IS a contingent matter that legal systems promote sur-
vival. That is, Hart may be arguing that it is contin-
gently true that survival is a generally held goal, but
that given this goal it follows in some way that the func-
tion of a legal system is to promote the realization of
that goal. This argument seems somewhat problematical
it seems to be logically possible for everyone to
have a particular goal but for no one to have regarded as
standards for the group types of behavior that tend to
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promote realization of that goal. For example, it is
conceivable that everyone wants to avoid nuclear war and
that no one has a desire the realization of which requires
that there exist nuclear weapons, and yet no one may
regard dismantling such weapons as a standard of behavior
for the group, even though it would promote realization of
the common goal. m short, it does not appear to be true
that the fact that a particular goal is universally held
implies that the system of social rules is thought to have
as a function promoting the realization of that goal, even
where social rules provide a suitable means of attaining
the goal
.
Criticism of the thesis that prevalence of a particu-
lar goal implies that law has or is thought to have the
function of furthering that goal may not be a criticism
of Hart since it is not clear that he holds that view.
However, it is clear that he assumes that it is the case
that law does have the function of promoting the realiza-
tion of what is, as a matter of contingent fact, a uni-
versally held goal, namely, survival. From this prem-
ise, Hart argues that a legal system has a certain mini-
mum necessary content by virtue of the fact that certain
contingent facts about human nature and the natural en
vironment imply the need for particular rules of conduct
in order to carry out the function of securing the goal
of survival.
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First, Hart points out that humans are physically
vulnerable to one anoth«=‘r-othe . That is, humans are capable
Of attacking and harming their fellows and of being harmed
by the attacks of others. Secondly, humans are roughly
equal in strength, agility, and intelligence, so that
domination of others is impossible without cooperation
among members of a group. Thirdly, humans have only a
limited capacity for acting altruistically. This combina
tion of facts-vulnerability, rough equality, and limited
altruism-in conjunction with the desire for survival
imply a need for constraints on the use of violence and
provide a basis for inferring that people generally will
agree to a system of mutual forbearance in order to
achieve their goal.
A fourth set of contingent facts provides a ground
for supposing that there necessarily will be rules govern-
ing the relationships of persons with respect to physical
resources. it is a contingent fact that human beings are
dependent upon physical resources for survival. Further-
more, it is a contingent fact that these physical resources
are not abundant and are generally reducible to usable
form only by the exertion of effort. Rules regulating
contractual relationships, property rights, and the trans-
fer of property rights from person to person are neces-
order to attain maximum mutual satisfaction of
the goal of survival in light of these facts.
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Finally, Hart attributes the prevalence of enforce-
ment procedures in legal systems to the fact that humans
exhibit limited willpower and understanding and so may
either fail to comprehend the advantages of cooperation
their fellows in accordance with a system of rules
or may fail to act in conformity with the acknowledged
advantages of conformity in order to pursue short-sighted
goals. In view of these human characteristics, the em-
ployment of sanctions contributes to the realization of
the goal of survival by guaranteeing that those who fail
to see or who ignore the advantages of compliance with
rules will not gain the upper hand. Hart argues that:
... except in very small closely-knit so-
^i^ties, submission to the system of
restraints would be folly if there
were^ no organization for the coercion
of those who would then try to obtain
the advantages of the system without
submitting to its obligations. 'Sanc-
tions' are therefore required not as the
normal motive for obedience, but as a
that those who would volun—
t^J^ily obey shall not be sacrificed to
those who would not. To obey without
this would be to risk going to the wall.Given this standing danger, what reasondemands is voluntary co-operation in a
coercive system. 13
Hart's observations about the physical and psycholog-
ical characteristics of human beings and the environmental
tances of human existence are uncontroversial
.
Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suppose both that most
people do desire to promote their own survival and that
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systems Of social rules generally are utilized to attain
that goal. However, the thrust of Hart's argument is
unclear because he does not seem merely to be asserting
that given certain contingent goals, and given the contin-
gent fact that the system of social rules is utilized to
promote realization of those goals, and given certain
contingent facts about human nature and the environment.
It follows that there will be certain kinds of rules--
e.g., rules limiting the use of violence and rules facili-
tating the making of contracts and providing for their
enforcement and not other rules.
We have questioned whether the fact that the goal of
survival is prevalent implies that there will be a system
of social rules designed to promote that goal and it was
suggested that it is unclear whether Hart endorses that
thesis. However, Hart does argue for what appears to be
a somewhat different thesis about the relationship between
the fact that there is a particular universal human goal
and the nature of a legal system. Specifically, Hart may
be arguing that because the goal of survival is so widely
held, there can be a legal system only if its rules gener-
ally tend to promote that goal, and that because the facts
about human life and the environment are such as they are,
a legal system can promote that goal only if it has such
and such a content. Thus, Hart argues that unless the sys-
tem of rules has a content that forwards "the minimum pur-
poses Of survival that men have in associating with each
Other," then
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oA; would have no rea-son for obeying voluntarily any rules-and without a minimum of co-opLation'given voluntarily by those who find thatIt IS in their interest to submit to andmaintain the rules, coercion of otherswho would not voluntarily conform wouldbe impossible . 14
This argument has significant implications in relation to
Hart’s social rule theory, according to which a group of
persons has a legal system just in case some members of
the group accept certain secondary rules for recognizing,
changing, and applying rules of conduct and most people
generally act in accordance with such rules of conduct.
The implication of the argument about the content of the
legal system is that one of the necessary conditions for
the existence of the system—namely, the requirement of
general compliance— is satisfied only if the system con-
tains rules of conduct that promote the goal of survival.
Thus, it is an essential characteristic of a legal system
that it furthers the goal of human survival
.
The argument about the function and content of a
legal system is not persuasive. At most. Hart has pre-
sented an argument that there cannot be a legal system the
rules of which are radically incompatible with the realiza-
tion of the goal of human survival. Such a system is im-
possible because, adopting Hart's argument, there would
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not be a sufficient base of voluntary compliance to enable
coerced compliance to be effective, with the net result
being that the generality of (coerced or voluntary) com-
pliance required in order to have a legal system would not
exist. Even^ argument about the function and content
of a legal system can be questioned in light of the his-
torical and contemporary precedents of societies which
arguably had legal systems that frustrated the fundamental
goals of large segments of the society and which contained
laws that were generally obeyed principally because of the
effective use of coercive power. Slave societies, especi-
ally those in which the enslaved population outnumbers the
free population, exemplify such a system. However, even
if the argument that there cannot be a legal system that
frustrates the basic goals of most of the members of soci-
ety, It does not follow that the legal system must have
laws that promote the goal of human survival. In short.
Hart's social rule theory does not require that the sys-
tem of rules have the function of promoting the realiza-
tion of any goal at all. Although the requirement that
the rules of the system be generally obeyed may imply
that the system cannot contain rules that completely frus-
trate a widely-held fundamental human goal, there is no
implication that the requirement of general compliance
precludes the existence of a legal system that is neutral
with respect to promoting such a goal.
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T. M. Benditt, unlike Hart, does not offer his theory
about the function of law as an afterthought. Rather, his
charcterization of the functions of law is an integral
part of a theory of law that is based on Hart's social
rule theory. Benditt argues that there is a particular
function or purpose that is essential to a legal system
and that furtherance of that purpose requires a legal
system to have certain properties possession of which
guarantees that the system has a minimum moral content.
As we will see, the theory appears to be vulnerable to
certain criticisms that are applicable generally to func-
tional characterizations and descriptions.
Benditt begins his argument with an account of func-
tional terms and concepts. According to Benditt, "a con-
cept is functional if, and only if, criteria for evalu-
ating the thing in question are part of the concept."
Further, "a thing has a function if, and only if, evalua-
tive criteria are part of the concept of that thing.
In other words, a thing has a function if and only if the
concept of that thing is a functional concept, and the
concept of the thing is a functional concept if and only
criteria for evaluating the thing in question are
part of the concept of the thing. Unfortunately, Benditt
has not explicated what it means for evaluative criteria
to be "part of" the concept of a thing. Furthermore, it
is unclear what the claim that a thing has a function
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implies about the properties of the thing. Although
characterization of a kind of thing in terms of a func-
tion implies that possession by an instance of that kind
of properties that facilitate realization of the function
constitutes that instance a "better" one of its kind, it
does not follow that lack of properties that contribute
to carrying out the function renders a thing not an in-
Stance of the kind.
It is noteworthy that although Benditt commendably
asks the basic question of whether the concept of law is
a functional concept, his argument that it is and that
law has the particular functions that he identifies is
perfunctory and unpersuasive. The argument appears to be
founded on Benditt 's assertion that "the law must, log-
ically, have some content or other; it must deal with
some matters or other. He then asserts that he can
identify "two possibilities
... for what something that
IS called a legal system could be dealing with"; namely,
the resolution or at least the regulation of conflict"
and "the expanding of possibilities for what people can
do or bring about." Benditt argues that the latter "pos-
sibility" itself merely creates "new areas of potential
conflict" and therefore concludes that "we are thus, left
. . . with the resolution or at least the regulation of con-
flict as something that the law must, logically, deal
with." ' Finally, Benditt asserts that "insofar as there
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or goal of a legal system, something that it
must aim at, and insofar as whatever can be pursued as
an end can be done in better or worse ways, we can con-
clude that the concept of a legal system is a functional
concept.
The validity and soundness of Benditt’s argument are
doubtful. First, he has concluded that a legal system
has an end or goal. However, the only basis for this con-
clusion appears to be the assertion that the law must have
some content or other. Evidently, Benditt's claim that
the law
-must^^ some matters or other- does not
simply restate the thesis that law must have some content
or other, but states that whatever content the law has is
dealt with as a goal. No support is given by Benditt for
the view that it follows from the fact that a system of
directives has a particular content that the system has a
goal or end related in some way to that content. A com-
parison to other attributions of functions based upon non-
functional descriptions of things suggests that this
inference is erroneous. For example, it does not follow
from the fact that the heart makes certain
-heart- sounds
that its function is to make heart sounds; nor does it
follow from the fact that the heart pumps blood through
the body that its function is to pump blood. If the latter
attribution of functions seems correct in some way that
termer does not, it seems to be because the heart is
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more frequently characterized in terms of the contribu-
tion its property of circulating the blood has in realiz-
ing or maintaining a particular state of the body than in
terms of the contribution its property of making certain
sounds has m realizing or maintaining any particular
state of affairs. Turning back to the question of whether
law has a function, it appears that a legal system may be
characterized in terms of the contribution certain fea-
tures of it make toward the realization or maintenance of
many states of affairs, including that of social harmony.
Relative to some such hypothesized goal or end-state, a
legal system can be characterized as having a particular
function by virtue of the contribution certain of its
properties make toward realizing that goal. However, the
mere fact that the laws that comprise a system must be
about something does not ^ imply that there is any
end-state such that it is the function of the legal sys-
tem to contribute to its realization by having laws about
whatever content is in question. In short, Benditt has
not given us an argument for, but has merely assumed that,
a legal system must have a goal and that by virtue of
having a goal the system must have a certain content that
promotes realization of the goal. This assumption states
the thesis but does not advance the effort to assess the
functional theory of law.
Benditt has not merely failed to adduce any argument
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- support Of the general thesis that a legal system has
a goal or end; he also has failed to Marshall any argu-
ments in support Of the thesis that the goal of a legal
system necessarily is that of resolving or regulating
conflict. It is true that Benditt has an argument for
the thesis, since he maintains that there are only two
Eossibilities of what the law can be "dealing with"—
namely, the resolution or regulation of conflict and the
expansion of possibilities of what can be done in a nor-
mative context. However, he does not argue for the prop-
osition that these are the only possibilities. This
thesis is not advanced by the observation that legal sys-
tems typically do have a content that regulates conflict
and facilitates transactions within a system of rules.
First, the fact that the content tends to promote realiza-
tion of a particular goal does not imply that the system
has any goal. Secondly, the question is not whether legal
systems actually have a certain content or even a certain
goal but whether legal systems must have a certain content
or goal.
In any event, Benditt 's argument that a legal system
must have certain properties possession of which guaran-
tees a certain minimum moral content is based on the
assumption that a legal system necessarily has the goal of
resolving or regulating conflict. The argument, roughly,
is as follows. In general, a goal or function can be
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furthered in better or worse ways. Thus, the goal of
regulating conflict can be furthered in better or worse
ways. Conflict is ^ regulated if it is done with less
friction and resistance on the part of the regulatees.
Friction and resistance to regulation are minimized only
If ... the addressees of the rules (or as many of them as
possible) can accept the rules-i.e., ta)ie an internal
point of view toward them.''^® Benditt concludes that the
function of a legal system is "... to regulate the conduct
of the individuals to whom the rules of the system apply
in such a way that most of the rules of the system, and
indeed the system itself, can be accepted by those indi-
viduals." This assertion is subsequently modified to
provide that the rules must be such that they rationally
can be accepted. Benditt postulates a "minimum sense" of
"rationality" according to which it is rational to do
something only if there is at least some reason for doing
it, even though there may be more compelling reasons
against doing it. Thus, if it is rational to accept a
rule, there must be some reason for accepting it, where
acceptance involves a willingness to recognize the mandate
of the rule even when it is contrary to one's overall
“iriterest
. Benditt argues that there are only three
reasons for accepting a legal system: a legal system
promotes justice; it promotes the good of people (oneself
or others); and it promotes personal or social ideals.
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These three reasons for accepting a system of law are
lumped together under the heading "promoting human good."
The final leg in the argument is the assertion that a
legal system that can be accepted by virtue of promoting
human good has a minimum moral content because the cri-
teria that are the basis for acceptance are moral cri-
teria. In short, Benditt's argument is that a legal sys-
tem necessarily has a certain minimum moral content
because a legal system has an essential goal or end the
realization of which is maximized only if the system can
be accepted rationally and a legal system can be accepted
rationally only if it promotes human good.
Let us return to the first stage of Benditt's argu-
ment to examine the intermediate conclusions he draws
from the hypothesis that a legal system is a system of
rules that has the goal or function of regulating conflict.
Benditt does not argue based on this hypothesis that there
is some specific content that a system of rules must in-
clude in order to be a legal system. Such an argument
appears to be difficult to make in any event without some
additional assumptions, since what will be subjects of
conflict and how such subjects might be regulated in any
particular society from time to time are contingent mat-
ters. For example, it is a contingent matter of fact that
people engage in industrial processes that generate unde-
sirable by-products and it is a contingent matter of fact
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that conflicts between persons who engage in such indus-
trial activity and persons who are adversely affected
thereby are regulated in one way rather than another
(e.g., by rules permitting the industrial user to engage
in the activity versus rules permitting the industrial
user to engage in the activity so long as he compensates
hose adversely affected versus rules permitting the af-
fected persons to enjoin the industrial activity).
Benditt's conclusion is not that there is some specific
content that a system of rules must include in order to be
a legal system, but that there are certain (moral) crite-
ria that a system of rules must satisfy in order to be a
legal system. He does not address the question whether
satisfaction of these moral criteria by a system of rules
entails inclusion in the system of certain specific rules
or types of rules or merely exclusion of certain rules
or types of rules.
The argument that Benditt does make on the basis of
the thesis that a legal system is a system of rules that
has the goal of regulating conflict is connected to his
characterization of functional concepts. Specifically,
Benditt maintains that since "whatever can be pursued as
an end can be done in better or worse ways" and since a
legal system has an end, then the concept of a legal sys-
stem includes evaluative criteria as "part of" the con-
cept. That is, to the extent that a particular kind of
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thing IS defined in ter.s of having some function or goal,
individual instances of that kind are appropriately eval-
uated in terms of that function or goal. That is, an
instance of the kind that has properties that tend to or
do result in the goal being more completely or consis-
tently realized is a "better" example of the kind than an
instance that lacks such properties or has properties that
tend to result in less complete or consistent realization
of the goal.
However, the key step for Benditt is the inference
from the thesis that (i) instances of a kind of thing that
is defined in terms of a function are appropriately ^-
ua^ in terms of how well they carry out the function to
the conclusion that (ii) something is an instance of that
kind of thing only if it has properties that result in
its doing a better (or the best possible) job of carrying
out the function. This step enables Benditt to move from
the hypothesis that a legal system has the function of
regulating conflict to the propostion that a legal system
has that function of ”... regulat[ing] the conduct of
individuals to whom the rules of the system apply in such
a way that most of the rules of the system, and indeed the
system itself, can be accepted by those individuals."^^
As we have already seen, the subsidiary premise in this
inference is the thesis that a system of rules achieves
the goal of regulating conflict well only if it is such
that the addressees of the rules
the rules.
rationally accept
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This key step in Benditt's argument appears to be a
misstep. Certainly, it is possible for an instance of a
kind of thing that is defined in part by reference to a
function to be completely incapable of realizing the func-
tion; to wit, a dysfunctional or malfunctioning instance
of the kind. Furthermore, it is obviously possible for an
instance of such a kind to be less able to carry out the
function. However, it does not follow m either case that
the individual in question therefore is not an instance of
the kind in question. Thus, there could be instances of
legal systems identified using the non-purposive social
rule theory analysis of the concept of a legal system that
are "defective" because they lack a property possession
of which is necessary in order for a system of rules to
bMt realize the goal of regulating conflict, whether that
property be the property of being capable of being ratio-
nally accepted by its regulatees or some other property.
Benditt anticipates the problem of "defective" in-
stances of things with a function, but his analysis does
not provide an adequate response to the objection that
there can be a legal system whose defect is that it is
not capable of realizing well the alleged goal of a legal
system. In discussing the notion of functional concepts,
Benditt considers the example of a wrench, which is a kind
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of thing defined in part by reference to the function of
turning nuts and bolts. He states:
made^of ^ wrench but istin foil is not a wrench, not
i^?hat^??^•°^^' this
^
IS not even minimally suit-ab^e for turning nuts and bolts. But we
say that anything that cannot be usedfor turning nuts and bolts is not afor a wrench that is damaged orhas a defect in it that prevents itsbeing used to turn nuts and bolts is
nevertheless a wrench. That is, we f-an-
not make it part of the definition of awrench that whatever is a wrench works.Thus we should say that a thing that has
a certain set of physical characteris-tics (those of a wrench), but is not
suitable for turning nuts and bolts and
would not be suitable for this even if
non-defective, is not a wrench. 23
This last statement is ambiguous, since it is not clear
what type of defect is being referred to. If Benditt
means that the defect of not being capable of turning nuts
and bolts, then anything at all can satisfy the functional
component of the definition of a functional kind of thing
since if the thing is non-defective (i.e., capable of
turning nuts and bolts), then it is suitable for turning
nuts and bolts. Thus, it would appear that Benditt is
referring to some other defect in virtue of which the
thing having the defect is not capable of turning nuts
and bolts. However, in that case it is not clear what
constitutes the defect of a tin foil wrench. Perhaps
Benditt 's point is made best by the initial statement in
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the quoted passage, namely, that something that is not
even "minimally suitable" for performing the function in
question is not an instance of the kind, where lack of
minimal suitability is a matter of the thing's being such
that in order to perform the function there would have to
be radical changes in its properties. For
order for a tin foil wrench to be a wrench,
example, in
tin foil
would have to be a rigid substance.
Given this understanding of Benditfs argument, it
IS difficult to see why he thinks that a system of rules
that lacks the property of being capable of being ratio-
nally accepted by its regulatees is not even minimally
suitable for purposes of regulating conflict. All that
Benditt has argued for is that a system of rules that has
that property is better able to realize the goal. A
stronger argument, which he has not made, is needed to
reach the conclusion that a system of rules must have the
property in order to be a legal system.
As a final point about Benditt 's argument, it may be
noted that there is some plausibility to the claim that a
system of rules that is completely incapable of being
rationally accepted by its regulatees could not be a legal
system. This claim is consistent with Hart's social rule
theory, according to which there must be general compli-
ance with the primary rules of the system. Presumably,
there would not be general compliance if the system could
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not be rationally accepted. However, the burden of the
argument now falls on what can be ratronally accepted.
If all that is required is that there be some reason to
abide by the rules, then a completely coercive system
that IS racking in the property of promoting human good
can be a legal system and Benditt has failed to establish
an essential link between law and
hand, Benditt might maintain that
morality. On the other
a legal system that
promotes human good is more stable and better able to
achieve the goal of regulating conflict than a completely
coercive system. However, it does not follow that a less
effective legal system is not still a legal system.
chapter V I I
SOCIAL RULES AND THE PROBLEM
POLITICAL OBLIGATION
OF
This study has been devoted to an examination of the
theory of law developed by H. L. A. Hart in The Concent
This theory, which we have called "the social
rule theory of law," undertakes to analyze the concept of
law and to provide an account of the conditions that must
obtain in order for a group of persons to have a legal
system. Our examination has led us to reject certain of
Hart's criticisms of the coercive orders theory of law
and to suggest certain inadequacies in his analysis of
social normativity. However, the key elements of Hart's
theory have been defended as providing a broadly correct
analysis of the phenomenon of law and in this regard a
number of arguments advanced by Hart's critics have been
rejected.
One conclusion that emerges consistently from the
arguments and positions that have been defended is that
law and legal systems are social artefacts that exist by
v^-irtue of certain attitudes and practices among the mem-
bers of a group. Although a legal system exists by virtue
of certain such social facts, what exists is not merely a
complex of behaviors or a set of predictions of the behav-
ior of particular members of the group (e.g., officials).
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Rather, what exists is a system of rules or norms. As a
system of rules or norms, a legal system contains direc-
tives that set forth the rights and obligations of those
persons to w.hom the system applies. These legal rights
and legal duties and the legal rules that establish them
have been analyzed ^ generis. Law has not been reduced
to expressions of the psychological will of a sovereign,
nor has legal normativity been shown to be parasitic on
moral considerations.
Hart devotes the first four chapters of The Concept
20;^ to a discussion and criticism of the coercive
orders theory of law, according to which laws are general
orders backed by threats given by one who is habitually
Obeyed but who habitually obeys no one. Several of Hart's
principal criticisms of this theory are based on his argu-
ment that the coercive orders theory cannot account for
laws that confer powers rather than impose duties and
that in order for the theory to account for phenomena
that would ordinarily be explained by reference to power-
conferring rules it is necessary under the theory to
appeal to other devices. Thus, Hart argues that the coer
Give orders theory must postulate a habit of obedience to
the sovereign in order to distinguish laws from the coer-
cive orders of an armed robber. Habitual obedience is
postulated since, if the theory cannot account for laws
that confer powers, the sovereign cannot be distinguished
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from the robber on the ground that the former is, but the
latter is not, authorize or emfiowered to issue orders.
Hart then shows that the concept of habitual obedience rs
inadequate to the role assigned it under the coercive
orders theory. For example. Hart shows that the notion
Of habitual obedience is inadequate to account for the con-
tinuity of law across different sovereigns.
we have questioned some of these arguments and con-
tended that the coercive orders theory is much more ca-
pable of dealing with power-conferring rules than Hart
seems to have recognized-for example, by treating nul-
lity as a sanction for non-compliance with the require-
ments of a power-conferring rule. As a result, certain
of the problems Hart raises about the coercive orders
theory can be avoided. Furthermore, we disputed Hart's
contention that the coercive orders theory must rely on
the concept of habitual obedience. Rather, since both
orders and rules are directives specifying standards of
conduct by which the behavior of the addressees of the
directive is evaluated for conformity or nonconformity,
there are significant similarities between order- following
and rule-following that Hart fails to take into account.
Exposing the errors and weaknesses in the arguments
Hart levels against what he regards as a leading theory
of law is a valuable enterprise in its own right. How-
ever, our goal has not been that of vindicating the coer-
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civa orders theory but of deepening our understanding of
Hart's theory. m furtherance of that goal, it has been
useful to explore the concept of habitual obedience for
the light it sheds on the notion of rule-following, while
at the same time rejecting Hart's contention that the
coercive orders theory of law must utilize that concept
in order to explain certain features of a
Nevertheless, as far as the coercive
legal system,
orders theory
itself is concerned, its crucial shortcoming appears to
be that It m.aintains that every law expresses the psychol-
ogical will of the present sovereign. m order to account
for a presently-effective law that was originally promul-
gated by a predecessor sovereign but which has not been
expressly reaffirmed by order of the current sovereign,
the theory must postulate the dubious notion of a tacit
order, according to which the present sovereign's failure
to rescind the prior order is itself a tacit order reaf-
firming that prior order. Similarly, the theory cannot
account for the apparent fact that many laws fail to
express any will at all. For example, laws enacted by a
sovereign lavraiaking body that lacks psychological attri-
butes, such as a congress, parliament, or other legis-
lative institution with multiple members, do not express
any actual psychological will.
Like the coercive orders theory. Hart's social rule
theory is a "will" theory, inasmuch as it maintains that
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the existence of a legal syste. in a group depends upon
at least some members of the group having certain voli-
tional states. However, the social rule theory is not
vulnerable to the criticisms brought againt the coercive
orders theory. The hey element in Hart-s theory is that
the only rules towards which at least some members of the
group must have favorable attitudes or about which at
least some members of the group must believe other menders
of the group have favorable attitudes, are secondary rules
.
We have seen that Hart’s own characterization of the dis-
tinction between primary and secondary rules is flawed.
Nevertheless, he correctly identifies three types of rules
(which we can conveniently label "secondary rules" as a
reminder that these rules are about rules) that are essen-
tial elements of a legal system. These types of secondary
rules are rules of recognition, which are rules that spec-
ify criteria for the identification of other rules appli-
cable to members of the group; rules of change, which are
rules that specify the procedures whereby the rules that
are applicable to members of the group can be changed;
and rules of adjudication, which are rules that specify
procedures for determining whether rules of the group have
been complied with in specific instances.
Under the social rule theory, the character of a legal
system as a social artefact is attributable to the thesis
that a group has a legal system only if there are instances
of secondary rules, and especially instances of rules of
recognition, that exist in the group as social rules
. A
social rule, roughly, is a rule that is accepted by mem-
bers of a particular group as appropriate for use as a
standard in the group, a social rule of recognition is
a rule that is accepted as appropriate for the purpose
of identifying other rules that apply to the members of
the group. A social rule of recognition may be as simpl,
in form as the rule that whatever the tablets Moses
brought down from Mt. Sinai say, is law, or as complex
as the rules for determining the applicable law in a
multi-jurisdictional system with legislative, judicial,
administrative. Constitutional, and customary law-making
sources
.
Given the concept of a social rule of recognition,
the concept of legal validity can be defined in terms of
having the properties specified by the social rule of
recognition as properties possession of which qualifies
the rule as appropriate for use in evaluating the behav-
ior of members of the group. Having a legal obligation
,
in turn, is a matter of having one's case come under the
scope of a valid rule. The social basis of the legal sys
tern of a particular group is accounted for by the fact
that the rule of recognition exists as a social rule of
that group. However, it is not necessary for the valid
rules under the social rule of recognition to express the
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will Of any member of the group. Furthermore, nothing
precludes the possibility that no members of the group
regard any of the valid rules favorably as such. For
example, the secondary rule that whatever the tablets say,
IS law, could exist as a social rule even though, as it
turns out, no one approves of what the tablets say. Admit-
tedly, this last possibility seems remote, since it would
seem unlikely that the rules validated under such circum-
stances would be generally obeyed. m that case, the rules
would not be effective, and thus the group would not have
a legal system with that particular constitutive rule
underlying it. This last point regarding the general ef-
fectiveness of the system of valid rules is reflected in
^ summary statement of the minimum necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal system;
namely, that a particular group has a legal system if and
only if there are certain rules of recognition, rules of
change, and rules of adjudication that are accepted by
officials as the appropriate rules for identifying, alter-
ing, and applying rules of the group, respectively, and
the rules of conduct that are valid under the ultimate
rules of recognition are generally obeyed by the members
of the group to whom they are applicable.
Hart never squarely addresses the task of character-
izing the phenomenon of acceptance of a rule. In general,
he appears to have relied on his distinctions between
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iStern^ and extern^ attitudes, statements, and points
Of view to fill in his theory of social normativity. How-
ever, his distinctions fail to reflect the diversity of
attitudes that people who recognize the applicability of
a rule to the behavior of a particular group may have
toward the rule. As in the case of his analysis of the
coercive orders theory, the inadequacy of Hart's distinc-
tions stems largely from his initial focus on habitual
behavior. The external point of view for Hart is the
antage poxnt of the individual who observes regularities
in behavior without taking cognizance of the fact that
the behavior is rule-governed, whereas the internal point
of view IS the vantage point of the person who recognizes
and accepts certain standards of behavior as appropriate
bases for evaluating the conduct of members of the group.
This characterization fails to distinguish (i) the individ-
ual who wants that standard of behavior to be realized
and appraises conduct in terms of whether it measures up
to the standard from (ii) the individual who recognizes
the standard as a guide but who is indifferent or hostile
to Its being realized. The latter individual is not tak-
ing the external point of view since he does not regard
conforming behavior as merely habitual; nor is he taking
the internal point of view, since he does not regard the
standard as an appropriate basis for evaluating conduct.
In response to this inadequacy in Hart's conception of
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ncrmativity, a distincton was developed between
volitionally internal point of view” of the individ-
ual who for some reason is committed to observing and
maintaining a particular line of behavior as a standard
and the "cognitively internal point of view” of the
individual who recognizes that a particular line of behav-
ior IS being used by the members of a group as a standard
but who is not volitionally committed to observing or
maintaining that standard. The cognitively internal point
Of view is characteristic of lawyers and other persons who
have a professional interest in identifying legal norms
and advising others of their rights and duties under those
norms. Despite their detached professional point of view,
such persons contribute to the realization of social nor-
mativity by particular normative propositions by reinforc-
ing the thesis that ^ose normative propositions and not
others are the norms that are applicable to this particu-
lar group.
As we have seen, the analysis of law in terms of the
concept of social normativity has not been favorably re-
ceived by all of Hart's commentators. In fact, much of the
critical response to The Concept of Law has consisted of
efforts to introduce moral considerations of one kind or
another into the analysis of law in order to link legal
obligation to moral requirements. The arguments of Dwor-
kin and Benditt that were examined exemplify such
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efforts. Dworkin attempts to show, in^
social rule theory of law cannot account for the obliga-
tions of a judge to apply extant law even in controversial
cases where, according to Dworkin, it is logically impos-
sible to have any soci^ rules. The only recourse avail-
able to the judge is to appeal to moral rules in a rela-
tively complicated manner that takes cognizance of cer-
tain conventional aspects of a legal system. We have con-
ested Dworkin s characterization of the phenomenology of
judicial decisions by maintaining that in some cases
judges in fact legislate new rules. Furthermore, we have
suggested that the social rule theory can account for the
adjudication of controversial cases by means of secondary
rules that provide for the recognition of legal rules that
are ''embedded" in noncontroversial legal rules.
Benditt, on the other hand, argues that Hart's theory
must be modified to provide that a system of rules is a
legal system only if it generally promotes human good.
This conclusion is derived from the premises that a legal
system has the essential function of regulating conflict
and that conflict can best be regulated by rules that
promote human good generally. We have questioned the
soundness of this argument in several respects. In par-
ticular, we noted that Benditt gives us very little rea-
son to think that a legal system must have any function
at all, let alone the specific function of regulating
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conflict. Furthermore, even if a legal system necessarily
has a function, it does not follow that a system of rules
that is incapable of realizing the function or is inca-
pable Of realizing it in the best possible way cannot be
a legal system.
The persistence with which Hart's critics, such as
Dworkin and Benditt, have attempted to show that legal
systems necessarily incorporate moral considerations in
some way or another manifests an underlying abiding con-
cern with the problem of political obligation. The ques
tion of political obligation, roughly, is whether there
IS a moral obligation to obey the laws of a particular
legal system. Some theories about the nature of law pro
vide a basis for answering the question of political
obligation by maintaining that in order for a rule to be
a valid law that establishes a legal obligation, certain
substantive moral criteria must be satisfied. Benditt’
s
theory about the essential function of a legal system
falls into this category, given the reasonable hypothesis
that there is a prima facie moral obligation to support
institutions that promote human good.
An investigation of the theories of political obliga-
tion is beyond the scope of this study. Many of the
leading theories have venerable histories with roots in
the Crito
. Recent works by Simmons,^ Woozley,^ Nozick,^
•
. 4 5Smith, and Raz, among others, which have given gener-
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ally Skeptical treatment to the leading theories, raise
numerous significant issues. However, in light of the
efforts of many of Hart's critics to establish that legal
obligation depends upon moral considerations in some way,
it seems appropriate to end this study by showing that the
social rule theory leaves the question of political obli-
gation open. For persons who are doubtful, as I am, that
there is a f^ obligation to obey the law as such,
this characteristic of the social rule theory of law is a
virtue
.
First, although it is not possible at this juncture
to undertake a detailed examination of theories of politi-
cal obligation, it is possible and useful to consider cer-
tain general features of a theory of political obligation.
The first task in characterizing a theory of political
obligation is that of identifying the proposition the
truth of which we seek to establish. Simmons states as
a "rough approximation" that a political obligation is
"a moral requirement to support and comply with the
political institutions of one's country of residence."®
The term "moral requirement” is used advisedly by Simmons
to encompass the possibility that the relevant moral rela-
tionship between an individual and political institutions
IS either an obligation or a dutv .'^ Obligations are moral
requirements generated by the performance of a voluntary
0
act. Promising to perform a particular action gives
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rise to an obligation to perform the action; voluntarily
accepting a particular job gives rise to an obligation to
perform the duties associated with that job; and so on.
Duties, in contrast, are either "positional" or "moral,
Positional duties are those that one has by virtue of
occupying a particular "position" or office, whereas
moral duties are those that one has simply by virtue of
being a human being. As examples of moral or natural
duties, Rawls cites the duty to help those in need or
jeopardy, the duty not to harm or injure others, the duty
not to cause unnecessary suffering, and the duty to sup-
port and further just institutions.^^ These duties are
owed oy all persons without regard to any voluntary act
and irrespective of the existence of any institutional
arrangements for carrying them out. In contrast to
moral duties, positional duties are requirements of a
particular position or office. Legal duties are
paradigmatic positional duties: these are requirements
that attach to a person merely by virtue of that person's
position in relation to a legal system. Simmons argues
that positional duties give rise to moral requirments only
if the person subject to those positional duties voluntar-
ily assumed that position. This thesis about positional
duties is controversial; Tony Honore, for example, has ar-
gued that there are positional duties that are not volun-
burily undertaken but do give rise to moral requirements.
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^nd that legal duties
duties
.
are among this class of positional
It is reasonable to assume that the principal "pol-
itical institution" to which our political obligations
refer are the legal systems that apply to us. Thus, the
theory of political obligation in large part seeks to
establish that there is a moral requirement to comply
with applicable legal norms. The goal is to show that
there is a general moral requirement to comply with legal
norms as such. it is not enough to show that particular
persons have a moral obligation to obey the law by virtue
of Idiosyncratic circumstances that are not generally
applicable to members of the group. Nor is it enough to
show that there are independent moral grounds to comply
with particular legal norms (e.g., because such norms are
Identical to particular natural duties). The goal is to
establish that there is a moral requirement to obey a
legal norm simply because it is a legal norm. Raz states
the objective as follows:
To look for an obligation to obey thelaw of a certain country is to look for
grounds which make it desirable, other
things being equal, that one should
always do as the law requires. These
9^ounds need not be the same for every-
one or for every occasion, but they
should be of sufficient generality so
that a few general sets of considera-
tions will apply to all on all occasions.
The search for an obligation to obey the
law of a certain country is an inquiry
into whether there is a set of true pre-
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misses which entail that everyone ^orevery citizen? every resident’) ouahtalwap to do as those laws require and
^rfrequir^fbv"?
"""" tLsfaSLns
prLis^lf ^ ^ non-redundant
There is one respect in which Raz
-
s
characterization
of the proposition sought to be demonstrated by a theory
of political obligation can be faulted. Although he ac-
knowledges uncertainty about the identity of the group
the members of which the theory seeks to show have an
obligation to obey the law, Raz nevertheless appears to
assume that a theory of political obligation must show
that all members of the groups to which a legal norm
applies have an obligation to obey if any member does.
However, despite the fact that we would not conclude that
there is an obligation to obey the law unless it is shown
that such an obligation is broadly applicable in a given
society. It does not seem necessary to discard a theory
that fails to capture within its net everyone who has a
legal obligation. Thus, a theory that establishes that
every citizen and resident--or generally everyone who has
legal obligations under the legal systems in question
—
has an obligation to obey the law, except isolated moun-
tain people in the Ozarks and street people in the Bronx,
appears to be an adequate theory of political obligation,
provided that there is a principled explanation of the
lack of political obligation on the part of those persons
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with legal obUgations who are not covered by the theory.
Thus, an adequate theory of political obligation must
cast a fairly wide net, even though it is not necessary to
show that every person who has legal obligations has a
moral obligation to obey the law. However, it does not
follow that every member of the group of persons whom the
theory seeks to show have an obligation to obey the law
must be shown to have such an obligation for the same rea-
son. Thus, some persons (e.g., naturalized adult citizens,
elected officials, civil servants) may have a moral obli-
gation to obey the law by virtue of having voluntarily
undertaken to do so in circumstances that have led others
to rely to their detriment on such undertakings. Others
may have such an obligation by virtue of duties of fair-
ness or gratitude, and so on. As long as each basis for
political obligation is not idiosyncratic and in the ag-
gregate the different bases cast a wide net, the objec-
tive of establishing an obligation to obey the law would
have been achieved. As the passage quoted above indicates,
Raz recognizes that an adequate theory of political obliga-
tion may postulate multiple grounds of obligation, some of
which may be applicable only to selected members of the
group of persons shown to have political obligations.^^
An important feature of the proposition to be estab-
lished by a theory of political obligation is that the
objective is to show that there is a moral obligation to
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obey the laws of a particular
of which one is a domiciliary
country
, such as the country
or a resident or in which
one is voluntarily present. Both Raz and Simmons recog
nize this point. Simmons uses it to criticize using
Rawls' natural duty to support and further just institu
tions as a basis for political obligations. Rawls states
that the duty to support and further just institutions has
two parts
:
[F]irst, we are to comply with and to doour share in just institutions when theyexist and apply to us; and second, we
are to assist in the establishment ofjust arrangements when they do not exist
at least when this can be done with little
cost to ourselves
.
The commitment to an obligation to obey the laws of a par-
ticular country is reflected in the requirement that we
comply with the just institutions that apply ^ us. How-
ever, Simmons persuasively argues that the statement that
a legal institution "applies to us" either means that we
are within its territorial or jurisdictional reach or that
we have performed some voluntary act whereby we have
agreed to be bound by it or have actively accepted its
benefits under circumstances that give rise to an obliga-
tion to obey. If we mean the former, then the fact that
a particular legal system applies to us has no moral sig-
finance and the natural duty to support just institu-
tions does not add up to an obligation to obey the laws
of one particular state rather than another equally just
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one simply because the laws of the former "apply to us.
If we take the latter interpretation, on the other hand,
then there may be an obligation to obey the law of a
particular state, but the obligation is limited in occur-
rence, since few people undertake such obligations. On
the other hand, the natural duty to support just institu-
tions is a duty everyone has without any voluntary under-
takings. However, this duty is not equivalent to, nor
aoes it entail, a duty to obey the laws of one's own
country in particular. The argument that one has a spe-
cial auty to support the laws of one's own country, pro-
vided they are just, simply because obedience to a system
of laws that one is close to tends to produce greater
beneficial effects than obedience to a system one is
rarely in contact with, is unavailing. if magnitude of
the effect is the determining criterion, then it is pos-
sible under certain circumstances that one will have an
obligation to obey the laws of another country rather than
one's own even while within the jurisdictional reach of
one's own country. Even if we might have such an obliga-
tion in fact, it is not what is referred to as a political
obligation.
It may be noted that Benditt's theory about the
essential functions of law fails as a theory of political
obligation because the obligation to support institutions
that promote hum.an good is not equivalent to and does not
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entail an obligation to obey the 1 piwo tuu nn laws of one's own coun-
try in particular, even if those laws are just. Neverthe-
less, Benditt's theory at least suggests a basis for
linking legal and political obligation. m contrast to
enditt s theory, the social rule theory does not even
suggest a basis for linking legal and political obligation.
The inadequacy of the social rule theory in suggesting an
answer to the question of political obligation can best
be seen by considering first the coercive orders theory,
which was discussed in Chapter II. The coercive orders
theory, which we have criticized as an account of legal
obligation, is also inadequate as a basis for inferring
a moral obligation to obey the law. The theory suggests
that It follows from the facts that (i) an individual, i,
commands an individual, 2, to perform some action. A,
under the threat of a sanction, s, and (ii) i has or is
believed by 2 to have the ability to apply s in case 2
fails to perform A, that (iii) j_ has an obligation to
perform A. However, this conclusion seems to fellow
only if we assume that j_ has an obligation to perform
actions stipulated by sanction-supported directives.
This principle is not one that is easy to support. But
as Baier has noted, without this principle the theory is
unable to generate moral obligations. First, if we have
an obligation to do some act. A, we necessarily have a
good reason to do A, but if we have (merely) been ordered
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by a coercive source to do A we have a good reason to do
A only If we want to avoid the sanction and believe that
non-compliance will result in the imposition of the sanc-
tion. secondly, if we have an obligation to do A, doing
A is ^ justified and not doing A is per se not justi -
but if we have merely been coercively ordered to do A,
doing A may only be excusable whereas not doing A may be
justified. The implausible principle that is needed to
overcome these shortcomings—viz
. ,
that we have an obliga-
tion to obey sanction-supported directives—highlights the
apparent root of the problem. Namely, genuine obligations
do not arise solely from the will of another: the mere
fact that an individual (e.g., the sovereign) wills that
some act be done by another gives rise to a moral obliga-
tion to perform that act only if there is a moral obliga-
tion to conform to the behavior willed by the sovereign as
a standard. This principle is obviously less plausible
than the principle that links legal obligation under
Benditt's theory to political obligation--viz
. ,
that there
IS an obligation to support institutions that promote
human good by obeying the rules of such institutions.
Like the coercive orders theory, the social rule
theory per se does not immediately suggest any plausible
principles that are capable of linking legal obligation,
as It is accounted for under the theory, to a moral obli-
gation to obey the law. Baier argues that as a theory of
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moral obligation, Hart's social rule theory is merely a
more sophisticated version of the coercive orders theory
and is vulnerable to similar criticisms, m particular,
Baier notes that according to Hart' theory, an individual
has an obligation to perform some act just in case there
IS a social rule requiring that act under that individ-
ual's circumstances. However, the individual has a moral
obligation by virtue of these facts only if there is a
moral obligation to comply with social rules that are
applicable to one's circumstances, which in turn depends
upon the characteristics of social rules as such. As we
have seen in previous chapters, the existence of a social
rule IS a matter of there being general compliance with a
pattern of behavior that at least some me.mbers of the
group accept as an appropriate standard of conduct. Baier
argues, in effect, that by grounding social rules on what
IS accepted as a standard by certain members of the group.
Hart has made social rules into expressions of the will
of those persons.
The problem of deriving a moral obligation to obey
social rules and rules validated pursuant to social rules
can best be understood by considering independently the
situation of those individuals who accept the social
rules and rules thereunder and those individuals who do
not, but whose conduct the rules purport to govern. In
the case of members of the group who accept the rules.
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there is a somewhat plausible basis for maintaining
they have a moral obligation to obey the rules. At
some of those persons who accept the rules will, in
that
least
so
doing, have voluntarily undertaken to act in conformity
with the standard of behavior in question. it seems
plausible to maintain that in some circumstances, for
example, where others have relied to their detriment on
one's undertaking to behave in a particular manner, there
is a moral obligation to act in conformity with the line
of conduct one has voluntarily undertaken to follow. The
principle adverted to here to derive a moral obligation
to obey the law is the principle that one has a prima
faca^ moral obligation to perform acts that one has volun-
tarily undertaken an obligation to perform. In one form
or another, this principle underlies theories of political
obligation that are based on social contracts, express or
tacit consent, and promising— in short, consent theories
of political obligation.
Setting aside any difficulties there may be in estab-
lishing that even those members of the group who have
voluntarily agreed to be bound by certain rules of the
group have a prima facie moral obligation to follow those
rules, the more difficult problem from the viewpoint of
the theory of political obligation is that of finding some
basis in Hart's social rule theory of law for attributing
a moral obligation to obey the law to those individuals
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who have not voluntarily undertaken to follow the rules.
Hart's theory appears to give rise to the dilemma with
respect to whether persons who do not accept the legal
rules that purport to apply to them have a moral obliga-
tion to obey such rules. if we suppose that these indi-
viduals ao not have any moral obligations in this regard,
then we appear to have an inadequate theory of political
obligation. Baier points out that the relevant moral
obligations are "categorical" in the sense that the asser-
tion that some individual has an obligation cannot be
refuted simply by showing that compliance would not fur-
ther any ends of that individual. However, the thesis
that non-acceptors do not have a moral obligation to obey
the law, whereas acceptors do, appears to be based on a
distinction between those for whom compliance furthers a
personal goal and those for whom it does not. On the
other hand, if we suppose that acceptance of the legal
rules of the group, in the sense of a voluntary under-
taking to comply with those rules, is a sufficent but
not a necessary foundation for political obligations,
and that non-acceptors have political obligations, then
it is difficult to see what characteristics of the social
situation that m.ust exist in order for there to be legal
obligations according to the social rule theory give rise
to a moral obligation on the part of non-acceptors to obey
the law. What appears to be required is the principle
223
that there is a erima facie moral obligation to obey rules
that are generally obeyed and that are accepted by at
least some members of the group as standards of conduct or
as standards for identifying standards of conduct). As a
moral principle, this thesis has as little plausibility as
the thesis that there is a prima facie moral obligation to
obey coercive orders as such.
In short, the social rule theory of law appears to
leave the question of political obligation open. Further-
more the social rule theory does not even appear to sug-
gest a plausible general principle that can link legal
obligation to political obligation, except to the extent
that the theory's requirement of some degree of accep-
tance of the rules establishing validity suggests a prin-
ciple of consent that might account for the moral obliga-
tion of certain members of the group to obey the law.
Whether these features of the social rule theory are
thought to be defects depends upon what questions one
expects the theory to answer. If, along with Baier, one
looks to the theory to answer questions about our moral
obligations, then these features are fatal flaws. How-
ever, if, as we have done in this study, one looks to the
social rule theory to provide an account of legal obli-
cation sui generis
,
then its failure to answer, or to
suggest the means to answer, the question of political
obligation is not a shortcoming of the theory. On the
224
contrary, to the extent that the question of political
Obligation appears problematical, the apparent neutral-
ity of the social rule theory with respect to the exis-
tence of an obligation to obey the law is a virtue.
Of course, the fact that the social rule theory of law
does not answer the question of political obligation does
not end the inquiry. That is, it is necessary to look be-
yond the existence of general compliance with rules that
are valid under rules of recognition that at least some
members of the group accept as appropriate for that pur-
pose. For example, in order to find a basis for politi-
cal obligation it may be necessary to look for the implied
consent of those individuals who have not expressly or
tacitly consented or it may be necessary to consider
whether obligations of fair play or gratitude imply
that there is a moral obligation to obey the law. How-
ever, these are matters that must be left for another
occasion.
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